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FOREWORD 
The study sllmmnrized in this report wns a pnrt of an analysis to 
determine the feasibility, desirability, and preferr~d approaches for disposal 
of st~lected hi!~h-level nlll~leur wa:;tes in space. Tll~~ Battelle Columbus 
Laboratories (nCL) study W'1:' un inte~ral pllrt of the Office of Nuclear \0/"5te 
1901"tion (l)NHl)-m~lnaged DOE/~ASA pro.~rnm for study of nuclear waste dispI)ual 
in spac~, Ilnd was :onductcd in pnrl\llt~l with efforts at Uattelle Pacific 
Northwl~st Laboratory; :3oein~ Aerospace Company; and Science Applications, Inc. 
(S,\! - under suhcontract to Ilattelle nnd reported here). The research effort 
rep0rted here WitS perf,lr:nl'li by Ullttelle Columhml Laboratories (with SAl bein~ 
n subcontractor) under NASA Contract NASS-34S12 from June 1991 throu~h 
February 1982. The study objective was to provide NASA and DOE with pre-
ltminnry spnce disposal risk estimates and estimates of risk uncertainty, such 
that potential totnl system risk benefits of space disposal of certain waste 
components could be evaluated. 
Tht~ information developed durin~ the study period is contained in 
this two-volume final report. The title of each VOll1l11C is listed below. 
Volume '[ 
Volume II 
F.Xt~CU t i ve 5umma ry 
Technical Report 
Inquiries rcgardinR this study should be addressed to: 
C. C. (Pete) Priest, COR 
NASA/Harsh,\ll Space nl~ht CentL~r 
Attention: I'S01 
Huntsville, Al"hnMn 35812 
Telephone: (205) 453-0413 
i 
Eric E. Rice, Project MsnsKer 
B<\ttelh~ Colllmhllu Lnboratories 
505 King Av~~nlle 
Col\lmbuu, Ohio 43201 
TelephoneJ (614) 424-5103 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This volume (Volume II) summarizes the results of the 1981-1982 
Battelle Columbus Laboratories preliminary assessment of the risk of nuclear 
waste disposal in space. The study objective was to provide NASA and 
DOE/Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation with preliminary space disposal risk 
estimates and estimates of space risk uncertainty, such that potential total 
(mined geologic repository risks included) system risk benefits of space 
disposal of certain nuclear waste components could be evaluated. To 
accomplish the objective of the study, the following work areas were defined: 
• Review Risk }bdels and Appropriate Data (Task 1) 
• Formulate a Risk Model Approach (Task 2) 
• Define Safety Requirements (Task 3) 
• Estimate Space Disposal Risks (Tasks 4 and 5) 
• Integrate Mined Geologic Repository (MGR) Risks with Space 
Disposal Risks to Determine Possible Risk Benefits (Task 6) 
• Define a Reference Space Disposal Concept (Task 7). 
The various sections of the final report are reviewed below. 
Section 2.0 provides an update/revision to previous system safety 
design guidelines that have been developed for space disposal over the years. 
The section first presents what is called. "general safety guidelines", a pre-
sentation of guidelines related to such things as: (1) radiation exposure and 
shielding, (2) containment, (3) accident environments, (4) criticality, (5) 
postaccident recovery, (6) monitoring systems, and (7) isolation. The 
discussion provides guidance in these areas on how to minimize exposure to 
humans and the environment to the radioactive waste materials during space 
disposal nissions. A discussion of how these "general" guidelines relate to 
the specific aspects of the current (February 1982) Reference Concept for 
space disposal is presented in Section 2.2. A definition of terms is 
presented at the end of the section. 
Section 3.0 provides a sunmary of the current space disposal concept. 
The overall Reference Concept is discussed in Section 3.1. Specific defini-
tions of space disposal system elements are given in Section 3.2. Accident 
and malfunction contingency plans for the Reference Concept are presented in 
Section 3.3. Section 3.4 assesses the projected quantities of hardware items 
and propellants required to carry out the Reference Traffic Hodel. Section 
3.5 provides a brief discussion of the alternative Tc-99 and 1-129 payloads. 
-
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Section 4.0 briefly discusses the overall risk model approach used iri 
this study. 
Section 5.0 provides a techitica1 discussion of how the space dis-
posal release risk estimates were made. Specific sections include the fol-
lowing topics: (1) space accident identification, (2) mission phase and fault 
tree development, (3) failure probability estimates, (4) payload response 
analysis, (5) consequence analysis, and (6) preliminary space disposal risk 
estimates. 
Terrestrial disposal risk estimates, as generated by Pacific North-
west Laboratory, under contract to DOE's Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation, 
are summarized in Section 6.0. 
Section 7.0 of this report integrates the "space risk estimates" of 
Section 5.0 and the "terrestrial risk estimates (PNL)" of Section 6.0. The 
results of the integration and discussion of benefits and disbenefits for 
various release risk scenarios are provided. 
Section 8.0 provides a summary of results of the study, Section 9.0 
states the study conclusions, and Section 10.0 presents the study 
recommendations. 
Appendix A contains all the references cited in the final report. 
Appendix B provides definitions of acronyms and abbreviations. Appendix C 
presents a handy metric/English unit conversion factors table. The space 
disposal fault trees for all nine mission phases are given in Appendix D. 
Appendices E and F give a brief discussion of Uprated Space Shuttle failures 
that can occur. Appendix G provides a sUI:lmary log of the failure probabil-
ities that match the fault trees given in Appendix D. Appendix H presents 
figures and plots ~elated to the waste payload ground impact response. 
:1 
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2.0 SYSTEM SAFETY DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR REFERENCE CONCEPT 
One of the most important factors in the ultimate decision-making 
process for the space disposal concept is public health safety. For space 
disposal to be an acceptable approach, it is likely that the total long-term 
health risk of a space disposal concept coupled with terrestrial disposal must 
be at a comparable or preferably at a much lower level than that of terres-
trial disposal of all the waste. TIle short-term health risk must be at an 
acceptable level. 
Over the years of studying space disposal, a "safety concept" has 
been developing. The various aspects of this safety concept are presented in 
this section. Work done on safety specifications for radioisotope thermal 
generators (U.S. DOE, 1977)*, was included in the development of safety 
guidelines for space disposal. As a result of the current study, the safety 
guidelines have been modified. 
This section defines system safety guidelines for the nuclear waste 
disposal in space missions and helps to assure that nuclear waste payloads and 
their associated handling may be considered acceptable and radiologically 
safe. These guidelines should be used for current studies and modified as new 
information and understandings evolve. 
The following subsections describe the general and specific system 
guidelines for nuclear waste disposal in space missions. The general system 
safety guidelines are based upon the assumption that the waste payload is 
carried into space by the uprated, liquid rocket boosted Space Shuttle vehicle 
and is processed at the launch site in a· facility named the Nuclear Payload 
Preparation Facility (NPPF). Definitions of terms are located ac the end of 
this section. References are shown in Appendix A. 
2.1 General Safety Guidelines 
Th~ g~~c~~l safety objectives for the nuclear waste disposal in space 
mission are: (1) to contain the solid radioactive waste materials, and (2) to 
limit the exposure of humans and the environment to the radioactive waste 
materials. For normal operations, complete containment and minimal radiolog-
ical exposure are required. For potential accident situations, the degrees of 
containnent and interaction shall result in an acceptable risk to humans and 
the environment and be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Many of the 
general safety guidelines have been selected using our best judgMent and do 
not have the benefit of detailed analysis. 
The general system safety guidelines for the nuclear waste disposal 
in space mission involve the following safety aspects: 
*See Appendix A for references. 
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(1) Radiation Exposure and Shielding 
(2) Containment 
(3) Accident Environments 
(4) Criticality 
(5) Postaccident Recovery 
(6) Honitoring Systems 
(7) Isolation. 
Lg t t_ 
The infomation given below defines the guidelines that should be 
followed for the development of any nuclear waste disposal in space ~ission, 
employing conventional space technology approaches such as the Space Shut:le. 
2.1.1 Radiation Exposure and Shielding 
Radiation exposure guidelines for normal operations for the public 
and ground crews are those contained in ERDA-HC-0524 (U.S. DOE, 1975) and 
shown in Table 2-1. Radiation exposure limits for astronaut crew mecbers 
during normal operations are those contained in the Space Shuttle Flight and 
Ground Specification, JSC 07700 (NASA/JSC, 1979) and sholo.'Tl in Table 2-2. 
The normal radiation exposure limits for the current terrestrial 
transportation of nuclear waste materials would also apply to ground transpor-
tation of nuclear waste payloads. The radiation limits [49 CFR 173.393(j) J 
are given as: 
• 1 m from a~ternal container surface ••• l000 mrem/hr (closed 
transport vehicle only) 
• External surface of transport vehicle ••• 200 mrem/hr (closed 
transport vehicle only) 
• 2 m from external surface of transport vehicle ••• l0 mrem/hr 
• Normally occupied position of transport vehicle ••• 2 mrem/hr. 
For accident condit ions of terrestrial transport, the postaccident 
dose rates are limited to 1000 mrem/hr at 1 m from the external surface of the 
waste package. 
A general guideline for the waste package shipped to space is that 
the radiation dose at 1 m from the flight shield surface is not greater than 
1000 mrem/hr. This value can be obtained by includ ing shielding con-
tributions from outer layers of the payload. In the absence of these layers, 
no mo re than 2000 mrt!1:1/hr at 1 m should be allowed. The shield should be 
carried all the way to the destination. 
2.1.2 Containment 
Containment must be defined for the various portions of the disposal 
mission. Five general mi.ssion phas .. .> include fabrication/a55embl>' of the 
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TABLE 2-1. NORMAL OPERATIOnS EXPOSURE LIMITS FOR INDIVIDUALS 
IN CONTROLLED AND UNCONTROLLED AREAS 
INDIVIDUALS IN CO~~ROLLED AREAS: 
TYpe of Exposure Exposure Period 
Whole body, head and trunk, Year 
gonads, lens of the eye(b), Calendar Quarter 
red bone marrow, active 
blood-forming organs. 
Unlimited areas of the skin Year 
(except hands and forearms). Calendar Quarter 
Other organs, tissues, and 
organ systens (except 
bone) • 
Bone. Year 
Calendar Quarter 
Forearlll8. (d) Year 
Calendar Quarter 
Rands(d) and feet. Year 
Calendar Quarter 
Dose Equivalent (Dose or 
Dose Commitment(a), rem) 
5(C) 
3 
15 
5 
30 
10 
30 
10 
75 
25 
INDIVIDUALS IN UNCONTROLLED AREAS: 
Annual Dose .Equivalent or Dose Como1tment (rem)(e) 
TYpe of 
Exposure 
Whole body, gonads, 
or bone marrow 
Other organs 
Based on Dose to Individuals 
at Points of 
MAximum Probable Exposure 
0.5 
1.5 
Based on an Average 
Dose to a Suitable 
Sample of Exposed 
Population 
0.17 
0.5 
(a) To meet the above dose commitment standards, operations must be conducted 
1n 8uch a manner that it would be unlikely that an individual would assim-
ilate in a critical or)<sn, by inhalation, ingestion, or absorption, a 
quantity of a radionuclid~(s) that would commit the individual to an organ 
dORe which exceeds the lio1ts specified in the above table. 
(b) A beta exposure below an average energy of 700 ~v will not penetrate the 
lens of the eye; therefore, the applicable limit for these energies would 
be that for the skin (15 r~/yr). 
(c) In special cases with the approval of the Director, Division of Opera-
tional Safety, a worker cay exceed 5 r~/yr provided his avera~e exposure 
per year since aRe 18 will not exce~d ~ r~/yr. 
(d) All reasonable eftorts shall be cade to keep exposures of foreOlnl9 and 
hands to the ~~neral liQit for the skin. 
(e) In keeping with ERDA policy on lowest practi~able exposure, exposures to 
the public shall be licite'! to as small a fraction of the respective 
annu31 dose limits as is practicable. 
Source: U.S. DOE, 197~. 
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TABLE 2-2. RADIATION EXPOSURE LllUTS FOR 
SPACE SHUTTLE FLIGHT CREWS(a) 
-~ -
Constraints, Bone Marrow, Skin, Eye, 
rem 5 cm 0.1 mm 3mm 
1-year average daily rate 0.2 0.6 0.3 
30-day maximum 25 75 37 
Quarterly maximum(b) 35 105 52 
Yearly maximum 75 225 112 
Career limit 400 1200 600 
Testes(c) 
0.1 
13 
18 
38 
200 
(a) These exposure limits and exposure rate constraints apply to all sources 
of radiation exposure. In making trade-offs between man-made and natural 
sources of radiation, adequate allowance must be made for the contingency 
of unexpected exposure. These data are from Space Shuttle Flight and 
Grou~\d Specification, JSC 07700, Volume X, Revision F, Chapter 7.4 (NASA! 
JSC, 1979). Estimated doses for Shuttle crew members, as based upon STS-1 
launch, are ~0.01 rem per day; worst normal case dose estimate for Shuttle 
crew members performing Reference disposal mission is expected to be less 
than 0.10 rem per mission. 
(b) May be allowed for two consecutive quarters followed by 6 months of 
restriction from further exposure to maintain yearly limit. 
(c) These dose and dose rate limits are applicable only where the possibility 
of oligospermia and temporary infertility are to be avoided. For most 
manned space flights, the allowable exposure accumulation to the the 
germinal epithelium (3 cm) will be the subject of a risk/gain decision for 
the particular program, mission, and individuals concerned. 
- - - _.. • - - ,...,., I I. IV!I R lJ R 
I. 
f 
I ) 
I 
i 
I , 
I 
~ 
r 
I 
" i.' 
i. 
J 
"'_ .~,.~~-\.- ['~ ~T-"'1"',~ '<;-",.< ........ ~l. .t~ ~ ~ -,', .,"'~ ~~~;..~:,: ~ (~-;t;'';·i::'''':~.· : 't =1:~ ,:. ;.-~~,'\ ....... ~'~-:~.;J: ~:(". /~,-l,;;{.t ,~ "~ - /1.., .... , :?~~ .. · ... :~~fl>:~ ... :, .. >'; .,.~ :"~i': "1"1''''. "-':-~~~~!~'"i ~t.": .' \" .~~~:~:;~~:);~~~ 
.-... h""",-,~.",~.~'''''.'''''..-_n.''''_", ____ ._ ....... :. __ •.. ~ .... __ ...... ".._ .............. _ .... _· __ .. ""'" ..... __ -... "r.r __ ""_ .... _ .. _.L..... . .... ~ .... --.... 
7 
waste fonn, terrestrial transport, launch site handling, launch to Earth 
orbit, and orbit transfer to destination. For all noroal operations, the 
systems should be designed so that no release of radioactive material occurs. 
For accident environments the system should be designed so that the risk to 
the public is acceptable. Current U.S. federal regulations cover little 
beyond transportation and general handling aspects. The discussion below 
outlines the general guidelines for containment of the high-level waste form 
during each phase of the space disposal mission. 
2.1.2.1 Containment/Philosophy 
The ideal goal for containment of high-level waste material is to 
(1) provide an absolute barrier between the waste and the environment, and 
(2) oinimize the radiation exposure to humans under all nonnal and accident 
conditions. Various governmental regulations have been developed and applied 
to current terrestrial transportation activities involving radioactive 
materials, including irradiat£i nuclear fuel. No regulation applies to the 
space transport of high-level waste. Consequently, the c0ntai\1r.lent guidelines 
-- developed here are based on considering e:<1sting regulations for other 
radioactive material handling, storage, and transport activities. The 
containment philosophy is applied first to meet carrent regulations and, 
second, to minimize human exposure to as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) 
where regulations do not exist. 
The acceptable amount of radioactive material that may be releas(>d 
should be a function of the mission phase, accident severity, and frequency of 
the loading condition, keepintT 1n mind ALARA criteria. Allowable reli!3ses 
from the pr10ary container are expected to range from zero, for normal condi-
tions, to minimal values (ALARA), for extremely s~e, low-probability 
accidents. 
Containment guidelines are presented in terms of three independent 
categories: (1) specific parameters indicative of the respons~ of various 
containment systems; (2) specific systems for containing the waste (waste 
form, container, etc.); and (3) various cission ph~ses during which specific 
levels of containment conditions are required. Table 2-3 lists the components 
of these categories. These three levels of containment categories can be used 
to define any aspect of containment. 
2.1.2.2 Parameters 
Contai.nment guidelines take the forn of specifiC Units for key 
parameters. For the space disposal mission, the significant par~eters can be 
grouped into three najor categories: (1) theroal, (2) !!lcchanical, and (3) 
chCl:lical. In thin each category, many specific paraneters can be included if 
the design is known; only the generic parameters are included in this discus-
sion. Once a conceptual design is known/postulated, specific technical data 
(temperatures, etc.) may be substituted to obtain specific working guidelines. 
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2.1.2.2.1 Thermal 
Thermal guidelines consider only limiting conditions ~mich, irrespec-
tive of critical parameters in other areas, serve as upper bounds to determine 
permissible designs and .responses., In. interrelations with other major param-
eters, a single parameter is considered as the limiting guideline and, through 
its dependence upon other parameters, in effect produces corresponding limits. 
Thus, parameters such as melting temperature will be independent limits, while 
yield strength will be a function of temperature. The limiting thermal condi-
tions for all forms of containment and mission phases should require that the 
containment barrier not be altered in physical or chemical phase during 
operations that are not remote from the human environment. For normal condi-
tions, 40 percent of the material melt absolute temperature is the guideline 
(material creep not expected to be significant below this). If the melt 
absoluta temperature is not kncwn, then 90 percent of the fabrication absolute 
temperature is the guideline. For accident conditions, the temperature limit 
is 90 percent of the melt absolute temperature. (See Table 2-4.) 
2.1.2.2.2 Hechan!cal St'rength 
For all normal mission phases, and containment barriers, the mechani-
cal strength must maintain stress and strain limits wi.thin 90 percent of the 
normal yield limits for given temperature conditions (standard 0.2 percent 
offset). For accident conditions, where stress/strain limits are provided, 
one should not exceed 90 percent of ultimate strength requirements at the 
temperature anticipated. Mechanical strength limits are ass~~ed to be 
dependent on temperature and loading conditions. In addition, it is assumed 
that all containment barriers must also have sufficient fracture toughness, 
fatigue endurance, and buckling stability to withstand normal and accident 
conditions. (See Table 2-5.) For accidents associated with reentry, total. 
mechanical integrity for all components is not feasible. Rather, a guideline 
to be usp.d would be to allow deformation but not allow major breach of 
containment. 
2.1.2.2.3 Chemical 
Containment materials shall be compatible with adjacent ~edia to the 
extent that no significant detrimental chemical reactions occur and the mate-
rial is nonpyrophoric in an air environment at sea-level (SL) ~ressure. For 
conditions not covered by existing U.S. federal regulations, guidelines are 
provided for the various containment barriers and mission phases. (See 
Table 2-6.) 
2.1.2.3 Containment Components 
Containment components constitute the barrier between the payload and 
tbe external environment. Depending on the cission phase, the containment 
barrier may be a single item (e.g., waste primary container) or multiple items 
(e.g., prir.lary container, radiation shield, ir.lpact absorber, etc.). 
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TABLE 2-3. SPECIFIC COMPONENTS OF COllTAIUMEtrr 
Parameters Components Mission Phases 
• Thermal • Waste Form • Fabrication/Assembly 
• Mechanical • Primary Container* • Terrestrial Transport 
• Chemical • Radiation Shield* • Launch Site Handling 
• Impact Absorber* • Launch to Earth Orbit 
• Ablation Shield • O~bit Transfer to Destination 
• Shipping Cask 
*Note: These may be combined. 
TABLE 2-4. THERMAL GUIDELINES FOR CONTAINMENT OF 
HIGH-LEVEL WASTE FOR SPACE DISPOSAL 
Mission Phase 
Fabrication! Terrestrial Launch Site Launch to 
Component Assembly Transport Handling Earth Orbit 
Ilas te Fon 40% Melt! 40% Melt! 40% Melt! 40% Melt! 
90% Melt.* 90% Melt 90% Melt 90% Melt 
Primary 40% Melt! 40% Meltl ' 40% ~.eltl 40% Meltl 
Container 90% Melt 90% Melt 90% Melt 90% Melt 
Flight Radia- 40% ~.eltl 40% Meltl 40% Meltl 40% Meltl 
tion Shield 90% Melt 90% Melt 90% Melt 90% Melt 
Impact Absorber 40% MellI 40% Meltl 
90% Melt 90% Melt 
Orbit 
Transfer to 
Destination 
40% Meltl 
90% Melt 
40% Meltl 
90% Melt 
40% Melt! 
90% Melt 
40% ~.eltl 
90% Melt 
Ablation Shield 40% Ablation/-- 40% Ablation/-- 40% Ablation/--
Shipping Cask DOT. NRC 
Reg. 
**Note: The nOr::lal absolute te::!peracure li!.lit is given first; t"e accident absolute 
te:lperature li:lI1t is give!l secor,':, If the melt absolute ce::!peracures are not 
appropriate for the caterial in 'luestion. then 90 percent of the fabrication 
absclute temperature should apply. 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS > •• 
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TABLE 2-5. MECHANICAL GUIDELIUES FOR CONTAINMENT OF 
HIGH-LEVEL WASTE FOR SPACE DISPOSAL 
Mission Phase 
Fabri .... tion/ Terrestrial Launch Site Launch to 
ComEonent Assemblz TransEort Handl1n6: Earth Orbit 
Waste Form 90% Yield/ 90% Yield/ 90% lield/ 90% Yield/ 
90% Ultimate* 90% Ultimate 90% Ultimate No Breach at 
95% Confidence 
Primary 90% Yield/ DOT, NRC 90% Y1eld/ 90% Yield/-
Container 90% Ultimate Res· 90% Ultimate 
Flight Rad1o- 90%. Yield/ 90% Yi.:ld/ 90% 'HeIdI 90% Yield/-
tion Shield 90% Ultimate 90% Ultimate 90: Ultimate 
Impact AbsClrber 90% Yield/- 90% Yield/-
Ablation Shield 90% Yield/- 90% Yield/-
Shipping Cask DOT, NRC 
Reg. 
Orbit 
Transfer to 
Destination 
90% Yield/ 
No Breach at 
95'; Confidence 
90: Yield/-
90% Yield/-
90% Yield/-
90: Yield/--
*Note: The normal mechanical limit is given first: the accident mechanical limit is given 
second. 
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TABLE 2-6. CHEMICAL GUIDELINES FOR CONTAINHENT OF 
HIGH-LEVEL WASTE FOR SPACE DISPOSAL 
Component 
Waste Form 
Primary 
Container 
• Flight R&dia-
tion Shield 
Impact Absorber 
Ablation Shield 
Shipping Cask 
Fabricationl 
Asset:1bly 
Container 
Compatible, 
Nonpyrophoric 
in Air at SL 
Similar to 
DOT, NRC 
Reg. 
Similar to 
DOT, NRC 
Reg. 
S1m1lar to 
OOT, NRC 
Reg. 
Tenestrial 
Transport 
Container 
Compatible, 
Nonpyrophoric 
in Air at SL 
DOT, NRC 
Reg. 
Similar to 
001', t.'RC 
Reg. 
Similar to 
DOT, NRC 
Reg. 
DOT, NRC 
Reg. 
Mission Phase 
Launch Site Launch to 
Handling Earth Orbit 
Container Container 
Compatible, Compatible, 
Nonpyrophoric NonpyroJ)horic 
in Air at SL 
Similar to 
DOT, NRC 
Reg. 
Sit:1ilar to 
DOT, NRC 
Reg. 
Similar to 
DOT, NRC 
Reg. 
Similar to 
DOT, NRC 
Reg. 
in Air at SL 
Similar to 
DOT, NRC 
Reg. 
Similar to 
DOT, NRC 
Reg. 
Si:rllar to 
DOT, NRC 
Reg. 
Similar to 
OOT, NRC 
Reg. 
OTblt 
"Transfer to 
Destination 
Container 
Coopatiblc, 
Nonpyrophoric 
in Air at SL 
Waste Fon 
Compatible 
Nonpyrophoric 
in Air at SL 
Container 
Compatible, 
Nonpyrophoric 
in Air at SL 
Shield 
Compatible 
Nonpyrophorlc 
in Air at SL 
Impact Absorber 
Compatible 
Nonpyrophoric 
in Air 
. .i 
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particular component may not be a part of containment in all 
If it is not a part of the containment barrier. then the 
for containment. as applied to a particular subsystem. do not 
2.1.2.3.1 Waste Form 
The principal containment barrier for the space disposal option is 
the primary container. A strong. nondispersible. waste form is required to 
minimize the possibility and quantity of nuclide release. To meet these 
requirements. the waste form will still have limits for thermal. mechanical. 
and chemical parameters. The nuclear waste mix and form will be designed to 
meet the criticality limit specified in later paragraphs. 
A meeting was held at Battelle Columbus Laboratories on July 19. 
1979. to e\'aluate waste forms for the space dispos3l of commercial and defense 
high-level waste (HLW). Participants included ONWI. NASA. BCL. and DOE-
Richland Operations (former NPO) personnel and was te form experts from 
Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Oak Riage National Laboratory. Idaho 
Chemical Processing Plant. and Sandia Laboratories. During that meeting. the 
following set of parameters (listed in order of priority) was determi~ed to be 
applicable and important to the selection of a space disposal waste form. 
High waste loading - This is an important parameter when con-
sidering the disposal of the large mass of commercial or defense 
~~. W. Waste forms having high waste loadings will require fewer 
launches. thus not only lowering operational costs but also yielding 
lower construction costs for dedicated launch facilities. Rating: 
primar.y importance. 
High thermal conductivity - Commercial HLW. especially in waste 
forms having high waste loadings. generates a significant quantity 
of heat. To prevent central regions from becoming excess ively hot, 
the waste form should possess a relatively high heat transfer 
coefficient. Similarly. upon unplanned reentry of a waste package, 
the waste form should be capable of rapidly conducting heat away 
from the container surface. Low heat wnste payloads imply that this 
is not an important consideration. Rating: primary importance. 
Toughness An aspect of dispersion resistance is material 
toughness. Th~ waste form should be shatter- and abrasion-resistant 
upon impact, and should deform to absorb impact. Retri,~val of the 
wast'! form as a single piece rather than rnany fragmented parts is 
desirable. Powdered forms are not desirable; liquid forms are 
unacceptable. Rating: primary importance. 
Thermochemical stability -In launch pad or reentry accidents, the 
waste form should remain chemically stable. It should not degrade, 
decompose, or otherwise be altered in its chemical forn in such a 
way that a significant release of radionucl ides occurs during such 
postulated accidents. Rating: primary importance. 
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Resistance to thermal shock - The waste form should be resistant to 
shattering which may be caused by thermal shock. This property will 
help' in achieving low' dispersibllity of the waste form. Rating: 
secondary importance. 
Resistance to leaching - A low leach rate may be important if the 
waste form package impacts into water after an unplanned reentry. 
While leach rate may be important, it is not as important as in 
terrestrial disposal where radionuclide transport by ground water is 
considered the most probable mechanism for loss of isolation. 
Rating: secondary importance. 
Resistance to oxidation - Another aspect of dispersion resis-
tance is waste form resistance to oxidation. If an unplanned reentry 
of the damaged waste package occurs, the surface of the waste form 
should not rapidly oxidize and break away from the main body of the 
waste package. Rating: secondary importance. 
Economics and resource utilization - Waste form materials and 
fabrication processes should not be prohibitively expensive. Also, 
waste form materials should not severely deplete valuable raw 
materials. Since the cost of a booster launch is expected to be the 
major part of the total cost, waste form material and process costs 
will not be overly important. Rating: secondary importance. 
For the waste form, the maximum temperature limit for normal condi-
tions is 90 percent of the fabrication or creep absolute temperature; for 
accident conditions the limit· is 90 percent of the melting absolute 
temperature. Mechanical limits, when applicable for containment, are yield 
(normal) and ultimate strengths or low dispersion (accident). Chemical limits 
requi re that the waste form be compatible wi th container materials, exhibit 
low reactivity, and be nonpyrophoric. It is also required that a subcritical 
condition be maintained at all times (see discussion on criticality in Section 
2.1.4). 
2.1.2.3.2 Primary Container/Core 
The prL~ary container, designed to enclose the waste form throughout 
all mission phases beyond waste form fabrication, 1~ also the primary contain-
ment boundary. The thermal limit for normal conditions is 40 percent of the 
melt absolute temperature. For accident conditions. 90 percent of the melt 
absolute temperature is the l,uideline. Hechanical limits are yield (normal) 
and ultimate strengths or low disperSion (accident). Che!:1ical li:nits are 
covered by existing federal regulations (U.S. NRC, 1978). 
2.1.2.3.3 Radiation Shield 
The raalation shield for flight should be designed to function during 
all mission phases through transfer to the final destination. The radiation 
./ , 
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shield should be supplemented with auxiliary shieldinr, materials, as needed 
during various mission phases, such that radiation exposure limits lire not 
reached. For mechanical strength, 90 percent of the yield (nomal) and 90 
percent of the ultimate (accident) stress limits apply (ultimate does not 
apply for launch and orbit transfer operations). Thermal limits are 40 
percent of the melt absolute temperature (normal conditions) and 90 percent of 
the melt absolute temperature (accident conditions). Chemical requirements 
will be sim~lar to those in e~isting federal regulations (U.S. NRC, 1978). 
Radiation shielding limits for the payload package (l000 mrem/hr at 
1 m) have been assumed for conditions not covered by existing regulations. 
Conservative limits (such as those for transportation) have not been selected 
due to the sensitivity of the overall system design (payload/shield mass 
ratio) to the dose limits. Rather, the guideline limits chosen reflect the 
fact that the waste payload package will be isolated from the general public 
throughout all but a small fraction of its lifetime. 
2.1.2.3.4 Impact Abnorber and Ablation Shi~ld 
The impact absorber and ahlation shield have similar containment 
limits. For thermal guidelines, 40 percent of the melt (normal) and 90 
percent of the melt (accident) absolute tCl'!1peratures apply to the impact 
absorber; 40 percent of the cinimum ablation temperature (absolute) applies as 
the upper limit for the ablation shield under normal conditions. For 
mechanical strength, yield (normal) limits exist. The absorber and ablation 
shield will be chemically nonreactive wi th other containment hyers (similar 
to other DOT/NRC regulations). They will be nonpYl'ophoric. TIle impact 
absorber is designed to absorb mechanical energy during accidents. The yield 
strength of the absorber material is expected to be exceeded. Therefore, the 
ablation shield, which is designed to reduce heating effects during possible 
reentry phases, is not expected to survive ground or water impact. 
2.1.2.3.5 Shipping Cask 
During ground-based Earth transport, the lagh-level waste package 
will be enclosed within a shipping cask. Current U.S. federal regulations [10 
CFR 71 (U.S. NRC, 1978),49 CFR 173 (U.S. DOT, 1979) and the 1973 IAEA Safety 
S~ries Number 6) define the requirements for this cor.tponent, which 1s expected 
to be similar to conventional shipping cask designs. 
2.1.2.4 Mission Phases 
As described previously, the containr.tent lSuidel1nes are also .. func-
tion of mission phases, and, r.tore specifically, the conditions within each 
phllse. The definition of r:lission phase, as used for contuinr.tent guidelines, 
is ch rono logi cal. 
-: 
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2.1.2.4.1 F~brication/Assemblv 
This phase begins wi th the insertion of the waste form into the 
primary container. and ends with the beginning of transport of the f11ght-
shielded primary container out of the fabrication facility. During this 
phase. auxiliary coolin~~ and additional shielding may be required. The 
primary container is the principal containment barrier during this phase. 
2.1.2.4.2 Terrestrial Transport 
This phase begins at the time of loading of the waste container and 
shield into the shipping cask and ends with the unlonding at the launch site. 
Throughout this phase. active auxiliary cooling may be required to maintain 
thermal limits. At both ends of the phase. additional shidding may be 
requi red. The requi remen ts are defined fa r irradi.l ted nuclear materials in 
existing U.S. regulations. They are expected to be similar to regulations 
governing transport of processed waste. "'hile in the shipping cask. the cask 
,- vl~ssel will be the principal containment barrier during transport. 
2.1.2.4.3 Launch Site Handling 
This phase. similar to the initial one. begins with the arrival of 
the shipping cask at the l.lunch site and ends with the completion of transfer 
into the launch system. AlIxilia .. "y coolinl~. and additi"nal shielding. may be 
required during this phase depending on the waste form characteristics. The 
principal containment barrier remains the primary container. 
2.1.2.4.4 Launch to Earth Orbit 
This phase begins wi th the loading of the wa~te payload into the 
launch sy~te11l. and ends after Earth orbit has been achieved. Auxiliary 
cooling r.tay be required for most of this phase depending on the waste form 
characteristics. Containment will rely principally on the pri~ary container. 
Accident conditions that might occur during thts plw~e are <llll0ng the most 
seVere. The t;uidelines during this phase allow for (1) no meltil\I~. and (2) no 
significant failure of the waste container. 
2.1.2.4.5 Orbit Transfer to Destination 
This mis3ion phast' COmmence~ with the removal of the wa~te payload 
from the launch systel"l upon arrival at Earth orblt. Ilnd concludl~s wi th the 
payload arriv.1l Ht the final destination. N" active 1l1lxilLlry cooling \1ill be 
required during this phase. Cont3inment guidelines f;>r this phase (and the 
lon~ term) .1re expected to be less restrictive than those for nc,lr-term phase~ 
involving )~rt'ater chances of public eXTh)SUre. The radiation shield. primary 
container. and W;lste form provide the princip'11 containment h'1rrier for the 
wn~te. 
I 
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2.1.3 Accident Environments 
The accident environments tha.t need to be considered in the design of 
containment and other auxiliary systems'are as follows: 
• Shipping accidents 
• Ground handling accidents 
• On-pad or ncar-pad booster vehicle failures 
• Reentry accidents. 
2.1.3.1 Shipping Accident Environments 
DOT and NRC regulations, as defined in 49 CFR 170 to 179 (U.S. DOT, 
1979) and 10 CFR 71 (U.S. NRC 1978), will be assumed for the ground shipment 
of nuclear waste payloads from the waste payload fabrication facility to the 
launch site. Sequential test environments for shipping cask accidents are 
given below. Initial conditions arc assumed the same as for the normal 
,,--, condition. 
• A 9-m drop in worst orientatio'n onto an unyielding surface 
• A I-m drop in the worst orientation onto the end of 
IS-cm-diameter, 20-cm-high bar (mild steel) 
• A 30-min ground fire at 800 C followed by 3 hours of no artificial 
cooling, with a cask emissivity of 0.9 and cask absorptivity of 
0.8 
• An 8-hour immersion in 0.9 m of water. 
At the end of this test, the shipment will meet the conditions speci-
fied in 10 CFR 71.36, including: 
(1) An external radiation dose rate not exceeding 1000 mrem/hr at 1 
m froM the external surface of the waste package 
(2) No release of radioactive material from the package, except for 
gases and contaminated coolant containing total radioactivity 
exceeding neither: 
(a) 0.1 percent of the total radioactivity of the package 
contents; nor 
(b) 0.01 Ci of Group I radionuclides 
O.S Ci of Group It radionuclides 
10 Ci of Group III radionuclides 
10 Ci of Group IV radionuc1ides, and 
1000 Ci of inert gases irrespective of transport group. 
/ 
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2.1.3.2 Ground Handling Environments 
The payload systems, auxiliary support equipment, and facilities must 
be designed to minimize the occupational radiation exposure to workers (see 
Table 2-1). Care must also be taken to ensure that if certain subsystem fail-
ures occur during ground handling, radiation exposure and contaoination are 
kept to as low as reasonably achie~able. The waste payload preparation facil-
ity at the launch site should be d~signed as a total containment facility. 
2.1.3.3 On- or Near-Pad or Ascent Booster Accident Environments 
The payload package must be designed to survive the predicted 
accident environments for a given time in the fUght for a given vehicle (see 
Rice et aI, 1980a) in e:'Cpected sequence without a major breach of primary 
containoent. Initial conditions are assuoed to be the normal condition. An 
example of predicted environments is given below for the on- or near-pad for 
liquid boos ted Space Shut tle (from Rice et al, 1980a). This example would 
gene rally provide the wars t-case acciden t po tential, assuming proper 
consideration of ground impact. 
• A blast side-on overpressure of 250 N/cm2 , a reflected over-
pressure of 1700 N/ cm2 , and side-on and reflected impulses of 
2.0 and 15.0 N·s/cm2 , respectively, in worst orientation based 
upon a 10 percent explosive yield of the External Tank (ET) 
propellants. 
• A potential edge-on penetration of 1 impacting fragme.:t per m2, 
assumed to be a disc 100 cm in diameter and 0.56 c!n thick, having 
a mass of 12 kg, and moving at 500 m/s (assuming the worst 
orientation). 
• A heat flux of 3500 kW/m2 for 15 seconds from a liquid propel-
lant fireball. 
• A 60-oin ground fire at 1100 C followed by 2 hours of no artifi-
cial coo ling. 
• An impact in the worst orient~tion onto an unyielding surface at 
10 percent higher than the predicted impact velocity; or an impact 
onto land such that the payload is buried t in low conductivity 
soil (k .. 0.35 W/m2 ·C) t but does not reach 90 percent of the 
~elt ahsolut.~ temperature. 
• An inpact 1n the worst orientation into 2S C water at a velocity 
10 percent higher than the predicted icpact velocity, followed by 
a descent into the ocean to a depth correspondlng to a hydrostatic 
pressure of 12,000 N/cm2• 
~ 
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ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
• An impact while restrained in the flight support system mounted in 
the Orbiter cargo bay at any of the combinations of velocity and 
direction as shown in Figure 2-1, followed by a TBO crushing load 
imposed by the Orbiter structure (see Reinert et aI, 1981). 
/ 
ENVELOPE OF POSSIBLE 
CRASH cOt/om ON VELOCITY 
VECTORS 
--t--~~~r'o"':';F;;"'--==4-:~+---- (DIRECTION OF X FORWARD FLIGHT) 
X. Y. Z ARE IN ORBITER 
COORDINATE SYSTEI1 
FIGURE 2-1. RECOMMENDED DESIGN CRITERIA FOR SHUTTLE CRASH IMPACT ANGLE 
2.1.3.4 Reentry Accidents 
The payload package shipped to its space destination must be able to 
withstand inadvertent reentry into the Earth's atmosphere and impact onto the 
Earth's surface without the dispersion of significant qU3ntities of radioac-
tive material. The reentry environments that must be considered for the space 
disposal mis~ion are defined as follows: 
• .... decaying reentry trajectory (shallow angle Skylab type) to 
provide maximum heating energy possible. 
• A reentry trajectory (steep angle) which provides the maximum 
heating flux possihle. 
• An impact in the worst orientation onto an unyielding surface 
(western granite) at a velocity 10 percent higher than the 
prE!dicted impact velocity, or an impact onto land such that the 
reentering waste payload is buried in low conductivity soil (k ~ 
0.35 W/m2·C), but the waste form does not reach 90 percent of 
the melt absolute terJperature. 
_____ a, eo _ r-,.... "fUlCI't~ 
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• An impact in the worst orientation into 25 C water at a velocity 
10 percent higher than the predicted impact velocity, followed 
by a descent into the ocean to a depth corresponding to a hydro-
static pressure of 12,000 N/c~2. 
The response of the payload package to the reentry environments 
mentioned above should be calculated after the possible reentry conditions 
have been detercined by analysis for a specific disposal mission type. 
2.1.4 Criticality 
The radioactive waste payload package cust be subcritical (calculated 
K-effective +Jcr <0.95) for normal operations or any possible credible acci-
dent during prvcessing, fabrication, handling, storage, or transport to the 
space destination. Calculations should show that any credible change in waste 
form geometry and any credible grouping of packages will not cause K-effectiv~ 
+3cr to exceed 0.95. 
~, 2.1.5 Postaccident Recovery 
Postaccident recovery teams should be made part of the operational 
disposal system. They should be responsible for all accident recovery opera-
tions, including accidents involving processing, payload fabrication and 
railroad shipment, payload preparation at the launch site, the launch, and 
possible reentry. Special recovery equipment should be developed and provided 
for possible usc in postaccident recovery activities. Every credible even-
tuality should be considered in developing recovery plans. Every effort 
should be !!lade to, recover as much waste material as possible. 
2.1.6 Monitoring Syst~:! 
Monitoring systems should be developed for the overall system such 
that overall mission safety can be assured. Examples of such systecs include: 
devices for measuring radiation; temperatare and pressure in the waste payload 
package; instruments to provide data for tracking the payload during its 
transit to its dE'sired destination; and permanent labeling specifying the 
product, contents, history, and radiation projection of the waste contents. 
2.1.7 Isolation 
The nocinal space destination should ensure, at a minimum, an 
expected isolation ti::Je from the Earth's biosphere in excess of one !!lillion 
years, and should not adversely interfere with norm,ll space operations 
projected to be carried out by futur.e generations. C.treless contanination of 
celestial bodies should be avoided. 
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2.2 Specific Safety Guidelines 
I . 
~' 
The following paragraphs define specific safety design guidelines 
established (based upon the general guidelines) for the Reference Concept for 
space disposal of nuclear waste (as defined in Section 3.0). Safety aspects 
not stated here are inferred from the general safety guidelines. As the 
Reference Concept changes, these guidelines may also change. The safety 
guidelines are discussed in terms of Reference Concept elements. 
2.2.1 Waste Form 
For normal conditions, a cermet temperature of 1050 C (90 percent of 
fabrication absolute temperature) shall not be eKceeded. For accident condi-
tions, a cermet temperature of 1050 C (90 percent of melt absolute tempera-
ture) shall not be exceeded. Criticality requirements shall also be met. 
2.2.2 Waste Processing and Payload Fabrication Facilities 
The design and operation of these facilities will follo\-1 current 
proposed regulations, as specified for reprocessing plants. 
2.2.3 Shipping Casks and Ground Transport Vehicles 
Shipping casks and ground transport vehicles will comply with DOT and 
NRC regulations. The maKimum outside diameter of the shipping cask will be 
3.05 m (10 ft). When required for heat rejection, a redundant cooling system 
for the shipping cask will be required. 
2.2.4 Payload Primary Container/Core 
For normal conditions, the outer surface of the primary 316 stainless 
steel container/core shall not exceed a temperature of 416 C (40 percent of 
melt absolute temperature). No chemical nor phYSical interaction will occur 
between the cermet waste form and the container. For accident conditions, the 
primary container must not exceed a temperature of 1280 C (90 percent of melt 
absolute temperature). 
2.2.5 Radiation Shield 
The radiation shield, including outer layer shielding contributions 
for flibht systems, will be designed to limit radiation to no more than 1000 
mrem/hr at 1 m from the package surface under normal conditions. The 
Inconel-625 shield itself, \,-TIp.n stripped of all outer "nonshielding" layers of 
the payload package, will not exceed 2000 mrem/hr at 1 IU from the shield. 
Auxiliary shielding will be designed such that radiation exposure limits (see 
Tables 2-1 and 2-2) for ground personnel and flight crews are not exceeded 
during handling or flight operations. 
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For normal conditions, the temperature limit for the flight radiation 
shield is 363 C (40 percent of melt absolute temperature). For accident con-
ditions, the stainless steel radiation shield must not exceed the temperature 
of 1157 C (90 percent of melt absolute temperature). 
2.2.6 Reentry Systems 
tems: 
system. 
The reentry system for the Reference Concept includes two basic sys-
the booster ver.icle reentry system and the payload package reentry 
The booster vehicle reentry system is the Space Shuttle Orbiter. It 
has the capability to detach from the ET and perform a controlled maneuver to 
a proper safe landing site (return-to-launch site, abort-to-contingency land-
ing strip, abort-to-orbit, abort-to-sea, or abort-to-land) at almost any time 
in the flight. The Orbiter has sophiscicated and redundant guidance and con-
trol systems, an elaborate thermal protection system, as well as a manned 
crew, which will all aid in the safe return to Earth of the payload package as 
a result of a critical ascent booster system failure. In addition, the 
'--'1rbiter will carry a structural pallet (to support the waste during launch) 
that will reduce the Orbi.ter crash-landing loads placed on the payload 
pack.age. Also, the Orbiter will provide systems \.hich will allow for Orbiter 
flotation in the event of a ditching at sea. 
The reentry system for the waste payload package must include provi-
sions to survive expected on-pad and reentry accident environments. The 
system must include: (1) provisions for absorbing the expected external 
impact loads, (2) a fire and reentry thermal protection system, and (3) a 
transmitter for recovery. The thermal protection system will not ablate more 
than 50 percent of its initial thickness during postulated worst-case reentry 
environments. The outer side of the package will have proper labeling. 
2.2.7 Launch Site Facilities 
The launch pad used for launching nuclear waste into space should be 
a dedicated pad. The Nuclear Payload Preparation Facility (NPPF) should be 
design~d as a total containment facility. 
2.2.8 Uprated Space Shuttle Launch Vehicle 
The Uprated Space Shuttle launch vehicle design l-1ill reflect consid-
erations of keeping on-pad accident environments as low as possible. Every 
effort will be made to save the payload and crew from adverse accident 
environments. 
': 
) 
f 
.i 
! 
/ ! 
/ 
.', 
22 
2.2.9 Earth Parking Orbits 
Intermediate Earth parking orbits shall be incorporated into the 
flight pr0files of space transportation systems to allow a minimum of 6 months 
before orbital dec~y of the nuclear waste payload package could occur. 
2.2.10 Orbit Transfer Systems 
Achievement of payload delivery is defined as starting in the proper 
Earth parking orbit and ending within the bounds of the following: 0.85 + 
0.01 A.U. and 1.00 + 0.20 degrees inclination. 
2.2.11 Space Destination 
The nominal space destination solar orbit at 0.85 A.U., 1 degree from 
the Earth's orbital plane, will be verified by proper anal}'sis to provide an 
expected isolation time of at least one million years. 
2.3 Definition of Terms 
The following terms are defined in the context of the safety guide-
lines as used in this section: 
Ablation Shield - a layer of protective package material attached to 
the outside surface of the payload. It is designed to reduce the 
heating effects during inadvertent atmospheric reentry. 
Accident Conditions - as "cnn"trasted to normal conditions, are low in 
probability and high in severity. The corresponding philosophy for 
the containment barrier is to survive accidents with low consequences 
rather than re:nain in an operable state. 
ALARA - less than maximum allowable and as low as reasonably achiev-
able. Federal regulations require this principle to be used in most 
nuclear technology license applications. 
Barrier - any medium or mechanism by which either release of encapsu-
lated radioactive waste material is retarded significantly or human 
access Is restricted. EX30ples of barriers are the waste form, the 
primary container, and isolation. 
Containment - a condition in which a hazardous material is isolated 
from the environment to an acceptable degree. 
Criticality - a measure of the capability of sustaining a nuclear 
chain reaction in a package containing fissile materials. 
Decomposition any significant change in physical or cher:lical 
properties resulting in a reduction in mechanical strength. etc. 
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DOT - U.S. Department of Transportation; regarding handling of 
nuclear materials, Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 
173.389-173.399. 
Fabrication - that stage of the waste treatment proces~ in which the 
waste form is fabricated to its proper shape and placed within the 
primary container. 
Fracture Toughness - the measure of a material's ability to absorb 
energy during plastic deformation; resistance to fracture. 
High-Level Waste - the waste product resulting from the first separa-
tion step of Purex fuel-reprocessing operations. 
Impact Absorber - that portion of a nuclear waste payload package 
intended to be an energy absorber while reducing impact forces trans-
mitted to the payload. 
Launch Site - the location on Earth's surface from which the space 
disposal Missions are launched. 
Material Interaction - U.e behavior or materials in contact wi th one 
another where a significant change in physical or chemical properties 
results. 
Normal Conditions - conditions that result from normal handling and 
transportation operations. No irreversible effects shall result to a 
containment barrier. " 
NPPF - Nuclear Payload Preparation Facility; that launch site facil-
ity providing interim" storage and remote handling operations for the 
waste payload from the time of receipt at the launch site until 
launch operations begin. 
NRC - u.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; regarding transportation of 
nuclear materials, Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 
71. 
Primary Container/Core - the 
high-level waste form, that 
mission phases. 
shell or vessel, adj2cent to 
provides containment throughout 
the 
all 
Radiation Shield - that cor.tponent of the payload package which is 
intended to reduce the nuclear radiation environment to acceptable 
levels. 
Rem - roentgen equivalent, man; a unit of radiation dose which takes 
into account the relative biological effectiveness of radiation 
energy deposition. 
Shipping Package - an enclosure and its systems licensed to transport 
radioactive materials (including high-level waste). 
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SOlS - Solar Orbit Insertion Stage used to insert (circularize) the 
payload package into the proper 0.85 A.U. solar orbit. 
Uprated Space Shuttle - reference launch vehicle for nuclear waste 
disposal in space. Vehicle uses Liquid Rocket Boosters and has a 
payload capability of 45,400 kg. 
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3.0 SPACE DISP0SAL CONCEPT DEFINITION 
The purpose of this section is to summarize the various concept 
definitions curren!:ly envision<!d for the nuclear waste disposal in space 
mission. The concept definitions described herein have developed over the 
years and represent the works of PNL and Boeing during the 1981-1982 time 
period (see Reinert et aI, 1982 and McCallum et aI, 1982). One "Reference 
Concept", defined for use in this study, was selected by a committee made up 
of NASA, ONWI, BCL, PNL, SAl, and Boeing representatives. Considp.rations that 
were given in selecting the Reference Concept included: (1) potential for 
risk benefit, (2) short- and long-term safety, (3) cost, (4) current state of 
technology, and (5) expected directions of NASA developments. An overview of 
the Reference Concept is given in Figure 3-1. Section 3.1 defines the overall 
Reference mission, giving emphasis to operational or procedural aspects. 
Definitions for specific Reference mission elements (e.g., waste payload 
characteristics, space systems, and facilities) are provided in Section 3.2; 
emphasis is on hardware and facilities. Section 3.3 describes the major 
.'~' contingency plans and systems that have been defined for the overall Reference 
mission to minimize effects caused by possible accidents and/or malfunctions. 
General space system hardware and propellant requirements for the waste 
disposal activity are identified in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 provides 
definition of alternative waste payloads (e.g., technetium and iodine). 
3.1 Overall Reference Mission 
The major aspects of the Reference mission defined in this section 
are illustrated in the pictorial view in Figure 3-2. This mission profile has 
been divided into seven maj or activities. The first two activities are ex-
pected to be the responsibility of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and 
the last five are expected to be NASA's. These are: 
(1) Nuclear Waste Processing and Payload Fabrication 
(2) Nuclear Waste Ground Transport 
(3) Payload Preparation at Launch Site 
(4) Prelaunch Activities 
(5) Launch Vehicle Operations 
(6) Orbit Transfer System Operations 
(7) Payload Monitoring. 
Rescue and recovery systems are discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Defini-
tions and requirements for individual system elements are discussed in Section 
3.2. 
3.1.1 Nuclear Waste Processing and Pnyload Fabrication 
Ty?ically, spent fuel rods from domestic power plants would be trans-
ported to the waste processing and payload fabrication sites via conventional 
I NUCLIDE lUX: 
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t WASTE SOURCE: DOHESTIC CIVILIAN _ J 
I 
REACTOR: CmMERCIAL LIGHT WATER REACTOR J 
I 
I FUEL CYCLE: URANIm{ Mm PWTOHIUM RECYCLE I 
I 
MODIFIED PUREX HIGH-LEVEL WASTE (95% Cs & Sr REMOVED) I 
I l WASTE FOP.M: CERMET MAI'RIX I 
I I GRomm TRAP.SPORTATlO!f: RAIL I 
I I LAunCH SITE: KEtit':1IDY SPACE CEUTER, FLORIDA I 
I 
LAUNCH VEHICLE: UPRATED SPACE SHUTTLE (LIQUID BOOSTERS) 
SHUTTLE DERIVED VEHICLE (LIQUID BOOSTERS) 
I 
PAYLOAD .~ LAUNCH CONFIGURATION: DUAL SmITTLE 
LAUNCH, SHIELD CARRIED TO FInAL DESTINATION 
I 
ORBIT TRAllSFER: CRYOGEIHC OTV AIID SOLAR_/ 
ORBIT INSERTION STAGE 
I 
lSPACE DESTINATION: SOLAR ORBIT 0.85 A.u.1 
FIGURE 3-1. OVERVIEl-l OF REFERENCE CONCEPT FOR INITIAL 
NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL IN SPACE 
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shipping casks. Using a Purex process, high-level waste containing fission 
products and actinides, including 0.5 percent plutonium and 0.1 percent 
uranium, would be processed from these spent fuel rods. Additional processing 
would remove 95 percent of the cesium and strontium for disposal in the mined 
geologic repos itory. Addi tional plutonium, processed from t ransuranic (TRU) 
wastes, would be added to the mix for space disposal. The mix would be aged 
for roughly 50 years.* The resulting high-level waste for space disposal 
would be formed into a cermet matrix by a calcination and hydrogen r~duction 
process. At the appropriate time, the waste form would be fabricated into 
cylindrical billets (3167 billets, each 5.858 cm in diameter). The waste 
billets would have a mass of 3000 kg. Within a remote shielded cell, the 
waste billets would be loaded into a spherical container/core; the container/ 
core would be closed and sealed, inspected, decontaminated, and packaged into 
a flight-weight gamma radiation shield assembly (see Figure 3-3). 
SHIELOED 
LOADING 
DOCK 
CORE LOAD 
STATION 
SHIELD ---~ 
ASSAY STATION 
" / SHIELDED OVERHEAD CRAN' 
INSPECTION ---
STATION 
IIELD-----
STATION 
FIGURE 3-3. WASTE PAYLOAD ASSEHBLY FACILITY (FRO~ BOEING STUDY) 
*Note: Fifty-year aging was recommended by P:-'L to be the most sensible way 
of reducing the heat production in the waste, such that postburial meltdown 
would not occur should there be inadvertent reentry (see Safety Guidelines, 
Section 2.1.2, Containment). 
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3.1.2 Nuclear Waste Ground Transport 
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The shielded waste container would be loaded into a ground trans-
portation shipping cask. This cask, which would provide additional shielding 
and thermal and impact protection for the waste container to comply with the 
NRC/DOT regulations, would then be loaded onto a specially designed rail car 
for transporting the waste container from the waste payload fabrication site 
to the Kennedy Space Center (Y~C), Florida launch site. Once the cask reaches 
the hunch site, it would be unloaded into the shielded loading dock of the 
Nuclear Payload Preparation Facility (NPPF). 
3.1.3 Payload Preparation at Launch Site 
The Nuclear Payload PreparatIon Facility (NPPF) would provide interim 
storage capability for a number of shielded waste payloads, affording effi-
cient preparation for launches plus capacity for unplanned delays (see Figure 
3-4). During storage, additional radiation shielding, thermal control, 
monitoring, and inspection of the waste payloads would be provided. 
SHIELDED PAYLOAD 
CANISTER 
WASTE PAYlOAO/NPPF WASTE PAYLOAD SYSTEM ASS(~BLY 
INTEGRA TlON 
FIGURE 3-4. POSSIBLE COnCEPT FOR A NUCLEAR PAYLOAD PREPARATION 
FACILITY (NPPF) (FRO~ BOEING STUOY) 
3.1.4 Prelaunch Activities 
In preparation for launch, the nuclear waste payloads are prelaunch-
checked in the NPPF. The first waste payload (waste form, core, radiation 
shield, and graphite/sted tUes) is mounted on the build-up frace in the 
assecbly canyon (see Figure 3-4). The interpayload support structure is 
./'" 
-, 
! 
~ , 
30 
remotely installed on the waste payload. The second waste payload is then 
mounted on the interpayload support structure. The installations are accom-
plished using a shielded crane. The waste payload system is installed in the 
flight support system. and is either stored for later flight or installed into 
a shielded canister. The payload canister is shielded to further reduce the 
external dos~ rate and Is designed" to provide commonality with the Rotating 
Service Structure (RSS) and Orbiter interfaces and to accommodate remote 
installation and re~oval of the waste payload system. The canister is trans-
ported to an area where it is erected and taken to the RSS at the Launch 
Complex. 
Transfer of the payload and supporting structure to the launch pad's 
Rotating Service Structure (RSS) is accomplished by a special-purpose trans-
porter which maintains the Shuttle payload and its supporting structure in the 
proper position for installation in the Orbiter cargo bay. Payload transfer 
from the NPPF to the pad is made after the Shuttle vehicle installation at the 
launch pad has been completed. The waste payload is remotely installed in the 
Orbiter using a payload ground-handling mechanism. After payload installation 
and final systems checkout have occurred. and the O'lV/sors has been properly 
positioned on orbit. the decision to launch is made. 
The OTV, which provides escape from low-Earth orbit and insertion 
into the heliocentric transfer traject'ory. and the sors. which c1.rcularizes 
the waste payload into the solar orbit disposal destination, are prepared for 
launch in the 0'lV Processing Facility. 
3.1.5 Launch Vehicle Operations 
One Uprated Space Shuttle and one Shuttle Derived Vehicle (SDV) would 
be readied for launch for a' given disposal mission. Pad C, which is to be 
constructed at KSC Launch Complex 39, would be used to launch the nuclear-
payload-carrying Uprated Space Shuttle. Pads A or B would be used for the SDV 
launch. 
The SDV would be launched first to place the orbit transfer system 
(O'lV/sorS) in a 370-km circular orbit inclined 38 degrees to the equator. The 
SDV propulsion and avionics modUle would reenter and be recovered for reuse. 
Approximately four hours after SDV launch, the Uprated Space Shuttle, 
with two waste packages, would be launched to rendezvous with the orbiting 
OTV/SOIS. 'Dle Shuttle Orbiter would approach the OTV/S01S using its vernier 
thrusters. There would be a soft docking, at which point the Orbiter's 
attitude control would be shut dOloll1. Several hour.s later a transfer of the 
payload to the OTV/SOlS in the cargo bay of the Orbiter would occur. The 
Orbiter and OTV/SOIS would then separate, and the Orbiter would back off from 
the OTV/S01S/payload at a velocity of 0.5 mise 
After the OTV delivers the nuclear waste payload and SOlS to the 
desired trajectory and returns to a low-Earth orbit, the Orbiter would 
rendezvous with the OTV and return it to the launch site to be refurbished for 
use on a later oission. 
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3.1.6 Orbit Transfer System 
After the OTV/SOIS/waste payload system has passed final systems 
checkouts, th< OTV propulsive burn will place the 5015 und its attached waste 
payload on the proper Earth-escape trajectory. Control of the propulsive burn 
from low-Earth orbit will be from the aft deck payload control station on the 
Orbiter, wi th backup provided by a ground control station. Af ter the burn is 
complete, the SOlS/waste payload is then released. In approximately 165 days 
the payload and the cryogenic LOX/LH2 propellant SOlS will travel to its 
perihelion at 0.85 A.U. about the Sun. [One astronomical unit (A.U.) is equal 
to the average distance from the Earth to the Sun.] The sors will placp. the 
payload in its final space disposal destination by reducing the aphelion from 
1.0 to 0.85 A.U. To aid in obtaining the'desired orbital lifetimes, this 
orbit will be inclined to the Earth's orbital plane by 1 degree. 
Recovery burns using the remaining OTV propellant and aerobraking 
will return the OTV to low-Earth orbit for rendezvous with the Shuttle Orbiter 
for subseqcent recovery, refurbishment, and reuse of the OTV on a later 
mission. The reference OTV/SOrS ~ission profile is shown in Figure 3-5. 
EAATl! melT 
D£pAAT\Jl!t ~ 
DISPOSAl. OR!IT 
0.85 A.U. CIRC\,. .. AA. 
1 OECREE INCLINATION 
P.!110CrNTRIC 
TRIJiSF[R TRAJECiORY 
1-2 Uprated Space Shuttle (45,400-kg payload) and Shuttle Derived Vehicle a5-
cent from Earth to a 370-km circular orbit with a 38-degree inclination. 
2-3 Prime OTV burn of approximately 32 min for escape from low-Earth orbit on 
elliptic solar orbit transfer trajectory with perigee of 0.85 A.U. and 
I-degree of inclination to the Earth's orbital plane. The f:J.V for this 
maneuver is 3390 m/s. 
3 OTV separation froc the SOlS/nuclear waste payload and retro burn to an 
elliptic Earth orbit. The 6V for this maneuver is 400 m/s. The OTV life-
time for return to the Orbiter is approximately 67 hours. TIle apogee for 
this orbit is 61,000 km. 
4 01V circularization into the 370-km, 38-degree inclination recovery 
orbit. The 6V is 120 m/s. 
S sors and payload circularization into 0.85 A.U., I-degree inclination to 
the Earth's orbital plane. The 6~ is 1280 m/s. 
FIGURE 3-5. REFERF.~!CE OTV/SOIS MISSrON PROFILE 
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3.1.7 Payload Monitoring 
Monitoring of the Earth escape trajectory of the SOrS/waste payload 
would be accomplished by ground-based radar systems and telemetry from the 
sors and OTV. The achievement of the final disposal orbit would be monitored 
by NASA's Deep Space Network. Once the proper disposal orbit has been 
verified, no additional monitoring is necessary. However. monitoring could be 
reestablished in the future if required. 
3.2 Reference System Elements and Operation 
Definitions and/or Requirements 
The definitions for Reference mission system and operation elements 
are described below. Thirteen major system elements have been identified for 
definition here: 
(1) Waste Source 
(2)- lvaste Mix 
(3) Waste Form 
(4) Waste Payload System 
(5) Shipping Casks and Ground Transport Vehicles 
(6) Launch Site Facilities 
(7) Uprated Space Shuttle Vehicle 
(8) Shuttle Derived Vehicle 
(9) Orbit Transfer Vehicle 
(10) Solar Orbit Insertion Stage 
(1 I) Rescue Vehicle 
(12) Flight Support System 
(13) Space Destination. 
Definitions for the Reference mission system elements follow. 
3.2.1 Waste Source 
The primary waste source would be nuclear waste generated by the 
operation of comrnercial nuclear power plants and recovered by reprocessing. 
Table 3-1 provides the most realistiC prOjections of waste generation (assum-
ing 200 GH.:! by the year 2000) found in the literature (Yates and Park, 1979). 
By assuming that the waste must be at least 10 years old before it can be 
reprocessed and be available for disposal, and that reprocessing capacities 
are able to process the waste according to the proposed schedule, the annual 
total amollnt of W.:lste available for disposal is given. Projections of the 
mass available for eventual space disposal are also given. The mass of waste 
available annually for eventual space disposal, in cermet form, will increase 
to 227 t:Ietric tons (~lT) by the year 2012 (launches lo.uuld actually occur ovt1r a 
25-year period beginning in the 2030-2040 tir:lc frame). Also sholom in the 
table are projections for technetill~ and iodine disposal in space. 
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1979 
1980 
1981 
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1983 
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1985 
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1992 
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1995 
1996 
1997 
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TABLE 3-1. TWENTY-FIVE YEAR PROJECTED U. S. nUCLEAR POWER GENERATION 
AND POSSIBLE COMMERCIAL HIGH-LEVEL WASTES AVAILABLE 
FOR SPACE DISPOSAL (100,000 MTHM BASIS) 
Annual High-Level Purex Annual Technetium 
Annual Nuclear Waste in Cermet Form(b) Waate 1n Metallic 
CUl:lulative(a) Waate Available Available for 30- to 40- Fol'lll Available 
Annual Iodine 
Waste is PbI2 
Form Available 
Power, Waste, for Dhpoaal, Year Storage Before for Space Disposal, for Space Disposal 
Disposal, HI/yr(C) HI/yr(d) HI/yr(e) GWe HIHM HIHM/yr Space 
61.9 S890(f) 0 0 0 0 
74.8 7690 0 0 0 0 
87.3 9790 0 0 0 0 
101.1 12,220 0 0 0 0 
115.4 14,990 0 0 0 0 
131.4 18,140 0 0 0 0 
144.3 21,600 0 0 0 0 
157.1 25,370 0 0 0 0 
164.9 29,330 0 0 0 0 
174.0 33,510 0 0 0 0 
180.9 37,850 5890(f) 279 4.42 2.36 
186.5 42,330 1800 85 1.35 0.72 
188.9 46.860 2100 '100 1.57 0.84 
190.1 51,420 2430 115 1.82 0.97 
192.5 56,040 2770 131 2.08 1.11 
194.0 60,700 3150 149 2.36 1.26 
195.0 65,380 3460 164 2.60 1.38 ' 
196.0 70,080 3770 166 2.83 1.51 
197.0 74,810 3960 188 2.97 1.58 
198.0 79,560 4180 198 3.14 1.67 
199.0 84,340 4340 206 3.26 1.74 
200.0 89,140 4480 212 3.36 1.79 
200.0 93,940 4530 214 3.40 1.81 
200.0 98,740 4560 216 3.42 1.83 
52.4(g) 100,OOO(g) 4620 219 3.46 1.85 
_(h) _(h) 4660 221 3.50 1.86 
4680 222 3.51 1.87 
470J 223 3.52 1.88 
4730 224 3.55 1.89 
4750 225 3.56 1.90 
478;; 227 3.58 1.91 
4800 227 3.60 1.92 
4800 227 3.60 1.92 
4800 227 3.60 1.92 
1260(g) 60 0.94 
.Jhl.l 
TOTALS 100,000 4725 75.00 40.00 
Projections through 2000 froo: Yates, K. R., and U. Y. Park, -Projections of CO!!Qerdal Nuclear Capacity and 
Spent-Fuel Accumulation 1n the United States-, Transactions of the Anerlcan Nuclear Societr. pp. 350-352 (June 
1979). 
Assumes 31.9~ Itg/HTI~ ",aste for space disposal (including removal of 95 percent of the cesium and strontium) and I 
cermet waste form loading of 67.4 percent (McCallum et aI, 1982). 
The waste must be decayed an additional 30 to 40 years before it can be flown into apace, given the current ·Safet) 
Guidelines and payload packaging concept. 
Based on 0.75 kg technetiu: metal per 1 MT~ (McCall,c et aI, 1982). 
Ba9cd on 0.40 It~ PbI2 per 1 MT~ (McCallum et al. 1982). 
Includes 4400 MT~ existing as of 1978. 
Data match cumulative 100.000 MT~ for MGR Reference Case used in this risk 8tudy. 
For purposes of this study, data beyond this point are ~ot shown. 
I 
.... 
/' 
, 
.I 
I 
/ 
1 
I 
I 
I 
,,1,/ ,-
/' 
I j 
I 
I 
! 
/ 
I 
/ 
1 
I 
I ! ' 
-
___ 6 6_ 
, 
, 
..---.-/ 
1-/ 
I I 
/
1 
, , 
34 
3.2.2 Waste Mix 
The waste mix to be disposed of in space is reprocessed high-level 
waste (containing 0.5 percent of the plutonium and 0.1 percent of the uranium 
present in the fuel rods at the time of reprocessing) that has been out of the 
reactor for approximately 50 years. Also, at the time of reprocessing, 95 
percent of the strontium and cesium is removed. Gases and TRU wastes, plus 95 
percent of strontium and cesium, would go to disposal in the mined repository. 
Plutonium would be processed out of the TRU wastes; this fraction would be 
added to the mix and go into space for disf'osal. The combination of cesium 
and strontium removal and the 50-year aging \:{ the waste is needed to avoid 
postburial meltdown for the "Reference-sized" spi.~re packages flown on a given 
mission. - (Smaller spheres or dilution of the wast~ form would allow the space 
disposal of lO-year-old waste.) 'vaste mix for space disposal amounts to 31.94 
kg/MTHM. 
3.2.3 Waste Form 
The Reference waste for~ for space disposal is the Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory (ORNL) iron/nickel-based cermet (ceramic/metal matrix), a disper-
sion of ceramic particles in a continuous metallic phase. This waste form has 
been chosen over others because of Its expected responses to possible accident 
environments. The cermet is expected to have a waste loading of the order of 
67.4 percent, where 100 percent is d~fined as high-level waste in oxide form. 
The thermal conductivity is expected to be about 9.5 W/m·C, and the density 
is about 6.5 g/cc. 
3.2.4 Waste Payload System 
The cermet waste form would be made into cylindrical billets that are 
5.852 cm long and 5.858 em in diameter. They would be placed into a 316 
stainless steel spherical waste form support structure or core. The core has 
241 parallel holes bored in it to accommodate the stacked cylindrical billets 
(see Figure 3-6). At the waste payload fabrication facility (see Figure 3-3), 
the billets would be installed in the core llsing an autoeatic loading machine. 
Covers at both ends of each bore would be installed to retain the billets. 
The loaded core would then be lowered into the lower half of the Inconel-625 
container/integral shield. The upper half of the integral shield would then 
be lowered into place and the upper and lower shield halves electron-beam 
welded together. Graphite/steel tiles would be preinstalled on the shield 
halves, except that a "belt" around the equator would be left free of tiles to 
allow the electron-beae weld. Following the weld. the remaining closeout 
tiles would be installed using remote-handling equipment. The waste payload 
is then ready to be placed in a shipping cask for transport to the launch 
site. 
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HANDLING LUG (4) 
.... ____ 1641_ 
I 
WASTE fOlUf 
SUPPORT 
STRDCTUltE 
(316 STAINLESS 
STEEL) 
,r-, 
I 
I 
PRIHAlty 
CON"rAINtR I A}.1l RADIATION SHIELD 
(INCOl-U-625) 
FIGURE 3-6. WASTE PAYLOAD PACKAGE FOR SPACE DISPOSAL 
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3.2.5 Ground Transport Vehicles and Casks 
For transport from the waste fabrication facility to the launch site, 
the integral waste container shielding would be housed in a shipping cask 
which would afford additional shielding and the~al and impact protection to 
meet the Nuclear Regulatory Commission/Department of Transportation 
regulations (U.S. -NRC, -1978). - The -cask is expected to be licensed by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Comcission. The cask would be transported from the payload 
fabrication facilities to the KSC launch site on a sp~cially designed rail car 
which would adequately support and distribute the weight of the cask and 
provide acceptable tie downs. 
3.2.6 Launch Site Facilities 
The reference launch site for launching nuclear ~~ste payloads during 
the early phase of the program is Launch Complex 39 at Kennedy Space Center, 
Florida. Facilities required to support the Reference Concept for space 
disposal are given below. 
(1) A secure, sealed, environmentAlly controlled. Nuclear Payload 
Preparation Facility (NPPF) to store, cool, monitor, assemble, 
and checkout the waste payload systems from the time the 
shielded nuclear waste cont-ainer arrives at KSC until t.he time 
the loaded payload reentry vehicle is moved to the launch pad. 
(2) A dedicated, special-purpose transporter to move the nuclear 
waste payload from the NPPF to the Rotating Service Structure 
(RSS) at the launch pad. This includes construction of a 
roadway or tracks for the tr,:msporter to use. 
(3) A dedicated Space -Shuttle launch pad (Pad C) for launching 
nuclear waste payloads. The waste payload would be installed in 
the Shuttle Orbiter at the pad. 
(4) A Ho!>ile Launch Platfom (MLP) for transporting built-up 
Shuttles froo the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) to the launch 
pads. Four ~~Ps would be required. 
(5) A third firing room in the Launch Control Center (LCC) would 
have to be activated to handle the increased number of Space 
Shuttle flights dedicated to the nuclear waste disposal program. 
This firing room would be used exclusively for the waste dis-
posal oissions. 
(6) Processing facilities, including bays, support shops, work-
stands, and storage, would be needed for: 
Orbiter - Two would be required to refurbish the Orbiters and 
the SDV propulsion and avionics modules between flights. 
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LRna One would be required to checkout LRBs prior to 
integration in VAB and to refurbish LRBs between flights. 
ET - One would be required to buildup and checkout ETs prior to 
integration in VAB. 
Orbit Transfer System - One would be required to integrate and 
checkout the Orbit Transfer System prior to integration with SDV 
ill VAB and to refurbish the OTVs between flights. 
3.2.7 Uprated Space Shuttle Vehicle 
During the early years of a space disposal program. the Uprated Space 
Shuttle (45.400-kg payload to low-Earth orbit, see Figure 3-7) would represent 
an ideal vehicle to carry out the boost phase of the space transport. The 
National Aeronautics and Space Adcinistration is now managing the development 
of the Space Shuttle (to be operational at Kennedy Space Center in 1982). a 
new class of space booster that is a reusable. low-cost vehicle that can 
transport payloads to low-Earth orbit and back. Also. the Space Shuttle is a 
manned piloted vehicle, with an intact mission-abort capability. thus making 
,~ it much safer than previous manned launch vehicles. It is anticipated that a 
continued. evolutionary uprating of the Space Shuttle vehicle will occur in 
the twenty-first century. The uprating assumed here involves the use of the 
more powerful and environmentally cleaner Liquid Rocket Booster (LRB) as a 
replacement for the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB). 
FIGURE 3-7. UPRATED SPACE SIIUTI"LE VEHICLE 
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The Uprated Space Shuttle consists of a piloted reusable orbiting 
vehicle (the Orbiter) mounted on an expendable External Tank (ET) containing 
hydrogen/oxygE:n propellants and two recoverablE: and reusable Liquid Rockel: 
Boosters (NASA/MSFC, 1979). The propellants for the LRBs are RP-1 (kerosene) 
and l~~uid oxygen (LOX), having an oxidizer-to-fuel ratio of 2.9. The Orbiter 
will have three main hydrogen/oxygen liquid rocket. engines and a cargo bay 
18.29 m long and 4.57 m in diall:eter. At launch, both the LRBs and the 
Orbiter's three liquid rocket engines will burn simultaneously. After 
approximately 124 seconds and after the Space Shuttle vehicle attains an 
altitude of approximately 45 km, the LRBs will be separated and subsequently 
recovered from the Atlar.tic Ocean. The ET is jettisoned before the Orbiter 
goes into orbit. The Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) is then used to propel 
the Orbiter into the desired Earth orbit. The Orbiter wi th its crew and 
payload (weighing up to 45,400 kg) will remain in orbit to carry out its 
mission. When the mission is completed and the Orbiter has retrieved th~ OTV, 
the Orbiter is deorbited and piloted back to the launch site for an unpowered 
landing on the runway at KSC. The Orbiter and LRBs would subsequently be 
refurbished and flown on other space missions. NASA/MSFC (1979) provides data 
on LRBs for the Uprated Space Shuttle. Table 3-2 provides a Reference mass 
summary for the Uprated Space Shuttle Vehicle. 
3.2.8 Shuttle Derived Vehicle 
The Shuttle Derived Vehicle (SDV), shown in Figure 3-8, consists of: 
(1) a large aerodynamic payload shroud (cargo bay 7 m in diameter and 30 m 
long), with the SS~1E propulsion and avionics pod mounted piggy-back on an 
expendable External Tank (ET); (2) the ET to supply propellants to the main 
engines; and (3) two r~usable Liquid Rocket Boosters (LRBs) also attached to 
the ET. The propellants in the ET are liquid hydrogen (LH2) and liquid 
oxygen (LOX), while the LRBs use RP-1 (kerosene) and LOX. At launch, both the 
LRBs and the three liquid rocket engines of the Space Shuttle ;.tain Engine 
(SSME) pod will burn simultaneously. After approximately 124s and after the 
Space Shuttle vehiclE: attains an altitude of approximately 45 krn, the LRBs 
will be separated and subsequently recovered from the htlantic Ocean. The ET 
is jettisoned before the vehicle goes into orbit. During ascent, the payload 
shroud is jettisoned and reenters and falls into the ocean. After the 
propulsion and avionics pod carries out its delivery mission, it reecters and 
is recovered for use on other missions. . 
3.2.9 Orbit Transfer Vehicle (OTV) 
The OTV (see Figure 3-9) is the injection stage which places the SOlS 
and waste payload into the heliocentric transfer orbit. It would us~ two 
RLlO-IIB engines in a dual-failui.'e-tolerant nain propulsion syste:n. The 
engines would use LOX and LH2 as propellants for an oxidizer-to-fuel (O/F) 
mixture ratio of 6.0 and a specific i~pulse of 465 s. A ballute deceler~tion 
system would be used for ae.:obraking to reduce velocity when returning to 
low-Earth orbit. Two Global Positioning Syst€!:I receivers would be used to 
provide redundancy in navigation of the aerobraking maneuver. The OTV would 
also have redundant avionics (dual-string sy~tec with two cocputers). With a 
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TABLE 3-2. MASS SUMMAltY FOR UPRATED SPACE SHUTTLE VEHICLE 
Vehicle 
Component/Element 
Orbiter 
Dry (Less Engines) 
Engines 
Personnel and Equipment 
Residuals and Reserves 
Total Inert 
OMS/RCS Propellants 
Total at Liftoff 
External Tank (ET) 
Dry 
Residuals and Reserves 
Total Inert 
Usable Propellants (LOX/LH2) 
Total at Liftoff 
Liquid Rocket Boosters (Both) 
Dry 
Residuals 
Total Inert 
Usable Propellants (LOX/RP) 
Total at Liftoff 
Payload 
Total Vehicle at Liftoff 
Mass, kg Weight, lb 
63,875 140,821 
9,063 19,980 
1,197 2,640 
4,212 9,285 
78,347 172,726 
12,322 27,166 
90,669 199,892 
32,757 72,217 
4,276 9,428 
37,034 81,645 
711,196 1,567,918 
748,230 1,649,563 
126,269 278,376 
4,853 10,700 
131,122 289,076 
1,080,480 2,382,050 
1,211,602 2,671,126 
__ 4J,360 100,000 
2,095,861 4,620,581 
-----_ ..... ..------.. ----------------~----------
Source: NASA/MSFC, 1979. 
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FIGURE 3-8. SHUTTLE DERIVED VEHICLE (SDV) 
." 2-&TACI 
AEAOIIIAKlD INJiCT'OH 
IT AGE. CR ''0 WIS 
FIGURE 3-9. REFERENCE OTV/SOIS/\~ASTE PAYLOAD CONFIGURATION 
20-mission service life, the OTV is designed to be refurbished after recovery 
for use again on a later mission. 
3.2.10 Sol~r Orbit Insertion Stage (SOlS) 
The Solar Orbit Insertion Stage (see Figure 3-9) is a sm<lller version 
of the OTV. The SOlS would use one RL10-IIB en!~ine which has A thrust level 
of 66.720 N and a specific impulse of 465 s. Redundancy would be built into 
the guidance and control system with redundant guidance and navigation 
sensors, three command units (each of which can execute all control functions 
independently), and two transceivers (transponder, power amplifier, and 
diplexer) for communications between the SOlS and ground control. TIle SOlS 
would be designed to adequately withstand the adverse nuclear radiation and 
spuce environments experienced while coasting 165 days before firin~~. 
A payload docking adapter system would be mounted to the front of the 
SOlS and would be compatible, with the Flight Support System docking system. 
The adapter provides structural support for the waste payload during Orbit 
Transfer System operations. In case rescue operations should be necessary, 
redundant rendezvous transponders would' be mounted on the payload adapter. 
3.2.ll Rescue Vehicle 
The rescue vehicle is a Shuttle-launched Orbit Transfer System. It 
would include appropriate provisions for targeting and dockin~ with thl' 
nuclear wa5t~ cont;l.iner attached to an OTV/SOlS, the nuclear w3ste cont.'lincr 
attached to an SOlS only, or u' flci)<)'rated wllste container only. It would be 
reusable or expendable, depending upon the resclle mission. This vehicle would 
be required to have an on-orbit st<ly time of Ilt least 308 days, with little 
reduction expected in reliability or performance. TIle rescue vehicle mny be 
returned to Ea t"th by the Shut t Ie Orbiter at the end of the cycle for 
refurbishment, if recoverable. 
3.2.12 Flight Support System 
The dual waste payload sy~tl~m is supported in the car~~o bay by thl~ 
flight support system (FRS). The FSS also consists of an extendable dockln!~ 
collar, tilt tabll~, and guide rll:ils. Thl~ docking collar is stO\~,'d .lway durin!; 
launch, but is extended to allow dockin!~ of the Orbit Transfer System. The 
tilt table and guide rails assist transfer of thl' waste paylo111i to the Orbit 
Transfcr System. 
Flight operation of the FSS iR described below Ilnd is SlllH .. "U in Fi!~ure 
3-10. 
• The Orb!. t Transfl~r Systl'm d,lCks to the t!xtendC'd dl)('kin~ collar 
• TIle waste payload is rotated 90 degrees by the tilt tllble , , 
·.---~"- .. ," .......... -. 
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• The waste payload is translated along the docking collar to the 
Orbit Transfer System, waste payload support system. 
I 
FIGURE 3-10. FLIGHT SUPPORT SYSTEM OPERATION 
3.2.13 Space Destination 
The Reference space destination for the nuclear waste disposal mis-
sion is defined as an orbital region between the orbits of the Earth and 
Venus. TIle nominal circular orbit is defined as 0.85 + 0.01 A.U. The orbital 
inclination about the Sun is defined as 1 degree from the Earth's orbital 
plane. 
3.3 Accident and Halfunction Contingency Plans for Reference Concept 
There are five general phases of the space disposal mission which 
require development of accident and malfunction contingency plans: 
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• Ground transportation from the payload fabrication sites to the 
launch site 
• Preflight operations prior to ignition of the Shuttle's engines 
• Launch operati~ns from the launch pad to act-ieving parking orbit 
• Orbital operations 
• Rescue operations. 
Preliminary contingency plans for each of these operational phases are 
addressed in the following sections. 
3.3.1 Ground Transportation 
Ground transport (via raU) of the shipping cask would he assigned to 
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), which would supply the necessary accident 
recovery plans and systems, as needed. Two types of incidents that Must be 
considered are: (1) loss of auxiliary cooling to the waste container, and (2) 
possihle breach of the waste container with 3. loss of radioact ive material. 
In case of cooling loss, adequate provisions should be made to have self-
contained, au:<iliary coolin)~ units available within a reasonable time. 
Honitoring equipment for both container tt'r.lperature and radiation will be 
required during all ground transport operations. A continuous capability to 
cope with a container breach will be necessary. A specially trained accident 
recovery crew will always be ready to act, if necessary. 
3.3.2 Prefli~ht Operations 
Contingency plans should be provided for potential malfunC'tions .1nd 
accidents that could occur while waste payload packa~;es are in the Nuclear 
Payload Preparation Facility (NPl'F), being transported to the launch pad, 
being transferred from the pad Payload Chnngeout Room (peR) to the Uprated 
Space Shuttle cargo bay, and awaiting liftoff in the Shuttle. Accidents and 
contingency plans would be similar to those discussed in the paragraph above. 
3.3.3 Launch Operations 
Contingcncy pl:lns, procedures, and system~ envisioned to minimize the 
hazard c.1used by on- or ncar-pad failures are given helow. Thesc would 
minimize the effects of severe blast wave, hi~~h-velocity fragments, fire, and 
possible high-velocity impact. 
• A two-Shuttle launch option wi 11 allow tlll~ two waste payload pack-
ages to he launched in a carf,o bay cOr.lpletely dl"\ icated to the 
support of the raylo;ld p.lckage. This 3110ws adJitt,)nal safety in 
that (1) no propellant-loaded Orbl.t Transfcr Vehicll' is available 
'. I 
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to contribute to the close-in accident environment (explosion, 
fire, high-velocity fragmet'ts), and (2) an additional structure 
can be used to protect the payload packages in t.he event of a 
crash landing or catastrophic failure. 
• Engine shutdown is an.important factor in vehicle survivability as 
a result of subsystem failures. For the Uprated Space Shuttle, 
all booster engines are liquid-fueled, and as such, they can be 
shut down if a failure occurs during the engine start-up process, 
and prior to actual liftoff. This capability is expected to 
greatly reduce the probability of an on-pad catastrophic vehicle 
failure. Also, the abort modes mentioned below become possible. 
• Flotation gear and locator beacons in the Orbiter will assist in 
the recovery operation after ditching at sea. 
• Conservatively designed containment systems (e.g., container, 
shielding impact, and thermal protection systems) will maximize 
the probability of surviving the possible hostile environments. 
• A tough, solid waste form will be used that is not easily 
dispersed under adverse conditions. 
• Appropriate launch constraints (e.g., wind direction) will be 
applied to reduce human radiological exposure resul ting from a 
potential containment breach from a catastrophic launch accident. 
• A recovery team will be ready to rescue the payload at sea or on 
land. 
Systems and procedures, in'addition to some of those mentioned above, 
which would minimize the hazard caused by subsystem failures during the boost 
phase are as follows: 
o Intact aborts can be implemented after a few seconds into the 
flight. Three types of intact aborts are possible for the Uprated 
Space Shuttle: (1) the return-to-launch-site (RTLS), (2) abort-
once-around (AOA), and (3) abort-to-orbit (ATO). 
• Contingency aborts could lead to either a return-to-land (runway 
or crash landing) or to a ditching at sea. 
• Design of the boost trajectory to avoid land overflight, for exam-
ple the 38-degree inclination orbit, should help in reducing over-
all risk for the early p0rtion of the flight. 
3.3.4 Orbital Operations 
The Orbit Transfer Vehicle (OTV) propulsion phase provides for trans-
portation from low-Earth orbit to the intermediate destination. In the 
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1n1tul years* of toe disposal mission. the OTV would be a high-thrust. chemi-
cal propulsion (LH2/LOX) sta~e. To minimize possible failures the following 
systems. procedures. and design guidelines are envisioned: 
• The U8e of command OTV engine shutdown in the event of a grossly 
inaccurate propulsive burn 
• The capability to separate the Solar Orbit Insertion Stage (SOlS) 
and attached payload hom the 01'\1 and the use of the SOlS to place 
the payload in a safe orbit for eventual recovery by a rescue vehi-
cle or Shuttle Orbiter 
• The use of a rescue vehicle to retrieve a waste paylond stranded 
in any given orbit 
• The use of redundant systems. where ef fective. to ensure high 
reliability 
• On-orbit OTV launch crew to obtain instantaneous visual and tele,-
metric status of the OTV propulsive burn (from the Orbiter) 
• The proper design of trajectories and propulsive burns of the OTV 
to reduce the probability for reentry. if a failure occurs 
• A waste form which helps ensure intact reentry and recovery of the 
paylond. should an unplanned recnt ry occur. and the requirement 
that the waste payload will not melt after self-burial in 10101-
conductivity soil 
• The use of themal protection tn.'lterial on the outside of the 
package to reduce the· risk of atmospheric dispersal on the ground 
and in the ai r. as well as an outer s teel shi~ld to protect the 
reentry material in the case of explosion 
• The use of a relatively high-melting-point container/core (316 
stainless steel) and shieJ,d material (lnconel-62S) to reduce the 
risk of atmospheric disposal of W;lste. 
The SOlS provides for trllnsportation from an intermediate to the 
final destinlltion. For the Reference Concept. the SOlS is used to reduce the 
aphelion from 1.0 to 0.85 A.D. Systems, procedures, and design requirements 
envisioned to ~inimize hazards due to SOlS failures are: 
*Later on. low-thrust techlhllor.y (e.!~ •• solar electric propulsiun lIsing argon 
propellant) might be used. lHth lm .. '-thrust systems, both the probability of 
reentry and ~lgnitude of an explosion are decreased. In addition. there is a 
milch longer decision and response time available in case of a malfunction of 
the low-thrust propulsion systems while in low Earth orbit. However. because 
of the large soLu arrays needed, the probability of solar array damage 
caused by an impact with on-orbit. man-m.llie debris could become significant 
in the future. 
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• The use of a rescue vehicle to retrieve a cooperative or non-
cooperative payload stranded in any orbit in heliocentric or Earth 
orbital space 
• The use of redundant SOlS systems where effective to ensure high 
reliabili ty 
• The proper use of trajectories and orbits inclined to the Earth's 
orbital plane that exhibit long-term orbital stability 
• The use of long-lived tracking systems on board the sors to aid in 
deep-space rescue operations. 
3.3.5 Rescue Operations 
Provisions must be made to rescue the sors and the nuclear waste 
payload in Earth orbit in the event of a failure of the OTV during the Earth-
escape burn. The approach is to rendezvous and dock the rescue OTV with the 
sors and continue the mission from the failed orbit. The rescue mission is 
based on the ~remise that, with proper control of the OTV launch, any failure 
of the OTV will result in an elliptic orbit about Earth. The mission profile 
for payload rescue is to deliver a rescue OTV to low-Earth orbit, transfer by 
a burn of the OTV to a phase-adjust orbit, and transfer from the phase-adjust 
orbit at the proper time for rendezvous and docking with the failed system. 
The lifetime of the rescue OTV, conSidering the coast time in the phase-adjust 
orbit, must be as much as 310 days, compared to the 3 days for OTV lifetime on 
the nominal Reference mission. 
After injection into deep space, the nuclear waste payload could fail 
to achieve its stable destination orbit, because of a premature shutdown of 
the OTV engine beyond Earth-escape conditions or a failure of the SOlS to 
ignite at solar orbit conditions. Studies that address the probability of 
Earth reentry under these failure conditions have recommended the use of a 
deep-space rescue mission capability as a way of further reducing the overall 
risk during this phase of the mission (Rice et aI, 1980a). The deep-space 
rescue mission ~lOuld begin with the launch of the rescue system into a 
heliocentric transfer orbit with perihelion less than 0.85 A.U. The first 
burn of the rescue system would lower aphelion to 0.85 A.U. A second burn 
would match velocity for rendezvous and docking with the failed SOlS. 
3.4 Reference Projected Traffic Hodel, 
Hardware, and Propellant Requirements 
The projected traffic model, hardware, and propellant requirements 
for major Reference mission elements have been estimated for the initial 
25-year disposal activity. 
For the Reference mission definition, an upper bound of 750 Uprated 
Space Shuttle flight3 and 750 SDV flights are required to dispose of all of 
the U.S. high-level commercial nuclear wastes generated through the year 2003 
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(100,000 HTHH). Consideration of development flights and aborted missions 
would be expected to increase this number somewhat. The projected number of 
missions for high-level nuclear waste disposal is 30 per year for 25 years for 
a total of 750 missions. Table 3-3 shows the major mission elements, the 
hardware use factor assumed, and the total number of hardware requirer.tents. 
The on-board propella.' _ requirements per disposal mission are given 
in Table 3-4. Total requirements can be estimated by multiplying these data 
by 30 missions/year. Actual propellant requirements will be somewhat higher 
than shown due to losses from propellant transfer and cryogenic propellant 
boUoff • 
3.5 Alternate Payload Definitions 
Two alternate payloads were defined by Boeing, with the aid of PNL, 
for inclusion in the overall risk assessment of space disposal of nuclear 
waste. These are technetium in metal form and iodine in the form of Pb!? 
These are discussed below. The reader is referred to l'1cCalluo et aI, ]982, 
and Reinert et aI, 1982, for details. 
3.5.1 Technetium Payload 
The technetium waste form would be fabricated as ri~ht cylindrical 
billets whose heights are equal to their diameter. The size of the individual 
billets (6 em) was selected to be the same as for the cermet waste form, which 
was limited by constraints imposed by the press and sintering fabrication 
process (HcCallum et aI, 1982). Several thousand of the technetium metal 
billets would be stored in a hexagonally close-packed array (as in the 
Reference Concept) to provide "m..1x1rilum volumetric efficiency in packing the 
spherical radiation shield and primary container. 
For a discussion of the waste processing needed to partition tech-
netiuo out of the BLU, the reader should see HcCallum et aI, 1982. The mass 
properties cf the Tc-99 payload are provided in Section 5.5, Table 5-20. 
3.5.2 Iodine Payload 
The PIn. study (HcCallum et aI, 1982) provides a detailed discussion 
of the waste processin~~ required for disposing of iodine in space. PNL also 
suggests the use of lead iodide (PbI.,) as the ~astc form. The PbI., waste 
form would be melted and cast in placi within the spherical radiation-shield 
and primary contniner to yield a r.1onolithic sphl~t'ical waste form. Although, 
theoretically, 100 percent volumetric eff iciency could he approached when 
usin~~ this r.lethod, a more conservative figure of 90 pt~rcent I..'as assur.1ed to 
allow for voids and shrinkage during tht": casting process (Reinert ct aI, 
1982). The m3SS properties of the 1-129 payload ,lre provided in Section 5.0, 
Table 5-20. 
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TABLE 3-3. MAJOR HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS ESTIMATES 
FOR HIGH-LEVEL COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR WASTE 
DISPOSAL IN SPACE (100,000 MTHM)(a) 
--.--.- - ----- --
Hardware Element Use Factor 
Vehicle Hardware 
- Orbiters 100 
- ETs 1 
- LRBs (2 LRBs per Flight) 20 
- SSME/Avionics Pods 55 
- Payload Shrouds 1 
Orbit Transfer System Hardware 
- OTVs 20 
- SOISs 1 
Waste Payload Systems 
Container Cores 1 
- Radiation Shields 1 
- Crew Shields and Flight Structure 100 
- Cooling Systems (Flight) 100 
- Rail Cars and Casks 200 
Number 
Required 
8 
1500 
150 
14 
750 
38 
750 
1500 
1500 
8 
8 
8 
(a) Table assumes 750 Uprated Space Shuttle flights and 
750 SDV flights to dispose of high-level commercial 
nuclear waste. 
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TABLE 3-4. ON-BOARD PROPELLANT REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH REFERENCE 
NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL MISSION 
III 
~ 
-i 
-i 
m 
r 
r 
m 
n 
a 
Vehicle 
External Tank (ET) 
Liquid Rocket Booster (LRB) 
Orbiter 
r 
C Orbit Transfer Vehicle (OTV) 
~ 
m Solar Orbit Insertion Stage (SOlS) 
C 
til Totals 
Liquid 
Hydrogen 
(LIIZ) 
204 
8.5 
1.7 
214.1 
Liquid 
Oxygen 
(I.OX) 
1220 
1606 
50.5 
9.6 
2886.1 
\ 
Propellants. MT 
RP-l 
(Kerosene) 
(RP) 
554 
554 
.,.< 
Nitrogen 
Tetroxide 
(NTO) 
15.16 
15.16 
Monomethyl 
lIydrazine 
(MMlI) 
9.48 
9.48 
.t:-
\0 
) 
--._--
-- --. 
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1 
1 
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4.0 OVERALL RISK MODEL APPROACH 
The overall risk model approach that has been developed for the 
current study is to estimate the nonrecoverable, cumulative, expected radio-
nuclide release in curies to the Earth's biosphere for different options of 
the disposal of nuclear waste. 
The risk estimates for the disposal of the waste in a mined geologic 
repository (}!GR) are based upon analyses of accident sequences performed by 
Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory (McCallum et aI, 1982). The space risk 
estimates were developed by Battelle's Columbus Laboratories 
Although it would have been preferable to represent the consequences 
of accidental releases in terms of direct health effects to the human popula-
tion, funding limitations did not permit this level of analysis. Instead, the 
consequences of accidents are characterized in teres of the release of radio-
nuclides in curies to the biosphere (air, ground, and sea). In those cases 
where release might occur from the waste package, but for which cleanup 
operations would be anticipated (in the near term), credit was taken for the 
recovery of material. " 
Frequently, risk results are presented as the product of the proba-
bili ty and the consequences of acciden t sequences. Rigorously, this common 
definition of risk is the first moment (expectation value) of the probability 
density function for accident consequences (probability of an accident within 
the interval dC about C). To provide a complete description of the risk, it 
would be necessary to present the entire density function rather than a single 
moment of the density function. This is particularly desirable if the risk 
includes very-high-consequence accidents of low probability. Because of the 
aversion of thepubl1c to high-consequence events (e.g., airplane crashes, 
tornados, and earthquakes)" this pa::-t of the risk spectrum is of particular 
concern. 
In the case of waste disposal, either for the MGR or for the space 
disposal of waste, no single events have been identified that would be radio-
logically catastrophic in the sense of representing an immediate health threat 
to a number of hunan lives. The expected consequence is therefore an appro-
priate characterization of. the risk. Fer each identified accident sequence, 
the probability and consequence is estimated and the risk is calculated as: 
where 
R. = 1: Ci Pi i 
R, .. risk in Ci 
Ci D consequences of accident i in Ci 
Pi - probability of accident i. 
Four sets of radionuclide groups have been selected to illustrate the 
results: (1) the SUr.l of 15 important long-lived radionucl1des (as given in 
the draft EPA release limit guidelines), (2) the sum of importartt actinide 
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elements (AC), (3) Tc-99, and (4) I-129. The time span considered in the 
study is one million years. Not only could events occur at various times in 
the future, the release of radioactive material to the biosphere could be 
distributed over extended time periods following an accident. In the 
presentation of the resul ts, the expected release rate of radionuclides is 
integrated over time to obtain the cumulative expected release in Curies, and 
this integral is plotted versus time. Short- and long-term risks are provided 
in the same figures. 
For comparative purposes the risks from (1) the Reference MGR, (2) 
the HGR complemented for each space disposal option without space disposal 
accidents, and (3) accidents directly associated with space disposal are each 
displayed separately. By adding the space disposal risk to the complemented 
MGR risk and comparing the Reference case, the potential benefits/disbenefits 
of the space waste disposal options could be determined. 
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5.0 SPACE DISPOSAL RISK ESTIMATES 
This section of the report describes how space disposal risks were 
estimated. Various approaches were evaluated before this effort was initi-
ated. The basic approach to determining preliminary estimates of space 
disposal risk, as defiiled in ~ection 4.0, was developed by cons1.derin,g what 
would be the most cost-effective method (because of limited funding for this 
effort). Basically the approach used drew on (1) past data bases developed 
for space disposal (Pardue et aI, 1977; Edgecombe et aI, 1978; and Rice et aI, 
1980a); (2) STS failure rates developed by the Wiggins Corepany (baeker, 1981; 
Hudson, 1979); (3) previous works by A. Friedlander on long-term risk (see 
Rice et aI, 1980a); (4) expert opinion where easily obtainable; (5) new 
response analysis, where practical; (6) engineering estimates; and (7) 
technical data provided by Boeing (R~inert et aI, 1982). The desired format 
for "space risk" was determined by the format developed by l-lcCallum (1982) for 
geologic disposal, both the Refer~nce case and the various "compleI:lented" 
cases. The major goal was to develop "space risk" in terms of probabilistic 
cumulative releases (unrecoverable) to the biosphere from launch through to 
one million years. It was assuced that short-term risks could be mitigated cy 
accident recovery and rescue, although these would not always be either 
,,--, successful or complete. For longer time frames (beyond 100 years after 
launch), recovery and rescue were ~ included in the analysis. 
Figure 5-1 provides an overview of the approach used for estimatinp, 
space disposal risks. The following subsections provide discussion of this 
approach and related study results. The following shows ~he organization of 
topics: 
• Space Accident Identification (payload insults) 
• }lission Phase and Fault Tree Development 
• Failure and Event Probability Estimates 
• Payload Response Analysis 
• Consequence Evaluation 
• Preliminary Space Disposal Risk Estimates. 
5.1 Space Accident Identification 
Accidents that involve the nuclear waste payload were the only ones 
considered here. Previous analyses (Edgecombe et aI, 1978) presented a list 
of possible accidents for a space disposal mission. Since that work and other 
follow-on work (Rice et aI, 1980a) have been completed, significant changes in 
the Reference space disposal concept have been made (see curr~nt Reference 
Concept, Section 3.0). Because accidents involving the release of radioactive 
material are the only ones of current interest, many previously studied 
accidents/events involving the payload have not been included here. 
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Table 5-1 provides a summary of the l'ossihle insults to the current-
ly defined Reference nuclear waste payload. The probabll1t~· of occurrence of 
the events listed was not considered. This list of possible insults to the 
payload was used to define the events that cCluld lend to br~,\ch of containment 
during and after launch. This is discussed furthc.'!r in the next section. 
TABLE 5-1. POSSIBLE INSULTS TO THE SrACE DISPOSAL PAYLOAD 
Impact 
On Ground 
• Rock • 
• H.:m-}tade Structures 
• Soils 
• Ice 
• Hater • 
• Explosion Fragments • 
• 
• 
• 
In SE3ce 
• Heteoroids • 
• On-Orbit Debris 
• On-Orbit Vehicles 
• Celest tal Bodies 
• Other \~aste Payloads 
• Expl0sion Frdgmcnts 
• Comet 
--
---------~-----------.-------.-.------------
~lelt1ng 
On Gro·.md 
Impact-Related 
Insulation (k < klimit) 
- Certain So11s 
- Certain Minerals 
Volcano 
Chemical Plant/Storage 
Tank Farm 
Processing Furnaces 
On-Pad Accident/Fire 
In Flight 
Rel"nt r~' 
-
Intact 
- Dam3:~ed 
-
Aged/Degraded 
-
Fragmented 
---
Corrosion 
On Ground 
• Aqucou!: 
Fresh W.1ter 
Ocean Water 
- Severe (Brines. 
lhS, etc.) 
R;;d\ldll~ 
• NOI1;lqlll"OUS 
- SnIt Beds 
• Sp~cbl 
- Chemical Plant/ 
Stornge 
• So11s 
In Space 
• Sputtering/Erosion 
... 
. ---
5.2 Mission Phase and Fault Tree Development 
After the list of possihle P;\ylO.l,1 insults \,'as Je\'eloped (see Table 
5-1), the space dIsposal mission was di\'id~d Ili' into nission ph,lSl'S which 
allo",'cd the trcatml'nt of certain tYPl'S "f accttl~nts. This .... -:IS nec~ss'lr)' 
h~cmlse the Ch,lr;lctL'r of accidents chnn~,'d \dth the ti::ll' ,11Irin~ the mission. 
Thl' p.1yll\ad altitlhle "'ld velocity, i\\stant,ml~l)US i:'I',lct 1""-) tnt location, 
p')tl~ntLll fot' dam.l!:~ hy STS l"Xph\Sl.oll. potl'nt!..ll reentry v('locit;-', ,1n.1 the 
potential for d~ep-spacc events IIfC constant 1)' ch.m~t"g thfl\llf~hollt the 
mission. 
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Previous study results (Rice et al, 19803) have indicated that an 
on-pad accident involving the catastrophic failure of the launch vehicle 
[Uprated (LRB) Space Shuttle) will not result in a breach of th~ current 
Reference payload concept. Environments considered include (1) the on-pad 
fireball, (2) 'on-pad 'residual, propellant fire, (3) blast overpressure, (4) 
fragment impact, and (5) hard surface impact. Even in an STS power dive, it 
is predicted that the maximum ve locity of the payload would ,lever exceed 250 
m/s, a veloci~y much lower than would be expected to breach a normal payload 
(one with no undetected defects). Intact aborts (noncatastrophic) have been 
eliminated from consideration here, as well 3S Orbiter crash landings (total 
recovery anttcipated for this event). Payload impacts onto chemical, 
munitions, or steel plants have also been eliminated becnuse it is believed 
that their probability is very small and that the payload would not be 
insulted by the chemical or thermal environment, that it would "fly through 
it" and end up below it in the ground. 
The phases and time lines for the disposal mission are listed in Table 
5-2. The timelines were developed from data presented in the Boeing report 
(Reinert et al, 1982). 
TABLE 5-2. MISSION PHASE AND TnIELINE DEFINITION 
-~----- --..----.. ---------------~ ... -------
Phase Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Description 
Ignition to tmpa'ct Point Clears Land 
Clear Land Impact to LRB Staging 
LRB Staging to MECo(b) 
HEeD to LEO Attainment(b) 
LEO Attainnent to OTV Ignition 
OTV Ignition to Earth Escape 
Earth Escape to OTV Shutdown 
Timeline, s(ll) 
0-24 
24-124 
124-518 
518-2,734 
2,734-35,024 
35,024-36,926 
36,926-37,005 
37,005-14,295,107 SOlS Coast Through sors Burn 
Placement 14,295,107-3.1SE13 
(a) Data derived from Boeing study (Reinert et nl, 1982). 
(b) .mco is main engine cutoff; LEO is low-Earth orbit. 
The fault tree analysis method was selected as most appropriate for 
use in this study. Fault tree analysis is a technique by which the component 
failures leading to system ~ailures can be logicalty deduced. Application of 
the technique yields combin3tions of basic events whose occurrcnce~ cause the 
undesired failure t!VCl1ts (containClent breaches). These event cOI'lblnntions can 
then be evaluated by various screening techniques to determine the hi~h-risk 
scenarios and their probability of occurrence. For its appl ication, the 
fault tree method requires probability information about all of the individual 
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component fallures. The fault tree technique is well-suited to analyzing 
r.:1pid events (such as space launches, which have discrete probabilities). 
Fault tree analysis, however, is not well-suited to analyzing the slow 
processes for which event orderinp" interdependencie,;. and time-phasing are 
important. Therefore, it has only been carried through phase 6 (see Table 
5-2). Phases 7 through 9 have been analyzed differently (see long-term events 
discussed in Se~tion 5.5). 
The fault trees developed for the nine mission phases include 
consideration of both short- and long-term events. H.:lny iterations among BeL 
staff occur red, and sug,..e~t ions provided by NASA/HSl"C, Or-.'WI, P~'L. Ilnd Boeing 
were incorporated into the current versions. The fault trees for PhaSeS 1 and 
2 are given as Figures 5-2 and 5-3. (Figures 0-1 through 0-9 in Appendix 0 
provide schcllIlltics of all nine fault trees.) (The probabilities for the 
events in the trees have been estimated; see discussion in Secti\)11 5.3. and 
values for each event in Appendix G.) 
5.3 Failure and Event Probsbility Estimates 
--- The fallure and event probability estimates developed to determine 
the probabilities of certain accidents used in this risk study are discussed 
here. The reader is referred to the fault trees, shown in SectIon 5.2 and 
Appendix G, for a summary of all the probabilities used in the fault tree 
analyses (Phuses 1 through 6; the space risks for Phases 7 through 9 are 
pres~nted in Section 5.5). Table 5-3 provides 3 slwmary of probability data 
dweloped for mission Phases 1 through 6 (see Appendix G Lir basis). 
Discuss!\)n here is broken down into space systems failure probabilities and 
short-term space event probabilities. 
5.3.1 Space Systems Failure Probabilities 
This section briefly discusses the sources of informstion for space 
systl?!U failure probabilities. Systems to be discussed include: (1) the 
standard (RRS) Space Shuttle; (2) the Uprated (LRB) Space Shuttle; (3) orbit 
transfer systt."ITIs including tlH~ Orbit Trallsfer Vehicle (OT\'), the S~)lar Orbit 
Insertion Stage (SOlS), and On-Orbit Rescue Vehicles; and (~) the payload. 
5.3.1.1 Standard (SRn) Space Shuttle 
NASA does not pUhlt:3h or have in its possession "offici.ll" relia-
bility or failure rate data for the Space Shuttle. TIle current experience (as 
of February, 198~) finds the Shuttle to have successfully flol-'n twice during 
its developmental tl.!st flight prograr.t. Plans 3re to continuously ul'~r3de prob-
h'm areas as they are encountered on fl ights. The f31lurl~ ratl.!s for the 
Shut t II.! ~l re actunlly coro llnr ies to AI..ARA (~s lol<.' '::5 .:.cnsoll..lbly ~.~h Ievnble, as 
in nuclear radiation risk). 
Because of 1\ ~AS'\ need to CV3luilte I.Ihether or lIot a destruct system 
on the Shuttle during the (,lIrly portion of the flight is ,,:orthl.·hile. ~ASA/KSC 
con t ractl?d wi th Wiggi ns Company, Redondo Beach, Callfo rnh, t 0 p~rform a study 
I 
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TABLE 5-3. SPACE DISPOSAL PROBABILITY DATA (SHORT-TERM EVENTS) 
Release EventB 
2 3 4 S 6 7 8 9 
Long-Term Impact Impact Long-Term High-Velocity High-Veloci ty High-Velocity 
Hlsslon Corroston, on Hard on So 11 On-Orbit Corrosion, Impact Impact Impact 
I'tlase Ocean Rock(a) Volcano He ltd own Collision SoU on \later on Rock on son 
III 
~ 
~ 4.2£-8 
~ 
m 2 1.lE-I0 
r 
r 3 2.3E-9 2.3£-8 2.3E-17 2.3E-15 1.3E-13 9.2E-lJ 
m 
4 8.6E-9 1.1£-5 1.1E-14 1.IE-12 7.7E-lJ 4.3E-IO 
0 5 I.OE-ll 2.3£-8 2.0E-17 1.9E-15 1.1E-l1 8.5E-14 
0 6 ~ ~ !d!::!! ~ 2.5E-12 5.6E-16 ~ ~ 2.1E-9 r 
C Total 1.IE-8 1.IE-5 1.IE-14 1.IE-12 1.4E-ll 4.3E-I0 6.3E-I0 4.8E-I0 2.1E-9 ~ 
III 
C 
tn (a) nata for the cose where impact safety requirements would be met are: Phase 1 - 2.1E-12; Phase 3 - 1.2E-12; Phase 4 - 5.6E-I0; Phase 
5 - 3.5E-10; Phase 6 - 8.0E-l1; snd Total - 9.9E-I0. 
"', 
---
". 
\. 
0-
0 
OC' 
"';C 
"'0 G; 
0 _· ... 0"-;;tlP 
1=>"'0 c,.. 
'po (..) 
r" f!1 
=4-
-<(I) 
\ 
i ) 
... , 
" 
-' ...... 
" 
~-. 
. ----(~ , . 
! 
61 
, 
" . 
. I , 
I 
involving the hazards to the public of a failing Shuttle (Backer, 1981). An-
other Wiggins study (Hudson, 1979) has also been conducted for the latter 
portions of the flight prof ile to evaluate hazards when flying nuclear pay-
loads (e.g., Galileo). The failure rates developed in these studies were 
based upon data developed forh3r-dware in \~ASH-1400 (U.S. NRC, 1975) and upon 
NASA committee reliability estimates for the Solid Rocket Booster. The 
analysis was accomplished for only single-point failure modes, as have been 
identified in NASA/HSFC, 1977; NASA/JSC, 1978; Rockwell International, 1978a, 
1978b, 1979; and Hartin !-farietta, 1977. The Wiggins data (Baeker, 1981) also 
include ch:mges/modifications to failure rates resulting from an in-depth 
review by NASA Space Shuttle engineers. The results of all this appear in 
Baeker (1981) and are summarized in Table 5-4 for STS ignition through MECO 
(main engine cutoff). Earlier work by Hudson (1979) is summarized in Table 
5-5. Log-normal distributions were assumed for the failure rates. 
5.3.1.2 Uprated (LRB) Space Shuttle 
The vehicle used for nuclear waste disposal missions (see Section 
3.0) is the Uprated Space Shuttle, with two Liquid Rocket Boosters (LRBs) 
replacing the two Solid Propellant Boosters (SRBs) of the standard Space 
,"-" Shuttle vehicle. To utilize the Wiggins' data, certain r.lOdifications were 
necessary to provide a best estimate for the Uprated Shuttle with LRBs. The 
approach used was to eliminate failure rates related to the solid propellant 
motors, but replace each of them with the equivalent of an SSME/ET configura-
tion, to represent a typical LRB substitution. Resources were not available 
to carry out a Honte Carlo analysis. Because pure substitution was used, the 
data generated should be conservative (higher failure rates than the data base 
would support through rigorous Honte Carlo analyses). The critical failure 
rates for the LRb Shuttle are shown in Tables 5-6 and 5-7. Ten critically 
failed vehicle response modes are indicated in these tables. Appendices E and 
F further discuss the basis for these data. Note that the data in Tables 5-5 
and 5-7 are identical, with the same vehicle confi~uration from MECO through 
to payload separation. 
When the failure rate (per second) data of Tables 5-6 and 5-7 are 
integrated into the mission phase (with timelin::!s) of the nuclear waste 
disposal mission, Table 5-8 results. This shows the predicted Uprated Shuttle 
failure probabilities during each of the f:ve mission phases involvillg the 
Shuttle. An interesting comparison between the Standard (SRB) Shuttle and the 
Uprated (LRB) Shuttle is shown in Table 5-9. The variation shown for the 
Standard Shuttle is due to the NASA expert's view that the SRB critical fail-
ure rate cOt:1ponent for the solid propellant t:1otors was between 1/1000 to 
1/10,000 for a man-rated systet:1 (see Baeker, 1981). This variation results in 
an overall critical failure probability estit:1ate for the Standard Shuttle of 
between 1/1000 and 1/360. The corresponding value for the Uprated Space 
Shuttle is 1/1300. Basically, this implies that one catastrophi..: Shuttle 
failure is expected to occur every 1300 flights. The probability that one or 
~. t:1ore critical failures will occur in 1300 flights is 63 percent (1-[1-
1/1300]1300). For 750 oissions of a T'\uclear waste disposal mission scelHrio 
equivalent to one 100 ,000 HT~ ret-~sitory, there is about a 44 percent 
(1-[ 1-1/1300]750) chance that at least one critical STS failure will occur. 
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TABLE 5-4. WIGGINS DATA FOR STANDARD SHUTTLE CRITICAL FAILURE RATES (LIFTOFF TO HECO) 
Failed Vehicl~ No. of Component No. of 
(a) 
Failure Rates 
Response Mode Failur~ Modes Compcnents Mean Lower Upper 
1. Tipover on Pad 7 14 3.3E-5(b) 1.6E-5(b) 6.0E-5(b) 
2. Loss of Control and Tumble 2.0E-3 to 2.0E-4(c) 
3. Inadvertent Separation at an 
SRB/ET Af t Attachment 
• Liftoff to 100 Seconds 
• 100 Seconds to Staging 
4. Inadvertent Separation at an 
SRB/ET Forward Attachment 
5. Corkscrew Motion (Resulting 
from an SRB TVC Failure)' 
6. External Tank Punctured 
• Liftoff to Staging 
• Staeing to MECD 
7. ET Intcrtank and/or Aft 
LOX Tank Faiiure(d) 
8. SRB Recontact at Separation 
9. Loss of ME Propulsion 
• Liftoff to Staging 
• Staging to HEeo 
5 
6 
3 
38 
99 
93 
15 
18 
18 
23 
34 
36 
8 
442 
538 
445 
98 
168 
60 
71 
4.5E-9 
5.3E-9 
1.5E-9 
4.2E-7 
2.0E-7 
1.8E-7 
7.7E-8 
1.1E-5(b) 
6.6E-9 
3.4E-8 
3.1E-9 6.5~-9 
3.6E-9 7.4E-9 
7.2£-10 2.4E-9 
2.3E-7 7.4E-7 
8.4E-8 4.6E-7 
7.5E-8 4.1E-7 
2.6E-8 1.6E-7 
7 .lE-6( b) 1.7E-5(b) 
1.2E-9 2.3E-8 
3.9E-9 1.2E-7 
---~ ........ -----~--. -------- --_ ..----.. ----..-.------.. ~---.. --------.... -.--. .... ------------_ ... ----.. -------- .. - .. -..-.• ....... --
Source: Backer, 1981. 
(a) Probability of failure per second (except for Response Modes 1 and 8); 
90 percent confidence assumed. 
(b) Probability of failure per event. 
(c) Engineering judgment from NASA for man-rated solid propellant boosters. 
(d). Th!s mode is much more likely to occur during Stage 1 flight when the loads and heating are high. 
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TABLE 5-5. WIGGINS DATA FOR STANDARD SHUTTLE CRITICAL FAILURE RATES 
(MECO TO PAYLOAD SEPARATION) 
Failed Vehicle 
Response Mode 
No. of Component 
Failure Nodes 
a. External Tank Punctured 
• HECO to Start RCS 
Separation Burn 
• During ReS Separation Burn 
b. Los s of Haneuve r a bili ty and 
Orbiter Tumbles to Earth 
• ~lliCO to Start RCS 
Separation Burn 
• During RCS Separation Burn(b) 
• End ReS Separation Burn to 
01-15-1 Complete 
c. Loss of Mancuverability on Orbit 
(Orbital Decay) 
• OHS-l Complcte to Payload 
Separation 
d. Fire and Explosion in Main 
Engillc C~mpartmcnt 
• End ReS Separation Burn to 
Oruit Insertion (OMS-l 
Complete) 
50 
73 
15 
4 
46 
46 
23 
No. of 
Components 
255 
461 
93 
11 
360 
360 
185 
Mean 
1.8E-7 
1.3E-6 
6.0E-8 
2.2E-7 
2.2E-7 
1.lE-7 
(a) 
Failure Rates 
Lower Upper 
7.5E-8 4.2E-7 
5.5E-7 2.1E-G 
1.6E-8 1.1E-7 
9.0E-8 4.6E-7 
9.0E-8 4.6E-7 
4.4E-8 3.0E-7 
--- .. -----.- ... ~- ............. -.. -.-.. --... -------.-----.--------.. ~··- .. ·--_--=-...... _ .._ .. __________ ... _· ___________ .4 __ 
Source: Hudson, 1979. 
(a) Probability of failure per se~ond; 90 percent confidence assumed. (b) 'Values are insignificant. . 
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TABLE 5-6. SUMMARY OF MODIFIED WIGGINS CRITICAL FAILURE RATE ~ 
DATA FOR LRB SlillTTLE (LIFTOFF TO MECO) 
___________________ ._--.-... ____ ---..-..--. _____________ .. _____ , _ _._. ____ -.-.-.-c ____ ............ ________ .. _ -.- • .:.a..a ________ .. .-__ • _ .. __ 
Failed Vehicle 
Response Hode 
1. Inadvertent Separation at 
an LRB/ET Aft Attachment 
• Liftoff to 100 Seconds 
• 100 Seconds to LRB Stag ing 
2. Inadvertent Separatlor. at 
nn LRB/ET Forward Attachment 
3. Propellant Tanks Punctured 
• Liftoff to Staging 
• Staging to MEeD 
4. Intertank and/or Aft LOX 
Tank Fa llures 
• Liftoff to Staging 
• Staging to MECD 
s. LRB Recontact at Separation 
6. Loss of Propulsion 
• Liftoff to Staging 
• Staging to MECD 
No. of Component No. of 
Failure Modes Components 
5 34 
6 36 
3 8 
99 1614 
93 445 
15 294 
15 98 
18 168 
18 180 
23 71 
Mean 
4.5E-9 
5.3E-9 
1.5E-9 
6.0E-7 
1.8E-7 
2.3E-7 
7.7f.-8 
(a) 
Failure Rates 
Lower Upper 
3.1E-9 6.5E-9 
3.6E-9 7.4E-9 
7.2E-IO 2.4E-9 
2.5E-7 1.4E-6 
7.5E-8 4.IE-7 
7.8E-8 4.8E-7 
2.6E-8 1.6E-7 
1.3E-S(b) 7.1E-6(b) i.7E-5(b) 
2.0E-8 3.6E-9 6.9E-8 
3.4E-8 3.9Z-9 1.2E-7 
-.- ....... -....... -, ..... -.... ...---.-------------~-----.".---------.--.-~-..... ----------------.--... --------. 
(a) Probability of failure per second (except for Response Mode 5); 90 percent 
confidence assumed. 
(b) Probability of failure per event. 
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TABLE 5-7. SUMMARY O~ MODIFIED WIG~LJS CRITICAL FAILURE RATE 
DATA FOR LRB SHUTTLE (MECO TO PAYLOAD SEPARATION) 
_ .... ___ .-__ ~_---. _______ __ • ______________ ,.._ .......... _~ __ . ____ .. ___ .... ________ ~ ...... _;-. ____ .. __ -..a. ........ _ • ___ , .... _____ .. __ .__.-.-- .. ____ _____ ~ __ 
Failed Vehicle 
Response Mode 
7. External Tank Punctured 
• HEeo to Start Res 
Separat ion Burn 
• During ReS Separation Burn 
8. Loss of Maneuverability and 
Orbiter Tumbles to Earth 
• HECO to St"rt RCS 
Separation Burn 
• During ReS Separation-Burn(b) 
• End RCS Separation Burn to 
First 011S Burn Complete 
9. Loss of Maneuverability on Orbit 
(Orbital Decay) 
• First OHS Burn Complete to 
Payload Separation 
10. Fire and Explosion in Main 
Engine Compartment 
• End RCS Separation Burn to 
Orbit Insertion (First OMS 
Burn Complete) 
No. of Component 
Failure Modes 
50 
73 
15 
4 
46 
46 
23 
No. of 
Components 
255 
461 
93 
11 
360 
360 
185 
Mean 
1.8E-7 
1.3E-6 
6.0E-8 
2.2E-7 
2.2E-7 
1.2E-7 
(a) 
Failure Rates 
Lower Upper 
7.5E-6 4.2E-7 
5.5E-7 _ 2.1E-6 
1.6E-8 -1.IE-7 
9.0E-8 4.5E-7 
9.0E-8 4.5E-7 
4.4E-8 3.0E-7 
-_ ..... ----- .. --- .~. -------...--.-..- .. --- ---------~..--.-.-----... --... ---------------- --------------------- -_ .... 
Source: Wiggins Company report (Hudson, 1979). 
(a) Probability of failure per second; 90 percent confidence assumed. 
(b) Values are insignificant. 
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TABLE 5-8. PREDICTED UPRATED STS CRITICAL FAILURE 
PROBABILITIES DURING EACH MISSION PHASE(a) 
Time, STS Failure Probabilities 
Phase s Component Mean Lower Upper 
1. I~nition to Clear Land '0-24 Shuttle/ET/LRR 2.1E-S 8.0E-6 4.7E-5 
2. Clcar Land to LRB Staging 24-124 Shuttle/ET/LRB 1.1E-4 4.1E-S 7.3E-S 
3. LRB Staging to MECO 124-518 Shuttle/ET 1.ISE-4 4.1E-S 2.7E-4 
4. MEca to LEO Orbit 
Attainment 518-2,734 Shuttle S.4E-4 2.2E-4 1.IE-3 
S. LEO Orbit Attainment to 
OTV Ignition 2,734-35,024 Shuttlt! 7.1E-3 2.9E-3 I.SE-2 
----.-------.-..- --- ......... - .. ---- ... ---_ .... --- . --_.-_ .. '-",,-- -- .... --... _--- .......... _--.. - ....... _- .. ---_ .... ----
(a) Derived from Wiggins Company reports on predicted STS failure rates (see 
Backer, 1981 and Hudson, 1979). 
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FAILL'RE PROBABILITY COMPARISON (SID SRB 
SmrrrLE VS UPRATED LRB SHUTTLE) 
STD SRB 
Shuttle 
Uprated 
LRB Shuttle 
Liftoff to NEeo 
SRB-Related Failures 1/3600-1/480 None 
Non-SRB-Related Failures 1/5900 1/4300 
NECO to Orbit' 
Non-SRB-Related Failures 1/1850 1/1850 
TOTAL 1/1000-1/360 1/1300 
----~--.--------~~------------------------ ------------~-----
5.3.1.3 Orbit Transfer and Rescue Systems 
Boeing's space systems st·.rly (Reinert et aI, 1982) prov!.ded the 
success probabilities for the Orbit Transfer Vehicle (OTV) and Solar Orbit 
Insertion Stage (SOlS). The success probability for a rescue mission was 
estimated by Boeing to be achievable. These data are shown in Table 5-10. 
Boeing's study also concluded that the probability of an CD! and SOlS not 
failing in a safe condition was 1.0E-6 (Reinert et aI, 1982). 
TABLE 5-10. PREDICTED OTV/SOIS/RESCUE VEHICLE 
SUCCESS PROBABILITIES(a) 
------------------~-----------------------------------~---.-----. 
OTV SOlS Rescue Vehicle 
Startup 0.9986 0.9986 
End Point 0.9875 0.9969 0.944 
(a) Data from ooeing Conpany study (Reinert et aI, 1982). 
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5.3.1.4 Payload Systems 
Two issues to be discussed here relate to (1) what is an undetected 
mechanical defect in the payload shield and the likelihood that it occurs, and 
(2) what is the failure rate for the payload's transmitters after ground/ocean 
impact. 
A review of WASH-1285 (U.S. AEC, 1974a) provided data on vessel 
defects. WASH-1285 reports that Phillips and Warwick analyzed 12,700 pressure 
vessels and found four preexisting defects. Also reported in HASH-1285 are 
data collected by Kellerman and Seidel which found six preexisting defects out 
of 7000 possible in high pressure steam drums. As a result of combining these 
data. we have an tmdetected mechanical defect rate of 10/19,700, or 5E-4. 
When we consider that more stringent quality control standards would be 
employed for the space disposal shield, we reduce this value by a factor of 10 
to 5E-5. We assume that. if this undetected defect 1s present, the shield 
will break upon impact or. a hard surface.* 
The Reference payload employs sh on-board radio transmitters/sonar 
beacons to help pinpoint the reentry trajectory and location in the ocean (for 
ocean impact). The failure rate (for ocean impact) assumed per instrument was 
,0.1. It was also 3ss~ed that of the six total, three would be knocked out by 
being on the side of the impact. Therefore, the probability of having all 
fail after a water impact would be (0.1)3 or 1E-3. 
5.3.2 Short-Term Space Event Probabilities 
This section discusses the estimated collision probabilities for 
short-term events that occur in spac~ which are reported in Appendix G for 
Phases 1 through 6 of the fault trees. Events included are meteoroid itapact$ 
and man-made on-orbit debris impacts. Also, Figure 5-4 was generated using 
Battelle's Interactive Graphics Orbit Selection (IGOS) program to support the 
estimates of land and ocean impact probabilities early in the mission. 
5.3.2.1 Collision Probability Estim:J.tes for Heteoroid Impacts 
The analytical approach for calculating the probabilities associated 
with payload/meteoroid fragmentation events was developed in a previous study 
of this risk pathway for nuclear waste payloads (Friedlander and Wells, 1980). 
Basic source data for such an analysis \o:ere derh·,,·J fr:oC! the published 
scientific literature dealing with the ceteoroid flux envirollI:lent and the 
destruction mechanics of high-velocity icpact. 
*The current payload design is not expected to meet the safety guideline of 
being able to survive hard rock impact (see Sections 2.1.3 and 5.4). The 
current risk data assUI:le that shield breakage will occur and radioactive 
material \"'Ould be released to the atoosphcre. if the payload it::jlacts 0:1. hard 
rock. 
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Experiments ~~th high-energy projectiles impactin~ basalt targets led 
to the development of mathematical models expressing the relationship bet~~en 
fragmentation energy, projectile mass, and target mass release in small 
particle distribution. These results were scaled to a space system/payload 
target assuming a tenfold increase in material strength relative to basalt. A 
critical energyltarget mass ratio Ep/Mt of about 7500 joules/kg would 
begin to release mass in catastrophic collision, e.g., beyond simple cratering 
collision. The projectile (meteoroid) kinetic energy is 
(1) 
where Hp is the projectile mass and Vr is the relative velocity of impact. 
At Ep/Ht - 7500 joules/kg and Vr - 17,500 mIs, the critical projectile 
size is then estimated to be 0.76 kg (7.8 cm diameter at 3 g/cm3) to begin 
partial fragmentation of a single payload sphere (Nt - 15,493 kg). 
The target fractional mass release in small particle distribution is 
given by the expression 
H (b < 1 llun) 
Nt 
(2) 
Small particle mass release at the critical energy level of 7500 joules/kg is 
only 0.3 percent. Total catastrophic breakup requires an energy level of 4.2 
x 105 joules/kg which would result from a prOjectile mass of 42.7 kg (30 cm) 
impacting a single payload sphere. 
The, pr:>babUity factor iS'introduced by the meteoroid fltL"t distribu-
tion. or collision frequency 
(3) 
in units of impacts/y..!ar for a target of area At in units of meters square. 
Hence. for a single mission (two spheres at 2.12 m2 each). the probabilities 
of pay~,ad/meteoroid impacts are: (1) 6.69 x lO-9/ yr at the critical 
fractut~ limit. and (2) 1.78 x 10-lO/yr at the total catastrophic breakup 
limit. Corresponding probabilities for other system elements (OTV. SOlS) are 
calculated toy area scal ing. Finally. che effecti ... !! collision probabilities 
for aisslon Fhases ) through 6 are obtained by I:1ultiplying by the time 
interval over which the system configuration is at risk. 
5.3.2.2 Collision Probability Estimates for 
Han-Hade On-Orbit D.:-br.i.s Inpacts 
The continuous usc of Earth-orbital space during the past two decades 
has resulted in a population of space "junk" or debris which poses a collision 
hazard for current and future operat ions. This debris includ~~s spent pay-
lo.1ds. rocket bodies. and nUClerous explosion fragments. It is esti:::ated that, 
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.... 
the debris population will continue to increase because the primary source 
operations continue. and because secondary collisions between such objects 
will feed this growth. Recent analyses of this problem have provided the data 
base for estimating the risk posed to space disposal of nuclear waste 
(Kessler. 1980; Chobotov. 1981; Reynolds. 1980). In this investigation we 
have used Reynolds' projection of the debris population to the year 2030, 
based on an gnnual growth rate of 5 percent. 
The collision probability may be calculated from the mean-free path 
model which states: A target with an effective cross-sectional area At mov-
ing with an average relative velocity Vr will sweep out a volume VrAtl:. t 
in the time inten'al l:.t. The number of debris objects encountered is the 
product of this volume and particle number density N(h) of the debris where 
the explicit dependence on altitude h is indicated. Since this product is 
generally much smaller than unity, the collision probability may be calculated 
as 
(4) 
Reynolds has taken the projected density distributlon as a function of alti-
tude and. assucing an average impact speed Vr - 8 lan/s, this provided an 
altitude histogram distribution of collision probability in normalized units 
of collisions/cm2 s. These data show that at the nocinal deployment ;tlti-
tllde, during Mission Phases 3 through 5. the debris collision probability is 
8 x 10-18 cm-2 s-l and reaches a peak value of about 10-16 cm-2 
s-1 at 800 km altitude. This then falls off to a value of 5 x 10-19 
cm-2 s-1 at 4000 km altitude near the point of orv burnout (end of Phase 
6) • 
The time lines (l:.t) used for the various mission phases 1 ave been 
given previously in Table 5-2. The cross-sectional areas 3ssumed are as 
follows: 
Shuttle Orbiter • • • • • • • • • • 250 m1 
orv/SOrS/Payload Configuration. 117 m2 
OlV •••••••••••••• 74.9 0 2 
sors • • • • 37.9 m2 
Payload (two spheres) ••••• 4.24 m2 
An example calculation is the srs Orbiter/Jebris collision probabil-
ity during Phase 3 (see Fault Tree Event No. 323 in Table G-3 of Appendix G). 
This probability entry is obtained as 
(8 x 10-18 cm-2 5-1) x (2.5 x 106 cu2 ) x (394 5) - 7.9 x 10-9 
A second example relates to !-!ission Phase 6, OT\' ignition throu~h attainment 
of Earth-escape conditions. Here the cur.lUlative debris collision probability 
is found by integrating the collif:lon distributlon over tbe (altitude), 
yielding 5.94 x 10-14 cm-2 • lienee, for the tot.\l configurath1n area of 
1.17 x 106 cm2 , the probability is 7 x 10-8 , which is the entry 
appearing in Table G-6 for Fault Tree Event No. 676. 
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A final comment may be made regarding the potential damage caused by 
space debris impact. w'hile the debris number density above a given size 
object is fairly well known from radar tracking data, there is considerable 
uncertainty regarding the size distribution of such debris below 4 em 
diameter. Consider a single payload sphere of mass 15,493 kg and area 2.12 
m2• At Vr • 8 km/s, the critical fragmentation energy of Ep/Mt .. 7500 
joules/ kg would result from an impacting projectile mass of about 3.6 kg (~10 
em diameter at 8 g/cm3 density). A 200 kg object ( 36 cm) would be expected 
to cause total catastrophic breakup of the cermet payload sphere. Although 
the occurrence of space debris with these characteristics is very unlikely 
(personal conversation with Don Kessler, NASA/JSC), this event was considered 
to occur one in every 1000 impacts. 
5.4 Payload Response Analysis 
Various payload response analyses were needed to verify the expected 
response of the payload to certain accident environments. Emphasis was placed 
on areas where it was felt that easy answers could be provided and where acci-
dents were expected to playa predominant role in the risk estimate for space 
disposal. 
The following accident environments and payload responses were 
analyzed: (1) reentry, (2) postburial meltdown, and (3) impact on granite. 
5.4.] Reentry Analysis 
This subsection summarizes efforts to predict the payload thermal 
response for inadvertent atmospheric reentry. The basic configurations that 
were examined are: 
• Waste form with Inconel-625 shield and carbon carbon (C/C) reentry 
tiles (orbital decay and vertical reentry) 
• Waste form with Inconel-625 shield only (i.e., C/r. tiles removed, 
orbital decay reentry) 
• Waste form chunks resulting from on-orbit payload collisions. 
The RETAC (Reentry Thermal Analysis Code) was used to provide the thermal 
response analysis. This code includes a complex thermal response model for 
determining the in-depth response oJf a material system to an external heat 
flux. Furthermore, internal heat generation is provided for as a code input. 
The exte~nal flux variation with time can be specified on input cards (e.g., 
to model a fire environment) or be calculated by the code's tr3jectory subrou-
tines (the aerodynamic flux due to a vehicle reentering the Earth's atmo-
sphere). A detailed surface energy balance is included to account for 
reradi'Atlon, conduction, and surface MaSS loss effects. The conductivity, 
specific heat, heat of fusion, heat generation, and density of various 
internal and surface material components are also input to the code to r.lodel 
the complex response of the naterial conponents to the input and internal heat 
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fluxes. Variations of the above material properties with temperature are also 
included where appropriate. 
RETAC code inputs can be placed in several categories: 
• Geometric considerations (i.e., size, shape, and weight) 
• Initial temperature conditions 
• Material properties as a function of temperature (i.e., conductiv-
ity, specific heat, emittance, density, and heat of fusion) 
• Initial orbit conditions (i.e., velocity, altitude, telative 
flight path angle, and ballistic coefficient) 
• Vehicle stability (i.e., spinning versus stable). 
The input variables used in the reentry analysis are given b~low. 
5.4.1.1 Geometry 
Geometric parameters are inputted into the code to define various 
material boundaries. This geometric definition essentially divides the body 
into a series of nodal regions which interact wi th one another as heat is 
transferred between the various nodes. An example of this complex nodal 
structure is shown in Figure 5-5. !~ote that for two-dimensional (2-D) calcu-
lations the body is usually divided into five sectors defined by six input 
angles (9 in Figure 5-5a) from 0 to 180 degrees. The 3-D shape of each sector 
is produc<!d by rotation of the 2-D representation about the 9 = 0 axis (I.e., 
symmetry axis). For example, the conically shaped 3-D representation of 
sector No.2 is shown crosshatched in Figure s-sa. 
The spherical body is further subdlvided into a series of up to 10 
concentric rings (see Figure 5-5b). The various ring radii usually define 
spherical shell regions of the body such as the waste boundary, but several 
rings can also be used within a given materlal to better define the tempera-
ture distribution within that material. The combination of rings and sectors 
define various nodal regions throughout the body. The location of the (sector 
.. 2, ring'" 2) node is shown in Figure s-5h. It is one of the 20 nodal 
regions shown in this figure. For 2-D calculations, up to SO nodal regions 
were used with a preponderance of nodes being located in the region of highest 
heat flu,. For I-D calculations, such as a spinning reentr)" or a fire 
enVironment, only one sector from 0 to 180 de~rees was used. Hence, the nodes 
reduced to a maximum of 10 concentric spherical shells. Regions of radiation 
gaps can also be conveniently defined usin~ the rin~ geometry. Heat transfer 
across a radiation gap is incorporated in the code, and ~lterial ~issivity is 
accounted (or as an input variable. 
For the particular cases of interest, the geOMetric O)del used a 
series of nlone or ten concentric spherical ri'1gs as shown in Figure 5-6. The 
location of each ring was dependent upon the case analyzed. -\ StlO.."'l3'Y of ring 
radii is also given in Figure 5-6. 
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FIGURE 5-5. INTERNAL NODAL STRUCTURE USED TO MODEL THE TRANSIENT HEATDlG 
RESPONSE OF VARIOUS WASTE FORM MATERIAL CONFIGURATIONS 
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FIGURE 5-6. RING GEOMETRY FOR TWO MAJOR CONFIGURATIONS ANALYZED 
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The initial temperature distribution of each node (i.e., ring if the 
initial distribution is spherically symmetric) is an important code input. 
The temperature distributions used in the present accident response analyses 
are shown in Figure 5-7. 
5.4.1.2 Material Properties 
The nominal material conductivity and specific heat used in the 
analyses are given in Table 5-11 as a function of material temperature. The 
waste form was assumed to thermally resemble the material called Invar. 
Inconel-625 properties were used for the shield and ATJ-S was assumed for a 
generic graphite material. In Table 5-11, the code linearly interpolates 
between the thermal conductivity values when the temperature lies between the 
given values. However, for the specific heat, Cp, a stepwise approach is used 
whereby the value given in the table is constant up to the tabulated tempera-
ture. This procedure allows the inclusion of the heat of fusion as a step 
jump in the specific heat for a specific temperature increment. The area of 
this step (i.e., 6Cp x 6T = t.Hfusion)' Other material properties are listed 
in Table 5-12. 
5.4.1.3 Initial Orbital Conditions 
The initial orbital conditions for the reentry scenarios of interest 
were as follows: 
Orbital decay: Velocity a 7620 m/s 
Altitude ~ 91.4 km 
Flight path angle = -1 degree 
Steep reentry: Velocity - 11,315 mls 
Altitude ~ 121.95 kID 
Flight path angle = -60 degrees 
The initial ballistic coefficients for the intact payload reentry cases were 
calculated from the total vehicle weight and frontal area using a drag coeffi-
cient of 1.00 to obtain values of 
C/C added: 
C/C removed: 
W/CDA - 7228.6 kg/m2 
W/CDA = 7818.9 kg/m2 • 
5.4.1.4 Stability Mode 
Another code input is the vehicle stability code (Le., randomly 
spinning or stable at supersonic speeds). The vehicle Qay also be allowed to 
randomly tllr:lble at subsonic speed. For the stable condition, calculated 
tC!:lperature will be different for each sector and ring. HOI."ever, for a 
totally spinning reentry only, the ring teoperature varies as the heat is 
spread evenly among the various sectors. A mixed stable/spinning trajectory 
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TABLE 5-11. MATERIAL PROPERTIES AS A FUNCTION OF TEMPERATURE 
Waste Core (Invar) Shield (Inconel-625) Graphite (ATJ-S) 
Temperature, k, Cp, k, Cp, k, CPt 
K W/mr.. W-s/kg K W/mK W-s/kg K (W/mK) (W-s/kg K 
44.4 2.1E-04 3.97E-05 8.90E-05 3.10E-05 1.611E-03 
88.9 8.90E-05 
111.1 2.1E-04 3.97E-05 
233.3 
255.6 3.0E-04 1.18E-04 3.10E-05 9.05E-05 
300.0 1.611E-03 
400.0 3.97E-05 
477 .8 3.8E-04 1.60E-04 3.54E-05 
533.3 1.242E-03 1.08E-04 
600.0 4.1E-04 4.49E-05 
700.0 2.03E-04 3.94E-05 
800.0 4.8E-04 
811.1 5.0E-04 9.45E-04 1.24E-04 
922.2 4.23E-05 2.45E-04 4.33E-05 
1088.9 5.8E-04 7.38E-04 1.39E-04 
1144.4 2.94E-04 4.7n-05 
1255.6 3.30E-04 
1366.7 4.62E':"05 6.25E-04 1.50£-04 
1561.1 5.17E-05 
1603.3 6.69E-04(a) 
1644.4 4.94E-05 5.53E-04 1.57E-04 
1922.2 5.40E-05 5.05E-04 1.63E-04 
2200.0 4.73E-04 1.66E-04 
2477.8 4.49E-04 1.69E-04 
2755.6 4.33E-04 1.70E-04 
3033.3 4.16E-04 
5811.1 5.8E-04 4.98E-05 3.30E-04 5.17E-05 4.16E-04 1.70E-04 
----=--------.--.---.-~.--.------.- --~- ~--
(a) Accounts for ~Hfu5ion. 
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can also be computed with the final result of differing temperatures for each 
node. 
TABLE 5-12. OnIER MATERIAL PROPERTIES OF INTEREST 
Material Property Waste Form Shield Graphite Aeroshel1 
Density (g/cm3) 6.84 8.44 1.83 
Emissivity 0.80 0.80 0.90 
Heat of Fusion (cal/g) 65.0 80.6 
Internal Heat Generation 1.2E-03 0 0 
(cal/cm3) 
Helting Temperature (K) 1720 1560 
-------------------
--
5.4.1.5 Results and Discussion 
Using the above code inputs, the thermal response of a shielded waste 
form container and waste form chunks was analyzed for several scenarios. Code 
outputs include node temperatures as a function of time during entry. 
Traj ectory data are also provided. Impact conditions are noted by observing 
the properties at the time of Earth impact. The code's analysis scheme ac-
counted for the mass loss of either graphite or a metal material (1.e., 
melting ablation). The resultant mass loss was thereby accounted for 
automatically throughout the reentry. 
5.4.1.5.1 Case 1 - Graphite Acroshell Included (Orbital Decay) 
The first case involved reentry of the waste form plus shield and 
graphite aeroshell. The ring radii are given in Figure 5-6a, and the sectors 
are defined by 9 = 0, 20, 40, 80, 120, and 180 degrees. An orbital decay tra-
jec.tory was as:;uced in this case. Re:;ults of surface mass loss and nodal 
temperatures for stable and randomly spinning reentry modes are given in 
Tables 5-13 and 5-14, respectively. The il'lpact velocity was predicted to be 
442 mise 
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TABLE 5-13. SURFACE RECESSION AND NODE TEMPERATURES 
AT IMPACT FOR STABLE REENTRY MODE 
-_. -~-- ---- .--
Total Ring Temperature, K(a) 
Recession, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
0, deg cm C C S S S S A A A 
0 (nose) 0.45 
853 678 383 352 402 765 1541 1640 1616 
20 0.43 
853 678 383 351 396 738 1496 1598 1582 
40 0.33 
853 678 383 251 376 639 1293 1392 1402 
80 0.10 
853 . 678 ·383 350 348 467 791 824 833 
120 0 
853 678 383' 349 339 386 524 535 538 
180 0 
- ..... ~------------... .---=------~.-..-~-~ 
------------
(a) C Core; S = Shield; A = Ablator. 
TABLE 5-14. SURFACE RECESSION AND NODE TEMPERATURES AT 
IMPACT FOR SPINNING REENTRY CONFIGURATION 
---- - -------------------------,-------------------
Total Ring Temperature, K(a) 
Recession, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
e, deg cm C C S S S S A A 
" 
0-180 0.112 853 678 383 350 364 580 1162 1247 1267 
(a) C = Core; S 2 Shield; A = Ablator. 
These results indicate that, for an orbital decay trajectory, the 
graphite-protected waste form and shield will survive intact to Ea~th i~pact, 
regardless of reentry stability mode. 
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5.4.1.5.2 Case 2 - Orbital Decay Reentry of Waste Plus 
Shield Only (i.e., Graphite Aeroshell Removed) 
In this case, the graphite aeroshel1 is assumed to be lost due to 
some malfunction, and the waste form inadvertently reenters on an orbital 
decay trajectory with only the Inconel-625 metal shield to protect it. The 
ring radii are given in Figure 5-6b and thp sectors are defined by a .. 0, 15, 
30, 45, 60, and 180 degrees. 
In this case a melting ab1ator mass loss calculation was assumed 
whereby material nodes were dropped when their temperature reached the melting 
point and the heat of fusions was supplied. No liquid layer effects were 
accounted for in the analysis. Hence, the mass loss results are expected to 
be conservative. These surface reces!'ion data and nodal temperatures for 
stable and randoMly spinning reentry modes are given in Tables 5-15 and 5-16, 
respectively. Impact velocity was r.alculated to be 470 m/s. 
TABLE 5-15. SURFACE RECESSION AlID NODE TEMPERATIJRE AT IHPAcr 
FOR STABLE REENTRY HODE RING TEMPERATURE (K) 
-- ---~- -------------~ 
Total Ring Temperature, K(a) 
Recession, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
a, deg em C C S S S S S S S S 
o (nose) 16.33 
836 678 457 _(b) 
15 15.72 
836 678 398 592 
30 13.64 
836 678 389 503 
45 11.05 
836 678 381 380 558 
60 6.91 
836 678 . 380 353 346 389 537 
180 0.00 
--------.. _---------------------------.. _------_.-------..... _--... 
(3) C .. Core; S .. Shield. 
(b) Haterial node is not present at impact (i.e., it ablated away during 
reentry). 
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TABLE 5-16. SURFACE RECESSIOn AND NODE TEMPERATURE AT IMPACT 
FOR SPINNING REENTRY MODK 
.. --.-_--
Total Ring Temperature, K 
Recession, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
a. deg en C r S S S S S S 
0-1':0 1.68 836 678 380 353 346 383 539 866 
9 10 
S S 
!O58 
_ ..... --..... -.,.----- .. - ------ .-----
These results indicate that. for an orbital decay trajectory, the 
shield will remain essentially intact if the vehicle randomly spins during 
reentry. However. if the body remains stable. a large portion of its nose 
region is eroded away during reentry (see Table 5-15). Therefore. shielding 
of the waste form will be reduced in that area and impact protection will also 
be adversely affected. 
5.4.1.5.3 Case 3 - Steep Reentry of Waste Form Plus 
Shield Plus Graphite Aeroshell 
This last case involved reentry of the waste form, shield. and graph-
ite aeroshell at a steep (60 degrees) angle and at a high reentry velocity 
(11,315 m/s). Analysis of this case is extre!lle1y difficult due to the high 
rate of heat flux to the vehicle. For the spinning mode of entry. the 
analysis was completed. but a very long run time would have been required to 
obtain results for the stable reentry configuration. A summary of toe impact 
results obtained for the spinning case are: 
T shield (surface) ~ 542 K 
T shield (bulk) ~ Unchanged (350 K) 
Surface recession = 0.048 cm. 
Based upon the results of the orbital decay trajectory calculations 
the nose recession for the stable case would be approximately four times that 
of the spinning case. Therefore, it is expected that the stable nose 
recession wOt!ld not have exceeded 0.20 em. For both reentry cor-figurations, 
the impact velocity was calculated to be 5328 m/s. (A 90 degree reentry 
results in an impact velocity of 5912 m/s.) 
Calculatlons and estimates given above indicate thnt the graphite 
aeroshe1l will protect the waste form plus shield prior to Earth ic:pact. How-
ever, the very high impact velocities deter~ined for this steep entry case may 
,---.. provide another set of problems for this reentry scenario. 
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5.4.1.5.4 Case 4 - Orbital Decay Reentry of Waste Form Chunks 
Several calculations were made to help evaluate the waste form burn-
fractions for different-sized waste form chunks. These pieces are believed 
sible when a catastrophic on-orbit coltision (meteoroid or debris) occurs. 
reentry conditions were those given for orbital decay (see Section 
.• 1.3), wi. th the assumption that the chunks were spherical and spinning. 
smallest size (3.35 em radius) approximated an individual billet. The 
ults are given below: 
Radius, cm 
3.35 
10.16 
20.32 
81.26 
Recession, cm 
3.35 (all) 
3.78 
2.55 
1.68 
ure 5-8 shows a plot of these data. It may be concluded that total burnup 
the waste form will likely occur for pieces less than about 9 cm in radius. 
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5.4.2 Postburia1 Neltdown Analysis 
The waste payload ~enerates heat due to the decay of radioisotopes. 
th~ payload were subjected to a sufficiently insulating environment, the 
.t 6eneration has the potential to cnuse the waste form core to melt inter-
1y. Thts may lead to the melting of the shield and breach of containment, 
.1owed by release to the bio3phere. 
In the event of an accidental payload reentry, it is possible for the 
'load to bury itself in nn insulattn~ material, such as dry sand. If the 
'loud were not recovered within some critical twe period (Tcr) , a melt 
1 release could occur. To analyze the possibility of this release, it W3S 
:essary to perform a thermal analysis on the payloild to determine the condi-
lOS required for melting to occur. In particular, it was necessary to 
termine the limiting thermal conductivity, kllmit, of the insulat ing en-
C'onment which would cause me Iting. The value established in this analysis 
;; then used to estimate the percentage of the Earth in which material of 
Eficiently low thermal conductivity exists (see fault tree discussion). 
The analysiS was performed as follows. Since the center of the 
here would be the hottest point. a limitin~ temperature (90 pl~rcent of the 
r':te formation absolute temperature; sec General Safety Guidelines) was 
tablished below which no meltin~ (with safety factor) ,",'Quld occur. The 
mperllture drops for the cermet, the gnp, the Inconel-625 shield, and the 
nphite thermal protection sy!ltcm (TPS) were then calculated. This reslllt~d 
the critical surface temperature which could result in melting. TIlls 
mperature, along with the surface area and mnbient temperature, wns then 
cd to calculate the limiting thermal conductivity, klimit. 
. In perfonnin~ this analysis, several aSRumptions were made. Constant 
llues were used for the properties of the cermet, Inconel-625, alld ~raphlte. 
lis assumption was proper since the temperature drops turn out to be small. 
lother conservative assumption was made that the parload wns buried deeply in 
Ie insulating medium. The results of these calcu13t ions are displayed in 
,ble 5-17. 
5.4.3 Grnnite Impact Analysis 
TIle object ive of this dynllmlc finite-clement impnct nn:llysis was to 
erform a preliminary analytical response assessment of the reentry impnct of 
1e waste payload Oil hard rock (itrallitc) in support of prcdictin!~ the (t'lease 
i5k. For this analysis, simpl Hying aSHUl'lpt ions were made for the tn·Herinl 
eh.wior of the paylo;ld and the granite taq:et. By not nllO\~ing failure to 
ccur in the target, the results presented here are conservlltivc. 
The D'i!\A2D f inite-ele:nent computer program, developed nt Lawrence 
,------.ivert:lore Nat ional L;\boratory. IJag used in the analyses. nY~A~D is nn 
~licit, time intcRrntlon code and contnln~ a four-noded qU8drilat~ral 
lcrnent tllDt is based on the Galcrkin-Petrov formulation. Featur~s within the 
rogram which arc significant in terms of the model employed in this analysis 
nclllde: 
I \. 
I 
! 
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TABLE 5-17. 
. 
Core Center 
Temperature, C 
1050 
1200 
IIi, I 
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THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY IN IMPACT MEDIUM NEEDED 
TO ALLOW TEMPERATURE COUDITIOUS GIVEN 
Core Surface 
Temperature, C 
1000 
1150 
1200 
1450 
1450 
--------,-----------------
Outer Shield 
Temperature, C 
1170 
1435 
1450(a) 
Limiting Thermal 
Conductivity, W/mC 
0.32 
0.28 
0.26 
0.21 
< 0.21 
--------------._------.-------------------------
~lelt condition for outer part of radiation shield. 
,-, 
(1) A bilinear representation with isotropic stra~,n hardening for, 
elastic-plastic stress-strain response of the m,lterial. 
(2) Calculations based on large deflection and finite strain 
theories. 
(3) Slidelines that allow modeling of initial separation and 
subsequent contact as a result of impact • 
. s particularly significant that the analysis was devoid of any material 
ure criterion, thus allowing stresses to exceed thresholds such as the 
mate or rupture stress. This implies that the calculated results, in 
s of the extent of damage through failure, would be conservative on 
unt of the simulation of the target. 
5.4.3.1 Impact Model Description 
The finite-element analysis is based on the assumption that the 
onents of the waste payload can be considered ~s homogeneous, spherically 
tetric core material representing th,' cermet 'lUstc form and the primary 
:1 core structure, surrounded by the Illconel-625 radiation shield shell. 
thin outer steel impact absorber and the thermal ablation shield (tiles) 
: assumed to be structurally insignificant and, hence, were not modeled. 
payload with the Inconel shield was assumed to inpact a 66-cn-thick 
lite layer which was assumed to be supported by a rigid foundation. 
An axisymmetric finite-clement grid was developed, and Is shown in 
Ire 5-9. It consists of 334 nodal points and 262 e ler.lcnts, of which the 
,--it,c impact slab accounted for 80 elctlcnts, the radiation shield was 
.sented by 92 ~lernents. and the waste core was represented by 90 elencnts. 
slldelines were prescribed in the model which dllowed separation or con-
: ali a result of dcforr.lation between the waste core and the radiation 
...... ~ ... ., •• ., _ rotM' """'I:II'Q 
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hield, and between the shield and the granite surface. These slidelines, as 
ndicated in Figure 5-9, allowed free sliding between the respective surfaces. 
The material representing the waste core (cermet waste form and its 
,ncapsulating steel core) was assumed to have mechanical properties corres-. 
oonding to lIastelloy X, while the radiation shield material was modeled as 
:nconel-625. The stress-strain curves for both these materials were cast into 
.ilinear forms to account for elastic and plastic responses. These repre-
.entation forms were dictated by the computer program. The granite layer was 
~deled as linear elastic. 
The effect of a temperature distribution within the primary contain-
lent and the radiation shield layer on the structural deformation was also 
;ought. Details of the assumed temperature distribution after reentry and 
ust befo re ground impact may be found in Section 5.4.1. It was assumed that 
:he contribution of temperature gradients toward nodal point loads applied to 
:he model is relatively small and can be neglected. However, the effect of 
:emperature on the material yield properties was considered important and, 
len~e, was included by assuming that the temperature distribution remains 
mchanged during deformation of the containment. Table 5-18 contains the 
lechanical property data assumed for the three material constituents in the 
'inite clement model. The data were either directly obtained from references 
r.ama, 1978; }lanson, 1976; or HIL-HDBK-SB, 1971) or derived through 
. terpolation/extrapolation. 
The data set defining the model also included ::ertain viscosity 
lararneters. It is usual to prescribe such parameters when modeling dynamics 
If impact through explicit time integration methods so as to smooth the shock 
:ronts as well as prevent hourglassing or keystoning effects (Hallquist, 
.980) • 
Two sets of' computations', corresponding to two impact velocities, 
lere carried out to determine the deformations suffered by the waste payload. 
rhe impact velocities assumed were 442 mls and 152 m/s. The higher velocity 
:orresponds to the expected velocity at impact following inadvertent payload 
:eentry due to a decaying orbital condition (see Section 5.4.1 for reentry 
:alculation). The second velocity was selected for analysis based upon the 
:hought that the payload survival could be achieved at this value, and that 
:his value was possihle in the early portion of the flight phase of the 
;hut tie. 
5.4.3.2 Results of Impact Calculation 
The DYNA2D computer program (given the modeling assut:lptions previ-
)usly stated) calculated stresses and deflections of the finite-element grid 
it various instants foll..,· .... ing initiation of impact. For the case correspond-
Lng to the impact velocity of 442 mIs, it was found that the kinetic energy 
~as almoRt entirely dissipated after 1.5 ms. Obviously, during this time 
/'lterval, the kinetic energy is converted into elastic and plastic deforca-
ons. The elastic part of the defor:natlons would induce the payload to 
=ebound after the kinetic energy has approached the zero level. 
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Assumptions 
Velocity of impact = 442 m/s. 
The effect of temperature gradient 
on material properties is accounted 
for in the model; thermal load 
effects are ignored. 
Inconel-625 shield 
Granite 
Rigid Surface 
FIGURE 5-9. FUnTE-ELEHENT MODEL FOR NUCLEAR WASTE 
PAYLOAD IMPACTING GRANITE 
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TABLE 5-18 STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES OF MATERIALS USED IN ANALYSIS 
___ ... ______ •• __ .-_. _______ ~ ___ ._. __________ ~ __ .._._ _______ ~ _____ ~ ____ .. ______________ .. _~ ___ .. ____ .... _-.. ___________ .. ___ .. ______ ::e_ .. _ 
m 
1I Hasteloy 
-i 
-i 
m 
r 
r 
m 
n Inconel-625 
o 
r 
C 
~ 
CI 
C 
Ul Granite 
Ter.1perature. 
C 
B35 
660 
365 
335 
350 
560 
25 
Density, 
g/cc 
6.83 
6.83 
8.45 
8.45 
8.45 
8.45 
2.49 
Young' 5 Hodulus 
N/cm2 
1.05E7 
1.21E7 
1.86E7 
I.B9E7 
I.SSE7 
1.76E7 
8.l9E6 
Sources: Lama (1978), Hanson (1976). and HIL-HDBK-SB(l971). 
Poisson's Ratio 
0.3 
0.3 
0.31 
0.31 
0.31 
0.32 
0.036 
Yield Stress, 
N/cm2 
1.79E4 
2.07E4 
4.03E4 
4.07E4 
4.06E4 
3.79E4 
. Plastic Modulus, 
N/cm2 
1.10E6 
1.21E6 
3.47ES 
3.47ES 
3.47E5 
3.47ES 
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Figure 5-10 illustrates the deformed shape of the modeled payload at 
rious times following initial impact on granite. It may be seen that the 
id progressively undergoes significant distortion, especially in the region 
thin the radiation shield close to the impact point. Distortions of the 
der evident in Figures 5-10e and 5-10f lead to numerical errors in the 
mputations when using a Lagrangian-based code like DYNA2D. It would have 
en possible to activate the rezoning feature existing within DYNA2D to 
unteract the problem of mesh. distorti,on; .. but such an undertaking would have 
ant significant, additional work. 
The reason for the deformation in the granite slab being small in 
mparison with those for the waste payload is because the elastic modulus of 
anite is significantly larger than the plastic moduli or the secant moduli 
rresponding to the stress condition of the Incone1 and Haste110y components. 
gures 5-11 and 5-12 present computer graphics of the von Mises stress 
.quivalent stress) and the hoop stress (stress perpendicular to the plane of 
Ie model) at 1 ms after impact (see Appendix H for additional plots at 
fferent times). 
The von Mises stress (0) is a measure of the triaxial stress state 
lat can usually be directly correlated against data derived from a uniaxial 
!nsile test. It may be seen in Figure 5-11 (and in figures in Apoendix H) 
lat a is particularly severe at the' edge of the contact zone. This result is 
.milar to what has been observed in other sicu1ations. It is also evident 
ro the maximum value of a during the cours~ of deformation exceeds typical 
... imate stress values (at specific locations) for austenitic steels. This 
tgnifies failure at these locations fairly early within the impact duration. 
It, due to the absence of a failure criterion, a is seen to progressively far 
cceed the ultimate stress range. This inadequacy in the model prevents a 
!distribution of stresses that would occur as a result of failure of a 
!rtain region. Qualitatively, it may be said that a larger region would 
tceed the ultimate stress, were redistribution allowed to occur. 
While t:le magnitude of (j is an index of stress criticality. the 
lke1y mode of failure can only be obtained by inspecting the stress compo-
mts. It wC\s found that the hoop stress (plotted in Figure 5-12) was the 
redominant tensile component, thus suggesting the possibility of the contain-
mt splitting open in two or more pieces (see Appendix H for hoop stress 
Lots at all four selected times). But at the edge of the contact zone. the 
idia1 component of stress was also tensile to an extent that suggests failur~ 
hrough spa1ling. 
It must be noted that the model also fails to account for the finite 
~terial strenf,th of the f,ranite; thu~ the calculations made overestimate the 
ama~e to the payload. 
Figure 5-13 depicts the deformed shape of the waste payload at 
arious times following impact on a granite slab at 152 m/s. The conputa-
ions were carried out through 1.5 milliseconds from the time of initial 
cpact. Inspection of the results corresponding to 1.5 milliseconds indicates 
!lilt the pa.yload will be 1n a state of rebound at that time. At the time 
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(a) Time = 0.15 mls 
(c) Time 0.75 mls 
(e) Time = 1.25 mls 
ORtG'NAt PAGE 13 
OF POOR QUAL TV 
(b) Time = 0.50 mls 
(d) Time 1.00 mls 
(f) Time = 1.50 mls 
FIGURE 5-10. DEFORHED SIIAI'E OF THE SHIELDED WASTE PAYLOAD FOR 
VARIOUS TIMES DURING IMPACT (442 mls INITIAL VELOCITY) 
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FIGURE 5-12. CONTOURS OF HOOP STRESS AFTER 1 ms OF 
IMPACT (442 m/s INITIAL VELOCITY FIGURE) 
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(a) Time 0.25 m/s 
(e) Time 0.75 m/s 
OR:G;r~;iL r~(:.£ ~j 
Of" peOR QUALITY 
(b) Time = 0.50 m/s 
(d) Time 1.00 m/s 
FIGURE 5-13. DEFORMED SRAPE OF TIlE SHIELDED WASTE PAYLOAD FOR VARIOUS 
TIMES DURING IMPACT (152 m/s INITIAL VELOCITY) 
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1.0 railliseconds (see Figure 5-13d), the kinetic energy corres-
the initial condition was observed to be almost entirely 
Figures 5-14 and 5-15 show the ·:ontour plots of tae von Mises stress 
l the hoop stress in the payload for 1 ms after impact (at 152 m/s). The 
ler plots for different times are provided in Appendix H. It may be noted 
It the stresses are still calculated to reach high leveJ.s and failure of the 
liation shield looks to be likely. However, as expected, the magnitude of 
stress ~nd the likely extent of damage of the waste paylead is cuted for 
case of V ~ 152 mls when compared with the results of V ~ 442 m/s. Again, 
reader is reminded of the conservative m.:>del assumptions. 
5.4.3.3 Conclusions 
The caj or conclusion reached by ·conducting this preliminary and 
~ervative impact analysis is that the radiation shield likely will not be 
.e to withstand the impact and will fail (at V - 442 m/s). As a result, the 
sibility of release of the enclosed waste form will need to be considered 
the risk analysis. 
Consequence Evaluation 
.-' This section discusses the various analyses conducted to evaluate the 
. __ quences of events shown at the top of the fault trees described and shown 
Section 5.2. Based upon the fault tree development, the events listed in 
,Ie 5-19 have been evaluated as to their potential consequences. Table 5-20 
ines the radionuclide inventot'ies (in Curies) as a function of time for the 
erence cermet HLW payload, the technetium payload, and the iodine payload. 
15 isotopes listed were selected such that the space disposal r!sk 
imates could be made compatible Nith the MGR ri::;k estimates p::ovided by 
The 15 isotopes are related to draft EPA repository release limits (see 
allut:l et aI, 1982). 
The consequences of each event shown in Table 5-19 are discussed in 
following sections. At the beginning of each section, a brief discussion 
each event is presented, followed by zn appropriate discussion of technical 
ues. 
5.5.1 Long-Terra Corrosion, Ocean 
This event occurs when the nuclear waste payload icpacts the ocean, 
act, recovery attempts fail, and the payload is lost forever. The release 
nario is governed by the corrosion of the Inconel-625 radiation shield, 
l-;:\wed by ","aste form leaching. Corrosion of the shield is estimated to 
ur based upon corrosion rates 0f 0.1 mils/yr with range of 0.3 mils/yr to 
1 cils/yr (see Section 5.5.1.1). This means that after' 87,800 years 
,300 years to 878,000 years) the core will be available for leaching. 'Far 
ching, a leach rate of 10-6 g/cm2'day, with 90 percent confidence that 
r-. 
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TABLE 5-19. SUMMARY OF RELEASE OF EVENTS FOR SPACE DISPOSAL(a) 
Title 
Long-Term Corroaion, Ocean 
Impact on Hard Rock(b) 
Impact on Volcano 
So11 Me1tdovn(b) 
On-Orbit Colliaion 
Long-Term Corroaion, Soil 
High-Velocity Impact on Water 
High-Velocity Impact on Rock(b) 
High-Velocity lDpact on Soll(b) 
Deep Spsce - Payload Return to Earth 
Deep Space - Meteoroid Collisi~n 
Deep Space - Payload/Payload Collision 
Deep Space - Payload/Comet Collision 
Deep Space - Erosion 
Description 
Payload impacts ocean, intact, recovery faila, and 
payload is lost forever. 
Payload impacts rock at nominal decaying reentry 
velocity, and is recovered within reasonable time. 
Payload impacts on active volcano, melts. mixes, and 
disperses into lava. 
Payload impacts on a highly insulating materia. k < 
klim1t' is not recovered, heata up, and celts. 
On-orbit payload/debris or payload/meteorite col11sion 
occurs with payload breakup followed by reentry. 
Payload impacts wet 8011, intact, recoveq fails, and 
payload is lost forever. 
Payload impact8 ocean, intact, but then breaches and 
leacheG, no recovery .ssumed. 
Payload impact a rock, intact, but then br~aches, 
releasing fraction of material to atmosp~re, fraction 
remaining is recovered. 
Payload impacta solI, recovery failS, the payload is 
breached and lesches to biosphere. 
Payload returns to Earth because of OTV/~tS failure 
after escape, all material released to blQaphere. 
Payload collides with meteoroid, breaks ~~ and some 
material travels way back to Earth. 
A payload/payload collision occurs, payloai breaks up, 
and material returns to Earth. 
A rayload/comet collision occurs, payload breaks up, and 
material returns to Earth. 
Long-term erosion of the paylosd shield ~~ deep space. 
sed upon the current Referen~e Concept (see Section 3.0). 
cident recovery possible. 
i 
J 
! 
I 
r 
I 
-i. 
i 
I 
! I, 
1 
j 
I 
I 
I 
i 
\ 
, . 
, 
TABLE 5-20. 
Isotope(s) 
Reference Payload(a) 
241"", 
238Pu 
AC 
1291 
14C 
135Cs 
137es 
90Sr 
126Sn 
FP 
15 EPA Isotopes 
Other Isotopes 
Total 
Techneti~ Payload(b) 
99Te 
Iodine Payload(c) 
1291 
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PAYLOAD RADIONUCLIDE INVENTORIES (IN CURIES) 
AS A FUNCTION OF TIME 
50 
1.71E3 
a.97E4 
6.210 
8.500 
2.49E2 
2.65E3 
2.70 
54.9 
4.26E-5 
(1.07£5) 
o 
74.6 
2.08 
1.95E5 
1.18£5 
73.0 
(3.13£5) 
(4.22E5) 
6.38E6 
6.80E6 
1.5E5 
646.4 
100 
1.71E3 
a.31E4 
6.18£3 
6.97£3 
2.57E2 
2.960 
2.78 
56.2 
9.26£-5 
(9.95£4) 
o 
74.2 
2.08 
6.21£4 
3.57E4 
73.0 
(9.78E4) 
(2.00E5) 
2.08£6 
2.2BE6 
1.5E5 
646.4 
Age of Waste, Years 
1.70E3 
1.94E4 
5.65E3 
1.33£2 
4.02£2 
2.740 
3.13 
69.3 
8.39E-3 
(2.84E4) 
o 
66.1 
2.08 
1.84£-5 
8.00E-6 
72.5 
(1.41E2) 
(3.02E4) 
7.90£3 
3.81E4 
1.49E5 
646.4 
104 
1.65E3 
1.04£2 
2.52E3 
o 
1.19£3 
1.09£3 
3.44 
73.5 
4.49E-1 
(4.98£3) 
o 
22.3 
2.07 
o 
1.21E3 
o 
0.73 
o 
1.83£2 
0.1 
3.04 
71.8 
3.62 
(2.62£2) 
o 
o 
2.02 
o 
106 
53.5 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
0.58 
53.7 
0.83 
(5.51E1) 
o 
o 
1.54 
o 
o 0 0 
68.1 36.5 7.1E-2 
(9.25El) (3.B5!1) (5.67E1) 
(6.72E3) (1.51!3) (1.10E2) 
3.38£3 7.90Il 7.99E2 
1.01E4 2.30G3 9.09E2 
1.45E5 1.0fil:5 4.69£3 
646.4 646.4 620.6 
(a) Based on 47.39 kg waste form per 1 MTHM, 133.2 MTHM/mission eq~ivalent, 2 spheres at 
6312 kg cermet. 
(b) Based on 0.75 kg waste form per 1 MTHM, 11,800 MTIM/mission equivalent, 2 spheres at 
8850 kg Tc metal. 
(e) Based on 0.40 kg waste form per 1 MTHM. 18,750 MTHM/mission equivalent, 2 spheres at 
7500 kg PbI2' 
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Lt is within 10-5 to 10-7 , has been assumed, based upon a conversation 
~th Scott Aaron, ORNL (see discussion below). Two leach models were possible 
:0 use. The first (more conservative) assumed that all billets are available 
for leaching at the given expected rate. The second assumes that only a 
3pherical surface area is available. Data for the billet leaching model are 
lsed here; the spherical model would reduce the release risk by about one 
)rder of magnitude (McKenna, 1982). 
The source terms used for this event for each of the three payloads 
::onsidered for space disposal are given in Table 5-21. The discussion that 
follows provides an overview of the assumptions made and the model used. 
Tillie, Years 
yload/ Isotope( s) 8.8E4 8.9E4 9.1E4 9.3E4 9.7E4 1.0E5 1.1E5 1.2E5 1.41E5 
ference Payload 
Tc-99 
AC 
0 0 0 0 0 6.7E2 9.8E2 1.1E) 1.2E3-----) 
0 0 0 0 0 1.6E2 2.2E2 2.5E2 2.6E2-----) 
15 EPA Isotopes 0 0 0 0 0 8.7E2 1.3E3 1.4E) 1.5E3------) 
chnetium Payload 
Tc-99 0 4.0E4 8.2E4 1.0E5 1.IE5------ ) 
dine Payload 
1-129 6.5E2--- -------- -------) 
TABLE 5-21. EXPECTED CUMULATIVE SOURCE TERM (CURIES) FOR EVENT 1, 
LOUG-TERM CORROSION/LEACHING IN THE OCEAN 
5.5.1.1 Radiation Shield Corrosion 
In the search for establishing a reasonable value and range for the 
corrosion of the radiation shield in seawater, staff at ONHI, Sandia (the 
Subseabed Disposal Program), 'md Battelle were questioned. Based upon the 
discussions, it was determine:G that Battelle and Walt Boyd were the experts 
. ____ ,.that should provide answers to the questions. !-Ir. Walt Boyd, nationally known 
corrosion expert, recommended that we consider titanium, Inconel-625, or 
Hastelloy C-276 for our radiation shield, such that low-shield corrosion would 
be possible. This recommendation was given to Boeing, and we selected the 
.> 
\~ f· 
-
-.i, 
99 
conel-625 shield for the Reference mission, considering its shielding and 
rength aspects as well. Boyd indicated that the expected corrosion rate for 
conel-625 was Oil the order of 0.1 mils/yr or so. He said it would not be 
fected by temperature and, for all practical purposes tit just would not 
rrode. Stainle!;s steel, on the other hand is subject to crevice corrosion. 
ttelle's Hetals and Ceramics' Inforination ,Center recently published Corrosion 
Hetals in Harine Environments, by W. K. Boyd and I. W. Fink (1978). This 
cument contains much information about the various types of ~orrosion 
eneral, crevice, galvaniC, pitt lng, etc.) that are poss ible for different 
terials. 
The corrosion rate values for Inconel-625 are too numerous to review 
re; however, in reviewing data in Battelle's Netals and Ceramics Information 
nter, all expected value of 0.1 mils/yr was chosen, with an upper boundary of 
3 mlls/yr and a lower bound of 0.01 mils/yr. 
5.5.1.2 Waste Form Leach Rate 
}lr. Scot t Aaron, ORNL, one of the leading experts on cermet waste 
nn technology, was asked (in a teiephone conversation December 7, 1981) what 
,..--Ild be appropriate cermet leach rates in the ocean for long-term space 
,posnl accidents. His reply is summarized ·as follows. Because cesium (Cs) 
d strontium (Sr) have been removed from the waste (95 percent), and because 
:sidual Cs and Sr will have long decayed (allowing time for Inconel-625 
rrosion). A..'lron suggests that the lower and upper bounds would likely be 1 x 
1- 7 and 1 x 10-5 , respectively. Galvanic coupling of the ~enuet and 
conel-625 (for nonuniform Inconel corrosion) or cermet nnd core stainless 
:eel could be possible. Hr. Aaron stated that 304 stain~.ess steel could be 
ther "active" or "passive". If it is active. then the leach rate of cermet 
·uld be slower than the expected' value~ We will assume that we can usc a 
.eel material for the core that would allow this to be teue. The lower limit 
: 10-7 is based upon the fact that actinide leach r,1tes are very low, on 
\e order of 10-8 to 10-9 • Therefore, for purposes of this preliminary 
lace disposal risk assessment, we assumed for long-term space disposal 
:cidents a cermet leach rate of 10-6 g/cm2 ·day, with 90 percent 
Illfidence that it is within the range of 10-5 to 10-7• 
5.5.1.3 Corrosion and Leaching Nodels 
One possible consequence of a space deployment accident is that the 
lclear waste payload could return to the Earth's surface intact (i.e., with-
It significant breakup) and be deposited in a "wet" environment. such as the 
;:e311. For short-term accidents. the nominal re~ponse is to recover the pay-
Hld. but if such recovery were to fail. then lonp:-ter:n radioactive releases 
mid occur. Corrosion of the Inconel-625 shield barrier and subsequent 
!Sching of waste form material represent a time-delay mechanism for cvent:lal 
/-'lease of radioactivity to the biosphere. This section presents the corro-
In and leaching models employed in the calculation of such releases. 
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5.5.1.3.1 Corrosion Model 
All waste form payloads (Reference HLW in cermet, technetium, and 
dine) are assumed to be packaged inside an Inconel shield approximately 22.3 
thick. It is further assumed that waste form leaching does not begin until 
e shield is completely corroded. The corrosion model is therefore quite 
mple, ;.dth the result stated in terms of the corrosion delay time, t c , 
ual to the thickness divided by rate of corrosion. The following table 
ves these data for the nominal and bounded values of corrosion ~ate 
scussed previously (see Section 5.5.1.1). 
ominal 
Corrosion Rate 
0.1 mils/yr ~ 2.54E-5 cm/yr 
0.1 mils/yr - 2.54E-4 cm/yr 
0.3 mils/yr 7.62E-4 cm/yr 
Corrosion Time, tc (years) 
878.000 
87,800 
29,300 
_~e that even the shortest value of 29.300 years provides for a significant 
" ay for many of the ibotopes in the cermet waste form to decay to low levels 
, radioactivity. 
5.5.1.3.2 Leaching Model 
Nominal leaching characLcristics. for the three waste forms under 
,aluation. have been estimated based upon discussions with DOE's wast.e form 
:perts. although there is uncertainty due to a lack of experimental data for 
le specific physical and environmental conditions. The leach rates are 
Itimated as (1) 10-6 g!cm2·day for cermet, (2) 10-5 g!cm2·day for the 
!chnetium payload, and (3) effectively instantaneous for the iodine payload • 
. nce the cerIDet and technetium waste forms are both packaged in the waste 
)rm core as numerous small billets, a conservative leach model was applied on 
i individual billet basis. assuming that the water leach source can contact 
II billets simultaneously. 
Each billet is cylindrical in shape wi th initial radius (ro) and 
mgth (to). To corvert the specific area leach rates (LR) given above to 
mass loss rate (m). it is assumed that the billet size will reduce in 
:oportion to its initial size. i.e •• 
(1) 
i = (t /r ) r 
o 0 
(2) 
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r.\:lSlJ h1~S rate cnn be st:ltl'd in tenns of thtl instantuneolls surface area 
the si:c/Jenslty parnmeters. 
., 
m • LA· ~r.r-(l+t Ir )LR R s 0 0 
? 
m - p1l'(2rH+r §,) • 3p::o(t Ir )r-t 
o 0 
(3) 
(4) 
ItinR (3) and (4) yield~ the constant value of i and the time for 
Ih~tc h'achin~. 
2L 
t • 30RO+ro/to) (5) 
(6) 
",---, 
, qUlIlltities :lrc l'va1u:\tt.·d be 1"1" for the desi~n billet sl:c of 1'0 • 
,6 em and to • 5.858 CM. 
Ccrml't Bllh·t Technetium nllh't 
0, ~/cm3 6.50 10.93 
l.R' g/cm2·yr 3.65E-4 3.1l5F.-3 
r, cm/yr 5.5!.E-5 3.34E-~ 
tL' yr 5.28E+4 8. 7 !:>F.+3 
Thl~ nt'xt stl'11 i>l t(' cnicuilltp the mns:; rt'l~:\sl' fr:lct Ion ns /1 function 
" Since the billet mnss is P::-r-I. the relellse irnction is given h~ time. 
f • M 1M • I-M/H • 1-(r/r )3 
R Roo 0 
(7) 
(8) 
! fol1(lI.'ln~ t.llb!l' illustrates the rt.'lells .. timt' charnctt'rlstic. 
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Cermet Pavload Technetium Pll~load 
t(years) fR-HR/Ho t(years) fR-NR7Ho 
0 0 '0 0 
1.0E:! 0.0057 1.0E2 0.0339 
1.OE3 0.0557 1.OE3 0.3049 
1.OE4 0.4673 2.0E3 0.5405 
2.0E4 0.7602 5.0E3 0.9210 
5.28E4 1.0 8.76E3 1.0 
5.5.1.3.3 Cumulative Release Calculation 
Let A(t) represent the radioactivity (in Curies) of II given isotope 
s a function of time. combination of isotopes. or the total payload. 
,!1ichever is of in teres t. Then the cumulative release to the biosphere as a 
unction of time up to total release can be calculated by the integral 
lrmu1as: 
,---' 
(1) Leaching Only (shield breakup) 
(9) 
(2) Corrosion artd"Lellching 
(lO) 
rapezoidal integration was found to be quite adequate for numerical 
" alculations. 
5.5.2 Impact on Hard Rock 
This event occurs wh .... n the nuclear waste payload impacts at the nomi-
,al reentry velocity of 442 mls (see Section 5.4.1) on hard rock, intact, and 
,s recovered by rescue teams within a reasonable time period (assumed here to 
Ie two days). Rased upon the payload response analYSis for the payload im-
''---cting on a rigid granite surface. the payload is expected to split open at 
.) top, wi th ddor_1ed billets falling out on to the ground with some release 
:0 the atmosphere in the fom of p"rticulate t:lateri.~l. The waste form billets 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
;.-
, i 
! 
,----, 
103 
d not be very hot; they are expected to be on the order of 400 C at 
t and cool further. With no analytical data to calculate the release 
tial, we have assumed that the amount released to the atmosphere is 
rtional to the releases from ground impacts of radioisotope thermal 
ators (RTGs). Typical atmospheric releases for RTGs are on the order of 
of plutonium for the RTG payload containing approximately 200,000 Ci 
" 1975). For the period prior to recovery, we assumed that the payload 
ce would be in a rainwater leaching condition for a period of one hour. 
: assumptions lead to the releases shown in Table 5-22. 
,"'-' 
TABLE 5-22. EXPECTED CUMULATIVE SOURCE TERM (CURIES) 
FOR EVENT 2, HARD ROCK llfPACT 
-------------------~ -----------------.--
Short-Term Release 
Payload/Isotopes Atmosphere' Ground Water(a) 
Reference Payload 
Tc-99 8.6E-3 4.2E-7(b) 
AC 5.3E-l 2.5E-5 
15 EPA Isotopes 2.1EO 1.0E-4 
Technetium Pallo ad 
Tc-99 7.5E-l 1.8E-4(C) 
Iodine Paz:load 
1-129 3.2E-3 1.3E-4(d) 
---------------------.------~---------- --------------~~---
(a) Assumes a leachable surface of 36,600 cm2 for each payload. 
(b) Cermet leach rate of 1.0E-6 g/cm2 'dav (Aaron, ORNL). 
(c) Technetium leach rate of 0.7E-5 g/co~·day (McCallum, PNL). 
(d) Iodine leach rate of 1.0E-3 g/cm2·day (estimate). 
5.5.3 Impact on Volcano 
This event occurs when a nuclear waste payload inadvertently impacts 
active volcano and meets within a certain time, mixes with the la'la, dls-
iles, and is transported to other areas and later solidified. For proper 
Luation, we need to estimate hmJ ouch of this is then leached by either 
~nd water or rainwater, or how ouch is released via an eruption or off-
sing while !:laterial is in molten lava. For the purpose of analysis, we 
e conservatively assumed a 100 percent release (see Table 5-20, the 50-
/~ column). 
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5.5.4 Soil Ue1tdown 
Analysis and discussion in Section 5.4.2 have forced us to conclude 
this event is not credible. Ther.efore, it has been dropped from further 
;ideration in this analysis. 
5.5.5 On-Orbit Collisions 
, Should a catastrophic payload/meteoroid or payload/debris collision 
Ir in orbit, payload fracture followed by relatively immediate reentry is 
!cted. Pieces are expected to be the size of billets for the Reference 
!. Reentry analysis indicates that individual billets will be expected to 
: and disperse above about 60 km altitude (see Section 5.4.1). Thus, for 
Ller fragments, the release is expected to be 100 percent into the 
)sphere. For larger fragments, it is possible that some will make it to 
i and water, contaminating both via leaching processes. For purposes of 
; study, we have conservatively assumed a 100 percent atmospheric release 
likely. Release data are assumed to be identical witn the SO-year column 
rab1e 5-20. 
5.5.6 Long-Term Corrosion, Soil 
,r--. 
This event occurs when the nuclear wasce payload impacts wet soil, 
act, recovery attempts fail and the payload is lost forever. For simpli-
y, the releases are assumed to be the same as long-term corrosion in the 
an (see Table 5-21 for data). 
5.5.7 High-Velocity Impact on Water 
This event occurs when the OTV fails in a certain way (orbit adjust 
.ows immediate reentry at high velocity) just prior to Earth escape. The 
lact velocities could be on the order of 3000 to 6000 mISe Water impact 
Ilysis could not be conducted because of limited funds available for this 
~y. A conservative estimate of the release scenario has been assumed, in 
! absence of needed analytical data. It has been assumed that the payload 
ltainment will be breached upon ocean surface impact and the entire payload 
)r Reference and technetium payloads leaching of billet-sized waste form 
aces) will be available for immediate leaching. Table 5-23 provides the 
nulative source term for this event. 
5.5.8 High-Velocity Impact on Rock 
The releases f,)r this event are estimated to be a factor of 100 times 
re than the releases in Event 2 (with an impact velocity of 442 m/s). Refer 
the values in Table 5-22 and multiply by 100. 
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TABLE 5-23. EXPECTED CUMULATIVE SOURCE TERIi (CURIES) FOR EVENT 7. HICH-VELOCITY IMPACT ON WATER 
---------.- .... --------,----- -_ ..... ----_ ..... _--- -----------------_ .. ----.. _. __ -....-----.-.._ .. -..-.. 
Payload/1sotope(s) 
Reference Payload 
Tc-99 
AC 
15 EPA Isotopes 
Technetium Payload 
Tc-99 
Iodine Payload 
1.0E2 
9.8EO 
5.7E2 
1.4E3 
5.1E3 
1.0E3 
9.5El 
3.3E3 
4.5E3 
4.6E4 
2.0E3 
1.9E2 
4.4E3 
5.7E3 
8.1F.4 
5.0E3 
4.4E2 
5.8E3 
7.4E3 
1.4E5 
Time, Years 
R.8E3 1.0E4 
7.0E2 
6.8E3 
8.6E3 
7.8E2 
7.IE3 
9.0E3 
2.0E4 
1.3E3 
8.2E3 
1.0E4 
5.3E4 1.0E5 1.0E6 
1.6E3------------------) 
8~6E3------------------) 
1.1E4------------------) 
1.5E5---------------------------------------------) 
1-129 6.5E2(a)------------------------------------------------------------------------------) 
(a) Occurs when event occurs, in the short term. 
) 
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;.5.9 High-Velocity Impact on Soil 
If a high-velocity impact occurs on soil, a large 100 to 300-m-
lter crater will likely be formed (Baldwin, 1963), and the payload will 
ly break open and mix with the target soil. For purposes of analysis, it 
lssumed that recovery of the radioactive material would be more difficult 
the rock impact case, and it was assumed that the fraction lost to the 
would be a factor of 200 more than that given for Event 2. Therefore, 
cumulative source term is calculated by multiplying the SO-year data in 
! 5-20 by 0.001. 
5.5.10 Deep Space - Intact Payload Return to Earth 
This event can occur as a long-term orbital evolution result of a 
failure of the OTV injection (after Earth-escape conditions are 
ined), but principally as a result of a SOlS failure during the solar 
t placement maneuver. The characteristics and mathematical model describ-
this event have been treated extensively in earlier studies (Friedlander 
ll, 1977a and 1977b; Friedlander and Davis, 1978). To summariz~ this 
1, let T denote the long-term time interval after launch for measuring the 
of such an event. The cumulative probability of Earth collision 
ntry) is given by the expression 
,~ l'EC(T) - J::C( T/ t) I d=~ t) I dt (11) 
o 
'e PEC{T/t) is the conditional probability of reentry within the interval 
T) given a failure occurrence of time t (deployment sequence timeline), 
R{t) is the reliability function of the deployment system. The propulSion 
:e reliability is stated in terms of a startup reliability Rs and an 
:ationa1 reliability R(t)=e- At , where A. is a constant failure rate given 
A • -In REP/tB, where tB is the stage burn time and REP is the 
-point reliability at burnout. 
In evaluating Equation (11) above, the conditional probability 
(T/t) is obtained by Monte Carlo simulation of the plar.etary close 
:lunter/collision problem (effectively a random process) initiated at each 
lcre stage. The integr?~ion was carried out using the OTV and SOlS stage 
\ lability parameters listed previously in Table 5-10. Numerical results 
wed a very smooth variation with T and were well represented hy the 
-quadratic least-squares fit 
1n PEe (T) - -22.1821 + 1.7862 (In T) - 0.0500 (In T)2 
o 
(12) 
s function, which is plotted in Figure 5-16, represents the Earth reentry 
bability distrihution for a single payload launch without rescue. Rescue 
ability for failed pay~\)ads in solar orbit has been shown to be a practical 
ponse offering orders-of-magnitude reduction in risk (Friedlander and 
-ts, 1978). AllOWing for rescue mission redundancy to order N, the long-
probability of Earth reentry is obtained as 
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(13) 
'e RR is the effective reliability (or success probability) of each 
:ue mission attempted. Each ouch attempt would require a time interval of 
to 2 years. It is most desirable that the rescue mode be "cooperative", 
, the payload attitude control and communication/tracking systeUlS remain 
:tional. This can be assured to an extremely high level of reliability 
'ough system redundancy) for perhaps a period of up to 10 years after 
,ch. Hence, for the present risk assessment we will assume a rescue 
ion redundancy level ,of N .. 4. With the estimated value of RR - 0.9[./14 
rescue mission success (see Table' 5-10), we obtain a five orders-of-
.itude reduction of th~ Earth reentry probability. 
T (years) PEC 
102 5.0 x 10-12 
103 5.0 x 10-11 
104 4.6 x 10-10 
105 2.6 x 10-9 
106 8.6 x 10-9 
e this is a cllCul&tive distribution, it sh~uld be interpreted as follows 
'., the probability that Earth reentry will occur sometime' within 104 
8 after launch is 4.6 x 10-10 ; the t>robability that thls event will 
,r within the interval 104 to lOS years after launch is 2.6 x 10-9 -
x 10-10 • 2.14 x 10-9 ). 
The final step in this analysis is to integrate the reentry event 
,ability with ~he consequence as measured in Curies of radioactivity. Let 
A(T) represent the radioactivity of selected isotopes or groups of 
opes in the nuclear waste payload (see Table 5-20). We define ~s(T) as 
cumulative source risk at the time of reentry as measureri in units of 
bable Curies". This source risk is calculated by the integral expression 
fT , £'s(T) '. A PEC dT • (14) 
o 
general, the second form of this expression has been employed with 
ezoidal integration used to generate the numerical results. 
Table 5-24 presents the singJ e missicn, cumulative reentry source 
for each of the 15 EPA isotopes in the Reference cermet payload. Also 
ed are risk values for the group of eight actinides, five tlsslon produc:s 
luding Tc-99), and the total of the 15 EPA isotopes. For times up to 
yean:, the risk is dominated by Am-241, Cs-13 7, and Sr-90 isotopes. 
een 103 and 105 years the major risk contributors are Ac-241, Ac-243, 
39, Pu-240, and Tc-99. After 105 years the docinant risk isotope is 
9. It should be noted, hOl.fever, that the cumulative risk of the 15-
ope sum does not exceed 1.S x 10-5 Curies over 106 years, and builds 
a 10 percent of this value during the first few hundt'ed years. 
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TABLE 5-24. CUMULATIVE REENTRY SOURCE RISK (Ci) 
IsotoEe lE2 
Tc-99 8.6E-9 
1-129 0 
Am-241 4.2E-7 
Am-243 3.1E-8 
Pu-238 3.4E-8 
Pu-239 1.3E-9 
Pu-240 1.5E-8 
Pu-242 1.4E-11 
Np-237 2.8E-10 
Ra-226 6.3E-16 
AC (5.0E-7) 
C-14 3.7E-10 
Cs-135 1.0E-11 
Cs-137 3.8E-7 
Sr-90 2.2E-7 
Sn-126 3.7E-10 
FP (6.1E-7) 
15 EPA Isotopes 1.IE-6 
--------- ~---
FOR REFERENCE MISSION: CERMET PAYLOAD 
INTACT PAYLOAD RETURN FROM DEEP SPACE{a) 
Time, years 
lE3 lE4 1E5 1E6 
8.5E-8 7.7E-7 3.9E-6 7.1E-6 
0 0 0 0 
2.3E-6 3.2E-6 3.2E-6 3.2E-6 
3.0E-8 1.9E-6 2.8E-6 2.8E-6 
8.7E-8 8.7E-8 8.7E-8 8.7E-8 
1.6E-8 3.6£-7 1.8E-6 1.8E-6 
1.4E-7 8.9E-7 1.1E-6 1.1E-6 
1.5E-10 1.5E-9 8.5E-9 1.8E-8 
3.1E-9 3.2E-8 1.9E-7 5.6£-7 
8.1E-13 2.5E-11 2.8E-9 1.3E-8 
(2.6E-6) (6.5E-6) (9.2E";6) (9.6E-6) 
3.5E-9 2.0E-8 2.6E-8 2.6E-8 
1.0E-I0 9.6E-I0 5.3E-9 1.6E-8 
4.2E-7 4.2E-7 4.2E-7 4.2E-7 
2.5E-7 2.5E-7 2.5E-7 2.5E-7 
3.6E-9 3.3E-8 1.5E-7 2.1E-7 
(7.6E-7) (1.5E-6) (4.8E-6) (8.0E-6) 
3.4E-6 8.0E-6 1.4E-5 1.8E-5 
-~----.-~ -----
(a) Single mission data; two spheres. 
,.--. 
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Table 5-25 presents the single mission, cumulative risk for impacting 
et soil. These results are based on the reentry source risk data multiplied 
y the probability of impacting wet soil (0.0118), and suitably delayed in 
ime by the cermet .leaching characteristics as discussed earlier in Section 
-.5.1.3. Note that the waste payload· 'Inconel shield is assumed here to be 
hattered upon high-velocity impact. 
Table 5-26 presents similar data for ocean impact risk. In this case 
:he reentry source risk multiplication factor is 0.667 representing the 
lrobability of ocean impact, and shield corrosion as well as cermet leaching 
.s included in the time-delayed release profile. 
Table 5-27 lists the cumulative deep-space risks in the vJlrious 
:elease cate~ories for the alternative 1-129 and Tc-99 waste payloads. 
[ncluded as item 5 in this table is the risk associated with small particle 
:eturn and subsequent upper atmosphere burnup. This pathway results from 
~ossible payload breakup caused by meteoroid impact in deep space, a topic to 
)e discussed in the next section of this report. It may be noted that this 
release risk is. negligible by comparison to other types of releases, except at 
'1cry long times approaching 106 years when the risk becomes larger than the 
intact payload reentry source risk. 
5.5.11 Deep Space - Meteoroid Collision 
The contribution of this event to the risk scenario occurs for the 
most part after the waste payload has successfully been placed at thE.' nominal 
solar orbit (0.85 A.U.) destination. Althou~h the probability rate of a 
meteoroid impact. (colliSions/year). is. very small, the lon!~ time scale ('\, 106 
years) in this orbit acts to increase the potential risk. If a hit of suffi-
cient energy breaks up the payload into a distribution of small particles 
« 1000 microns), and if some fraction of this material eventually returns to 
Earth, the radionuclidc release mechanism is total burnu? in the upper 
atmosphere. 
The problem of payload breakup due to meteoroid collision and the 
long-term orbital evolution of a small particle distribution has been treated 
in depth in a previous study (Rice et aI, 19803). The principal orhit disper-
sion pathway leading to possible mat~rial return to Earth is induced by the 
dominant nongravitational perturbations, namely solar radiation pressure and 
electromagnetic forces on charged particles, and tht!ir interacti.on with 
gravitational close encounters of these particles with t~le Earth and Venus. 
We wUl not reiterate these characteristics here, but simply apply the method-
ology developed earlier to the space disposal application defined in the 
present study, and report the major results. 
With reference to the discussion in Section 5.3.2.1. the single-
mission (two payload spheres) prohability of bein)~ hit by a meteoroid of 
sufficient size to initiate payload breakup at the orbital ener~y limit is 
6.69 x 1O-9/ yr • TIle probability of heing hit by a large enou)~h meteoroid to 
cause total catastrophic breakup (100 percent release in small particles) is 
estin8ted to be 1.78 x lO-lO/yr. For the present ana1ysi:;, we assumed a 
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TABU: 5-25. CllHUlJ\TlVl-: wn SOIL UII'ACT RISK (CO FOR REI-'I-:Ri':NCF: 
MISSION: INTACT PAYLOAD RETIlRN FROH DEI-:l' Sl'ACE(ll) 
--------------------------,------------------------------,--------------
Comr<'I\~t\t 1E2 IE) 1E5 lEo 
99 1.4t:-13 1.4E-ll 2.4E-08 5.SE-OS 
29 o o o o o 
8) 8. n:-12 3.5E-1O 4.9£-09 2.4E-08 3.1E-08 
1.4F.-ll 3.SE-IO 6.3E-09 4.8F.-OS 
-----------------,-------------
TABLE 5-26. CUMU1.ATIVE OegAN UIPACT RISK (CO !-'OR mmmKNCt: 
~tISSION: INTAl.'T PAYLOAD RlmJRN I-'ROM DEEP SI'ACH(n) 
----------._-----------------------_.----.--------
1'iml' • Yt.'nrs 
Cl,)ml'olh~n t (H .HE~ 1.liJ~~i :~ .llE5 5.l1ifs 1.0E(1 
-99 0 6.6E-l18 9.4F.-07 2.01-:-06 2.31-:-06 
129 0 0 0 0 0 
(8) 0 1.4F,-OS 1.7E-07 3. n:-07 ~.n:-07 
EPA 1:;0 tOpt.·!t 0 8.2E-08 1.1 E-06 :! .4E-Ni :!.8E-06 
----_. ..... ------- . ----------
i 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
, ! 
I 
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.... : 
1 
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CUMULATIVE DEEP-SPACE RISKS (Ci) FOR 
ALTERNATIVE WASTE PAYLOADS(s) 
--------------------_.----,---------------------------
,pe of Release 
Intact Paylond 
Reentry Source 
Risk 
1-129 
Tc-99 
Intact Payload 
Return - Hard Rock 
Impact 
1-129 Payload 
Tc-99 Payload 
Intact Payload 
Return - Wet Soil 
Impact (leach) 
1-129 Payload 
Tc-99 Payload 
Intact Payload 
Returll - Ocean 
Impact (Corrode/ 
Leach) 
1-129 Paylond 
Tc-99 Payload 
Paylond Breakup 
Into Sm3ll Particle 
Distribution Upper 
Atmosphere Burnup 
1-129 Payload 
Tc-99 Payload 
lE2 
3.?,E-9 
7.5E-7 
2.9E-I0 
6.7E-8 
3.8E-l1 
7.5E-11 
o 
o 
o 
o 
lE3 
3.2E-8 
7.5E-6 
2.9£-9 
6.7E-7 
3.8E-10 
6.9E-9 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Time, years 
1E4 
3.0E-7 
6.8E-5 
2.7E-8 
6.1E-6 
3.5E-9 
3.4E-7 
o 
o 
4.2E-14 
8.0E-12 
lE5 
1.7E-6 
3.3E-4 
1.5E-7 
3.0E-5 
2.0E-8 
3.3E-6 
2.4E-7 
1.6E-5 
2.2£-12 
3.4£-10 
1E6 
5.5E-6 
6.2E-4 
4.9E-7 
5.6E-S 
6.3£-8 
6.3E-6 
3.4E-6 
2.5E-4 
4.9£-5 
8.4£-4 
--_ ... _--_ .. _--------------------_. .. ------- ..... --
1) Sin~le mission data; two spheres. 
» Impact probabilities used were: ocean, 0.6673; wet soU, 0.0118; 
rock, 0.0898; other, 0.0384. 
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ntinuum meteoroid flux over 
me-integrated distribution of 
.ste paylo~d. The integrated 
hield pbs cermet) is 2.3 x 
.ngle mission (two spheres). is 
.tio, i.e., 
a range of mass (size) and allowed for a 
impacts resulting in material release from the 
mass release rate for a single payload sphere 
10-6 kg/ yr. The ce rmet release rate for a 
estim.ated. in proportion to cermet/payload mass 
.r a period T ,. 106 years, the probable, cumulative cermet releas~d in deep 
lace is just under 1.0 kg. Only a small fraction of this release will find 
.s way back to Earth, as described below. Furthermore, the material that 
les return will do so, not at one point in time, but rather as a distribution 
'er time. 
The probable mass return to Earth has two components, each of which 
I induced by the Poynting-Robertson effect of solar radiation pressure caus-
Ig the small particle (size) distribution to spiral in to\yard the Sun. These 
~~ponents are: (1) an intermedi~te time-scale effect for particles reaching 
Ie close vicinity of the Sun, swept outward with the solar wind, and then 
~e fraction being intercepted by Earth; and (2) a longtime-scale effect for 
Irticles coming into close gravitational encounter with Venus during their 
liral toward the Sun, and then some fraction being defiected into an Earth-
'ossing orbit, with some smaller fraction then colliding 'with Earth on 
!entry trajectories. For the solar wind effect, it has been estimated that 
Ie probability of a solar wind ion beinp, intercepted by the Earth's 
Ignetosphere and subsequently being transported into the atmosphere (1 
!rcent transport efficiency) is (5 x 10-7) x (10-2) .. 5 x 10-9 • 
The two tables that follow present the probable cermet mass return-
I-Earth reentry as a cumulative function of time after launch for a single 
.ssion. 
Poynting-Robertson -+ Sun -+ Solar Wind -+ Earth 
T (years) 
< 3 x 10 3 
104 
105 
106 
Poynting-Robertson -+ Venus -+ Earth 
T (years) 
< 2.05 x 105 
2.15 x 105 
5.10 x 105 
106 
o 
1.4 x 10-12 
4.2 x 10-11 
1.4 x 10-9 
~ (kg) 
o 
1.4 x 10-6 
6.7 x 10-5 
5.8 x 10-4 
\ 
I 
. i 
I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
1 , 
, 
- , 
,! :.~' 
.. " ", 
114 
esc data were integrated with the cermet radionuclide inventory and decay 
Jfile to obtain the risk (in Curies) associated with small particle return. 
e results are prest>nted in Table 5-28. 
TABLE 5-28. CUMULATIVE UPPER ATMOSPHERE BURNUP RISK (Ci) FOR 
REFERENCE MISSION: SMALL PARTICLE RETURN(a) 
._--- --------
Time, years 
::omponent O.DE3 1.DE4 1.DEs 2.DES 
~9 0 3.7E-13 9.4E-12 2.2E-09 
29 0 0 0 0 
n 0 1.6E-12 8.5E-12 2.7E-09 
E:PA Isotopes 0 2.OE-12 1.8E-ll 1.9E-08 
--------------~----------------------------------------
,--" Single mission data; two spheres. 
5.5.12 Deep Space - Payload/Payload Collision 
1.OE6 
1.3E-05 
o 
5.8E-06 
1.9E-05 
In this section and the two that follow we briefly present supporting 
ta for several risk mechanisms that have negligible contribution to the 
tal risk profile for space disposal. The first of these considers possible 
llisions between nuclear waste payload spheres placed into the destination 
bit region on different missions. The payload orbits (at 0.85 A.U.) are all 
sumed to be inclined by 1 degree to the ecliptic plane, but the various 
bits are not coplanar since they do not have identical values of the ascend-
g node, i.e., the orbits will intersect in spat!al orientation by I-degree 
lative inclinations. The relative speed of potential collisions is 564 mis, 
d the kinetic energy of impact is 2.4 x 109 Joules for a payload sphere 
ss of 15,493 kg. The energy-to-t:laSS ratio, Ep/Mt, is 1.6 x 105 
ules/kg, which is considerably greater than the critical fragmentation ene~-
level of 7500 Joules/kg. In fact, such a collision would be expected to 
lease 25 percent of the payload mass in small particle distribution (~ ~DOO 
crons). 
The annular spherical volume of orbits at r = 0.85 A.U. a!ld i ~ 1 
gree is 1.5 x 1032 m3• For 750 missions at two spheres each, the number 
nsHy is 5.0 x 10-30 m3• Hence, the collision probability for any two 
heres of 2.12 m2 cross-sectional area is 3.8 x lO-19/ yr • The single 
ssion risk measured in terms of cermet t:laSS release in space is 6.0 x 
~,-16 kg/yr. For the total of 750 missions deployed, the collision proba-
, Hty is 2.8 x 10-16/yr and the probable cermet nass release is 4.5 x 
-13 kg/yr. This is several orders of magnitude less than the meteoroid 
llision risk. 
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5.5.13 Deep Space - Payload/Comet Collision 
So-called "new comets" are believed to emanate from a source of mate-
rial loosely bound to the solar system at very great distances. Occassionally 
this material is deflected on near-parabolic trajectories toward the Sun, per-
haps by gravitational perturbations of nearby stars. Based on hundreds ot 
years of observational data and recent theories of comet source dynamics, it 
has been estimated that the cometary flux within 1.0 A.U. of the Sun lies in 
the range of 2/yr to 19.5/yr. We will conservatively assume the larger flux. 
The probability of collision between anyone payload sphere and a comet is 
estimated to be 2.1 x 10-23 • We will assume complete destruction of the 
payload if such a collision should occur. 
The single-mission (two spheres) collision probability is 8.1 x 
10-22/yr , and the risk measured in terms of probable cermet mass release in 
space is 5.1 x 10-18 kg/yr. For the total of .150 missions deployed, the 
collision probability is 6.1 x 10-19/yr and the probable cermet mass release 
is 3.8 x 10-15 kg/yr. This is two orders of magnitude less than the 
payload/payload risk, and many orders of magnitude less than the meteoroid 
collision risk. 
5.5.14 Deep Space - Erosion 
The occurrence of sputtering and erosion of the payload shield due to 
impingement of solar wind ions is estimated to be 1 angstrom/yr .. 10-8 
cm/yr. Since the shield is 22 cm thick, the material recession even in 106 
years is inconsequential. No cermet mass release is expected from this 
insult. 
5.5.15 Leaching and Corrosion Consequences for Alternate Payloads 
The leaching and corrosion consequences of a launch accident involv-
ing alternate payloads are summarized in Tables 5-29, 5-30, 5-31, and 5-32. 
5.6 Preliminary Space Disposal Risk Estimates 
Based upon the work reported in the previous subsection, the short-
and long-term space risks can be integrated. Tables 5-33 and 5-34 provide the 
data necessary to plot and compare a short- and long-term space disposal risk 
for the Reference Hission, and the two alternative missions (Tc-99 and 1-129 
to space). Figures 5-17 and 5-18 present plots of these data. 
Considerable uncertainty exists in the data. The accomplishment of a 
Monte Carlo analysis needed to help define uncertainty was beyond the scope of 
this study. However, based upon cathematically carrying through the high- and 
low-probability data and estimated uncertainty in source terms, we believe 
there are at least two orders of magnitude on either side of the Nexpected" 
space risk data. 
Section 7.0 discusses how these data relate to the MGR and 
complemented HGR cases. 
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TABLE 5-29. 
Isotope(s) 
~c-99 
lC(8) 
15 EPA Isotopes 
OW- ...... 
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CUMULATIVE LEACHING CONSEQUENCES (Ci) FOR 
REFERENCE mSSION LAUNCH ACCIDENT(a) 
Time, i:ears 
1E2 lE3 1E4 2E4 
9.8EO 9.5E1 7.8E2 1.3E3 
5.7E2 3.3E3 7.1E3 8.2E3 
1.4E3 4.5E3 9.0E3 1.0E4 
:a) Single mission data; two spheres. 
.1i'l.! . .!'J •• SHa-aaP.L:aa:::e 
>5.3E4 
1.6E3 
8.6E3 
1.lE4 
TABLE 5-30. CUMULATIVE CORROSION AND LEACHING CONSEQUENCES (Ci) FOR 
REFERENCE MISSION LAUNCH ACCIDENT(a) 
--------------.------------------------~ 
Time, years 
Isotope(s) <8.8E4 1.0E5 1.lE5 1.2E5 >1.4E5 
rc-99 o 6.7E2 9.8E2 1.lE3 1.2E3 
~C(8) o 1.6E2 2.2E2 2.5E2 2.6E2 
15 EPA Isotopes o 8.7E2 1.3E3 1.4E3 1.5E3 
------,~----.---.-.... ----~---~----
:a) Single mission data; 2 spheres. 
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TABLE 5-31. CUMULATIVE LEACHING CONSEQUENCES (Ci) FOR 
Tc-99 DISPOSAL MISSION LAUnCH ACCIDEHT(a) 
Time, years 
IE2 IE3 2E4 5E4 >8.8E3 
S.IE3 4.6E4 8.IE4 1.4ES I.SES 
TABLE S-32. CUMULATIVE CORROSION AND LEACHIUG CONSEQUENCES (Ci) 
FOR Tc-99 DISPOSAL MISSION ACCIDEIITs(a) 
13ATTEL.L.E - COL.UMEJUS 
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TABLE 5-33. 
Isotope(s) 
)rt-Term Events 
Tc-99 
AC 
15 EPA Isotopes 
ng-Term Events 
Tc-99 
AC 
,~, 15 EPA Isotopes 
Tc-99 
AC 
IS EPA Isotopes 
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LOG10 CUMULATIVE RISKS (Ci) FOR SPACE DISPOSAL 
OF HLW, LESS Cs AND Sr, 750 MISSIONS 
Time, years 
lEI lE2 lE3 lE4 lE5 
-4.03 -4.01 -3.86 -3.33 -2.18 
-2.24 -2.22 -2.13 -2.00 -1.95 
-1.64 -1.63 -1.60 -1.57 -1.45 
-5.19 -4.20 -3.24 -2.53 
-3.43 -2.71 -2.31 -2.16 
-3.08 -2.59 -2.22 -1.98 
-4.03 -3.98 -3.69 -2.98 2.02 
-2.24 -2.19 -2.02 -1.82 1.74 
-1.64 -1.61 -1.56 -1.48 1.34 
lE6 
-1.95 
-1.92 
-1.39 
-1.82 
-1.94 
-1.56 
-1.58 
-1.62 
-1.17 
------------ ---.--..-.-....--
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TABLE 5-34. LOG10 CUMULATIVE RISKS (Ci) FOR SPACE 
DISPOSAL OF IODUI'E AND TeCHNETIUM 
PAYLOADS (100,000 MTHM EQUIVALENT) 
------------------------------------~-----------------------------
Time, years 
Isotope(s) lEI· 'lE2 . IE3 1E4 IES 1E6 
odine payload(a) 
Short-Term Events 
1-129 -5.61 -5.61 -5.61 -5.61 -4.26 -4.26 
Long-Term Events 
1-129 -7.77 -7.77 -5.80 -5.02 -3.54 
Total 
1-129 -5.61 -5.61 -5.61 -5.39 -4.19 -3.46 
rrechnetium payload(b) 
Short-Term Events 
Tc-99 -4.01 -3.93 -3.47 -3.05 -1.95 -1.95 
Long-Term Events 
Tc-99 '-5 .. 20' . -4.20 -3.24 -2.55 -2.28 
Total 
Tc-99 -4.04 -3.91 -3.39 -2.83 -1.78 
--.--------~--,-~---~-----------------
(a) Calculated for 5.33 missions over 25 years to satisfy 100,000 MTHM. 
(b) Calculated for 8.47 oissions over 25 years to satisfy 100,000 MTHM. 
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6.0 TERRESTRIAL DISPOSAL RISK ESTIMATES (FROM PNL STIJDY) 
This section provides an overview of PNL-generated MGR risk data that 
re used in this preliminary risk assessment of nuclear waste disFosc.>l in 
pace. The Waste Mixes Study, by McCallum !lnd his coworkers (1982), was 
erformed during 1981. The objectives of the study were to: 
• Determine' if removal of selected isotopes (or waste mixes) from 
HU~ and TRU waste would reduce the potenti.al impacts of geo:i..ogic 
disposal 
• Determine if partitioning of the selected isotopes is feasible 
from the standpoint of cost and technology 
• Determine ~ll acceptabl- waste form(s) for dicposal of selected 
. isotopes in space 
• COfnpare any reduction in repository impact to the increase in 
waste treatment, storage, and t~ansportation impacts incurred as a 
resulc of t -.~ partitioning activity. 
The potential waste mixes. identified in the PNL study have been used 
:hroughout this report as a basis for evaluating the risk benefit or disbene-
r-tt of nuclear waste disposal in space. (Risk is defined as expected cumula-
ive releases to the biosphere.) The PNL analyses led to defining five 
llternative ~~ste management systems: 
• Reference Case - Dispose of all HLW and TRU waste in a mined 
geologic repository (MGR). 
• Alternative A - Dispose of iodine (1-129) in space and the balance 
in the MGR. 
• Alternative B - Dispose of technetium (Tc-93) in space and the 
balance in MGR. 
• Alternative C - Age for 50 years and then dispose of 95 percent of 
both cesium (Cs-137) and strontium (Sr-90) in a repository; 
dispose the halance of the HLW in space; separate plutonium from 
the TRU waste for recycle; and dispose of the balance of the TRU 
waste in MGR. 
• Alternative D - Age llLW for 50 years and then dispose of in space; 
separate plutonium from TRU waste and dispose of in space; nnd 
dispose of the balance of the TRU waste in a MGR. 
For each of the alternatives, thE' "terrestrial risk" is made up of 
two parts: 
BATTELLE - COLUMDUS 
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Releases during reprocessing and partitioning (what we refer to as 
procE;!ssing) 
Releases from accidents that occur during processing or after the 
waste is placed in the repository. 
e potential for risk benefit for the MGR depends on the degree of separation 
1 losses to the biosphere. Risks from short-term accidents during W3ste 
ocessing or placement in the MGR have been shown to be negligible (McCallum 
aI, 1982) and will not be included in the discussion here. 
1 PNL Waste-Processing Risk Estimates 
The five PNL waste management alternatives differ by the frnction of 
ch isotope which is sent to space. The nuclide fractions sent to space for 
'lD.e of the more important isotopes are presented in Table 6-1. The frac-
.on relll!lining is then sent to a terrestrial disposal site. These fractions 
~e presented in Table 6-2. 
Each of the waste management alternatives requires processing. With 
lch additional processing step an additional fraction of certain isotopes 
luld be released to the biosphere. The fraction lost to tne biosphere due to 
Irmal reprocessing (Reference MGR Case) has been estimated by PNL and is 
lven in Table 6-3. The short-term partitioning (additional waste process-
Ig over and above the Reference Case) releases to the biosphere have also 
~en estimated by PNL and are presented in Table 6-4. These releases have 
!en used in the overall risk estimates (see Section 7.0). It should be 
)inted out that the releases shown in these tables are dominated by C-14 
~lease during reprocessing (see 15 EPA isotope values in Table 6-3). But, 
~re importantly, they are completely overshadowed by a total tritium release 
f 2.2 x 107 Ci for a 100,000 MTH~ repository equivalent (HcCallum et aI, 
982). For all alternatives, this tritium release dot'linates the e:-tpected 
~tal dose to the population for reprocessing and partitioning. The value 
rovided by PNL is approximately 1000 man-rems. Based on the P:-'1. data, 
here fore , it is conclud~d that the total actual health risk of waste 
rocessing does not significantly chan~~ (within 2 to 9 percent) with 
dditional partitioning steps in Gupport of space disposal. For additional 
nformation regarding these reprocessing and partitioning releases, the reader 
s urged to review the PNL Waste Mixes Study report (HcCallum et al. 1982) • 
• 2 PNL Risk Estimates From a Repository Release 
PNL has assUI:1ed that the Reference repository i a n:ined geologic 
·epository (HGR) in bedded salt (at Paradox Basin). The Hl.W waste is stored 
/~.n containers which are assuced to have a design life of at least 1000 years. 
md institutional control of the site will be for n lOO-year period after 
:losure. 
During the time period considered in this risk assessment (out to 
[06 years), the repository could be subjected to a number of disruptions. 
') 
TABLE 6-1. NUCLIDE FRACTIONS SENT TO SPACE DISPOSAL 
---~-------------.......-...... ----------------------------.--.......----------
Isotopes 
Fission Products 
Tc-99 
I-129 
Cs 
Sr 
Ru 
Zr 
Mo 
Rare Earths 
Actinides 
Pu 
Np 
Am, em 
Reference 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
a 
Aged HLW 
to Space 
1.0 
o 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
0.005 
1.0 
1.0 
Disposal 
Cs/Sr 
Separation 
0.99 
o 
0.05 
0.05 
1.0 
0.4 
1.0 
0.99 
0.004 
1.0 
0.99 
Alternative 
Tc 
Separation 
0.98 
o 
o 
o 
0.01 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
___ "--_~ __ '-'-""'--...rL ____________ '_ .... __________________ • 
Source: McCallum et aI, 1982. 
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TABLE 6-2. NUCLIDE FRACTIONS SENT TO GEOLOGIC DISPOSAL 
- -------~ -------------------------- .-----------_.------.... 
Isotopes 
Fission Products 
Tc-99 
1-129 
Cs 
Sr 
Ru 
Zr 
Mo 
Rare Earths 
Actinides 
Pu 
Np 
Am, em 
Reference 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
0.011 
1.0 
1.0 
Aged HLW 
to Space 
0 
1.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0001 
o 
o 
Disposal Alternative 
Cs7Sr Tc 
Separation 
0.01 
1.0 
0.95 
0.95 
0 
0.6 
0 
0.01 
0.0002 
o 
0.010 
Separation 
0.02 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
0.99 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
0.011 
1.0 
1.0 
I 
Separation 
1.0 
0.014 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
0.011 
1.0 
1.0 
-----.----------------- _.---.-...---------- .. ---------------~--
Source: McCallum et aI, 1982. 
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TABLE 6-3. SHORT-TERM REPROCESSUIC RELEASES TO TIlE BIOSPHERE (Ci/l00,OOO MTHH) 
Isotope(s) 
Tc-99 
1-129 
8 Actinides 
15 EPA Isotopes 
All Wastes 
to Reference MGR 
1.7E-8(a) 
3.5EO 
1.3E-2 
5.6E2(b) 
HLW to Space, 
Reference Space Disposal 
1~7E-8 
3.5EO 
1.3E-2 
5.6E2(b) 
Technetium 
to Space 
1.7E-8 
3.5EO 
1.3E-2 
5.6E2(b) 
Iodine 
to Space 
1.7E-8 
3.5EO 
1.3E-2 
5.6E2(b) 
---..-- -------- .--------.--------~ 
Source: PNL Haste Mixes Study, by R. McCallum et aI, 1982. 
(a) Believed to be low - see GElS (P£fer to Section 3 of McCallum et aI, 1982). 
(b) Carbon-14 is 5.6E2 Ci; not included in this is tritium, which is 2.2E7 Ci. 
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TABLE 6-4. SHORT-TERli PARTITIONING RELEASES TO TIlE BIOSPHERE (Ci/IOO,OOO MTHM) 
Isotope(s) 
Tc-99 
1-129 
8 Actinides 
15 EPA Isotopes 
All Waste:! . 
to Reference MGR(a) 
o 
o 
o 
o 
HLW to Space, 
Reference Space Disposal 
5.2E-2 
o 
2.0E-2 
o 
Technetium 
to Space 
2.6E-l 
o 
o 
o 
Iodine 
to Space 
o 
O(b) 
o 
O· 
-~-----~---- -------------- -----.. _--------------
Source: PNL Waste Mixes Study~ by R. McCallum et aI, 1982. 
(a) Zero by definition of the terms reprocessing vs. partitioning; reprocessing releases 
given in Table 6-3. 
(b) Releases included in reprocessing losses (see Table 6-3). 
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Table 6-5 (from Greenborg et aI, 1978) represents a list of some of the 
postulated challenges to the integrity of the repository. These events could 
possibly lead to a release to the biosphere. Quantitative estimates for two 
of the events (see boxed items in Table 6-5) were made in the Waste Mixes 
Study (McCallum et a1, 1982). The two events considered by PNL, a drilling 
event into bedded salt and a natural fault (bedded salt) are believed by PNL 
to provide the most significant contribution to the overall risk of the MGR. 
These events, along with PNL's models and assumptions, are described in the 
next two subsections. 
6.2.1 Fault Risk Estimates 
The natural event chosen by PNL for analysis was a seismic (fault) 
event occurring 1000 years after repository closure, followed by ground water 
entering and exiting a region of the repository. Raymond et al (1980) pre-
viously addressed this scenario. Raymond's work formed the basis for the 
release mechanism assumed by PNL in the study. Using a leach rate of 1.0 x 
10-5 g/cm2 ·day and other parameters (detailed in McCallum et aI, 1982) 
which were believed by PNL to be conservative, cumulative releases over 
10,000, 100,000, and 1,000,000 years to the accessible environcent were 
estimated for isotopes identified by the EPA (U.S. EPA, 1981 and U.S. NRC, 
1981) to be of concern for long-term risk. The accessible environment is 
r-. defined by the EPA (U.S. EPA, 1981) as surface waters, land surfaces, the 
atmosphere, and underground formations greater than one mile from the 
repository boundary which might provide ground water for human consumption. 
The one-mile boundary was selected by PNL as the measure in this study. 
Thp. results of the PNL calculations for the fault case, with and 
Without HLW disposal in space, are presented in Tables 6-6 and 6-7. These 
tables display the cumulative consequences and risk out to one million years. 
For removal of iodine and technetium, PNL recommended reducing Tc-99 
and 1-129 values in Table 6-6 by factors of 0.014 and 0.020, respectively. 
PNL compared these releases to the draft EPA release limits for 
repositories (U.S. EPA, 1981) and found that the predicted releases, even 
assuming the fault occurs at 1000 years, were well below the limits. 
6.2.2 Drilling Event Risk Estimates 
PNL also used EPA estimates of future drilling rates to determine 
the consequences of possible human intrusion. Drilling for resources, etc., 
was assumed to commence after the first 100 years, when institutional controls 
have ended (200-year-old waste). The consequences and risk of a drilling 
event were estimated by PNL. The results in terms of expected cumulative 
releases to the biosphere (land, top soil, and air) are presented In Tables 
5-8 and 6-9 for the Reference HGR and HGR complemented by removing HLW. less 
~5 percent cesium and strontium. A detailed explanation of the rationale 
behind these assumptions is presented in the P!';1. report (HcCallurJ et aI, 
1982). 
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Natural Processcs 
• Cllmetic Fluctuations 
• Sea-Level Fluctuations 
• Glaciation 
• River Erosion 
• Sedimentation 
• Tectonic Forces 
• Volcanic Extrusion 
• Igneous Intrusion 
• Diapirism 
• Diagenesis 
• New or Undetected 
Faul t Rupture 
• Hydrsulic Fracturing 
• Dissolution 
• Aquifer Flux Variation 
') 
~V"'''''l'''''~ &lA.u ..... ..., ....... _ •• ____ ... _ ... 
Natural Events 
• Flood Erosion 
• Seismically Induced 
Shaft Seal Failure 
• Meteorite 
Han-Caused Events 
Improper Design/Operation: 
• Snaft Seal Failure 
• Improper Waste Emplacement 
Undetected Past Intrusion: 
• Undiscovered Boreholes or Kine 
Shafts 
Inadvertent Future Intrusion: 
• Archeological Exhumation 
• Weapons Testing 
• Nonnuclear Waate Disposal 
• Resource Mining (Kineral, 
Hydrocarbon, Geothermal, Salt) 
• Storage of lIydrocarbons or 
Compressed Air 
Intentional Intrusion: 
• War 
• Sabotage 
• Waste Recovery 
Perturbation of Ground Water Syatem: 
• Irrigation 
• Reservoirs 
• Intentional Artificial Recharge 
• Establishment of Population Center 
Repository-Caused 
Processes 
Thermal, Chemical Potential, 
Radiation, and Mechanical 
ForcO! Gradients: 
• Induced Local Fracturing 
• Chemical or Physical Changes 
in Local Geology 
• Induced Ground Water Movement 
• Waste Container MoveMent 
• Increase in Internal Pressure 
• Shaft Seal Failure 
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Source: Waste Isolation Safet Assessment Pro ram Scenario Anal sis Methods for Use in Assessin the Safety of the Geologic 
Isolation of Nuclear Waste, by J. Greenborg et aI, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, PNL-2643 November 1978) • 
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Isotope(s) 
Tc-99 
1-129 
Am-241 
Am-243 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-242 
Np-237 
Ra-226 
AC 
C-14 
Cs-135 
Cs-137 
Sr-90 
Sn-126 
FP 
TOTAL 
131 
TABLE 6-6. CUMULATIVE CONSEQTJ~NCES AliT) RELEASE RISKS 
FOR FAULT SCENARIO, REFE~~~CE HGR 
--- -.. _------ -.-------~ 
Consequences (Ci) Probabilistic Risks (Ci) 
for Cumulative Relqase for Cumulative Release 
to Accessible EnvfronmEmt to Accessible Environment(a) 
104 yr 105 yr 106 yr 104 yr 105 yr 106 yr 
9.9E3 1.3E4 1.3E4 9.9E-3 1.3E-l 1.3EO 
2.7El 3.5El 3.5El 2.7E-5 3.5E-4 3.5E-3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 5.0E-5 0 0 5.0E-9 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1.0E1 0 0 1.0E-3 
0 5.5E2 5.5E2 0 5.5E3 5.5E-2 
1.8E-2 1.2E2 2.1E2 1.8E-8 1.2E-3 2.1E-2 
(l.8E-2j (6.7E2) (7.7E2) (l.8E-8) (6.7E-3) (7.7E-2) 
2.2E2 3.5E2 3.5E2 2.2E-4 3.5E-3 3.5E-2 
0 3.1E2 3.1E2 0 3.1E-3 3.1E-2 
0 0 '0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 4.7E2 4.7E2 0 4.7E-3 4.7E-2 
(2.7E2) (1.1E3) (1.1E3) (2.2E-4) (1.1E-2) (1.1E-1) 
1.01E4 1.48E4 1.49E4 1.01E-2 1.48E-l 1.49EO 
------------ -------------
Source: PNL \.,Taste Mixes Study (McCallum et aI, 1982) • 
(a) Probahility of fault occurring estimated by PNL/Om-lI to be ~lO-10/year; 
consequence data multiplied by the probability for event in that given 
period. 
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TABLE 6-7. CUMULATIVE CONSEQUENCES AND RELEASE RISKS FOR 
FAULT SCENARIO, COMPLEMENTED BY REMOVAL OF HLW, 
LESS 95 PERCENT Cs AND Sr 
--
Consequences (Ci) Probabilistic Risks (Ci) 
for Cumulative Release for Cumulative Release 
to Accessible Environment to Accessible Environment(a) 
Isotope(s) 104 yr 105 yr 106 yr 104 yr 105 yr 106 yr 
Tc-99 9.9El 1.3E2 1.3E2 9.9E-5 1.3E-3 1.3E-2 
1-129 2.7El 3.5E1 3.5E1 2.7E-5 3.5E-4 3.5E-3 
Am-241 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Am-243 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pu-238 0 0 0 0 0 C 
Pu-239 0 0 9.1E-7 0 0 9.1E-ll 
Pu-24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
--
Pu-242 0 0 1.8E-1 0 0 1.8E-5 
Np-237 0 5.5EO 5.5EO 0 5.5E-5 5.5E-4 
Ra-226 1.8E-4 7.2EO 2.1EO 1.8E-10 7.2E-5 2.1E-4 
AC (1.8E-4) (1.3E1) (7.6EO) (1.8E-10) (1.3E-4) (7.6E-4) 
C-14 2.2E2 3.5E2 3.5E2 2.2E4 3.5E-3 3.5E-2 
Cs-135 0 2.9E2 2.9E2 0 2.9E-3 2.9E-2 
Cs-137 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sr-90 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sn-126 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FP (2.2E2) (6.4E2) (6.4EQ (2.2E-4) (6.4E-3) (6.4E-2) 
TOTAL 3.46E2 8.18E2 8.13E2 3.46E-4 8.18E-3 8.12E-2 
Source: PNL Waste Mixes Study (McCallum et al. 1982). 
(a) Probability of fault occurring estimated b)' P~'L/ONWI to be "-lO-IO/year; 
consequence data multiplied by the probability for event in that given 
period. 
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TABLE 6-8. CUMULATIVE RELEASE RISKS (CURIES) FROM DRILLING 
EVENTS OCCURRING OVER PERIOD UP TO 1 x 106 YEARS 
AT A BEDDED SALT REPOSITORY. REFERENCE MGR(a} 
--
Time, ~ears 
Isotopea 200 lE3 lE4 lE5 
Tc-99 3.8E-1 1.6EO 1.5El 1.3E2 
1-129 1.1E-3 4.5E-3 4.2E-2 4.1E-1 
Am-241 1.8E-1 4.8E1 6.1E1 6.3E1 
Am-243 1.4EO 5.8EO 3.7E1 8.6E1 
Pu-238 1.IEO 1.4EO 1.4EO 1.4EO 
Pu-239 5.8E-2 2.4E-l 2.1EO 5.7E1 
Pu-240 6.6E-1 2.7EO 1.8E1 3.8E1 
Pu-242 6.2E-4 2.6E-3 2.6E-2 2.9E-l 
Np-237 4.0E-3 9.4E-2 1.3E-l 6.0EO 
Ra-226 4.7E-8 6.0E-2 6.1E-2 2.5E-l 
AC (3.4EO) (5.8El) (1.2E2) (2.5E2) 
C-14 1.7E-2 6.8E-2 4.0E-l 5.7E-1 
Cs-135 9.3E-3 3.9E-2 3.6E-1 3.7EO 
Cs-137 1.1E2 1.2E2 1.2E2 1.2E2 
Sr-90 5.9El 6.1El 6.1El 6.1El 
So-126 1.6E-2 6.9E-2 6.4E-l 4.8EO 
FP 0.7E2) (1.8E2) (1.8E2) (1.9E2) 
TOTAL 1.7E2 2.4E2 3.2E2 5.7E2 
---
Source: PNL Waste l-1ixes Study (HcCallum et al, 1982). 
lE6 
4.6E2 
4.0EO 
6.3E1 
8.6El 
1.4EO 
9.0E1 
3.8E1 
1.6EO 
5.7El 
1.7EO 
(3.4E2) 
5.7E-l 
3.2El 
1.2E2 
6.1El 
9.5EO 
(2.2E2) 
1.0E3 
(a) Assumes the EPA (1980) first estimates of drilling rates, the release 
parameters io the DOE (1980) disruptive event, and a 100,000 HTilli 
re pos i to ry. 
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TABLE 6-9. CUMULATIVE RELEASE RISKS (CURIES) FROM DRILLING 
EVEUTS OCCURRING OVER PERIOD UP TO 1 x 106 YEARS 
AT A BEDDED SALT REPOSITO~Y, COMPLEMENTED MGR BY 
REMOVAL OF HLW, LESS 95 PERCEIIT Cs AND Sr(a) 
Time. ~ears 
Isotopes 200 lE3 lE4 lE5 
Tc-99 3.8E-3 1.6E-2 1.5E-l 1.3EO 
1-129 1.IE-3 4.5E-3 4.2E-2 3.9E-1 
Am-241 1.8E-3 4.8E-1 6.1E-1 6.3E-1 
Am-243 1.4E-2 5.8E-2 3.7E-l 8.6E-l 
Pu-238 4.0E-3 5.2E-3 5.2E-3 5.2E-3 
Pu-239 2.1E-4 8.8E-4 7.6E-3 2.1E-l 
Pu-240 2.4E-3 1.0E-2 6.4E-2 1.4:'-1 
Pu-242 2.2E-6 9.6E-6 9.6E-5 1.0E-3 
Np-237 4.0E-5 9.4E-4 1.3E-3 6.0E-2 
Ra-226 4.7E-I0 6.0E-4 6.1E-4 2.5E-3 
AC (2.2E-2) (5.6E-l) (1. lEO) (1.9EO) 
C-14 1.7E-2 6.8E-2 4.0E-l 5.7E-l 
Cs-135 8.8E-3 3.7E-2 3.4E-1 3.5EO 
Cs-137 1.0E2 1.1E2 1.1E2 1.1E2 
Sr-90 5.6El 5.8E1 5.8El 5.8El 
Sn-126(b) 1. iE-3 4.5E-3 4.2E-2 3.9E-l 
FP (1.6E2) (1.7E2) (1.7E2) (1.7E2) 
TOTAL 1.6E2 1.7E2 1.7E2 1.8E2 
Source: PNL Waste Mixes Study (McCallum et ai, 1982). 
lE6 
4.6EO 
3.8EO 
6.3E-l 
8.6E-l 
5.2E-3 
3.3E-l 
1.4E-1 
6.0E-3 
5.7E-l 
1.7E-2 
(2.6EO) 
5.7E-l 
3.0El 
1.1E2 
5.8El 
3.8EO 
(2.0E2) 
2.1E2 
(a) Assumes the U.S. EPA (1980) first estimates of drilling rates, the 
release parameters in the U.S. DOE (1980) disruptive event, and a 
100,000 MTHM repository. 
(b) Some fraction of this isotope would reoain in a repository; however, 
this point wa3 not examined in the P~L study. 
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PNL concluded that, froa a human intrusion-risk stan.]')oint, there may 
, some incentive to remove the actinides from the repositor) inventory; how-
'er, PNL's results also show that the release rates were within the draft EPA 
.mits • 
. 3 Summary of PNL Terrestrial Risk Data 
A summary of the PNL MGR risk data for waste processing, the fault, 
Id drilling events is given in Tables 6-10, 6-11, and 6-12. The cumulative 
Lsks, in Ci, are provided in terms of LoglO. This facilitated the plotting 
: the values (see Section 7.0). 
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TABLE 6-10. LOGIO OF TOTAL EXPECTED MGR RISKS (CURIES) 
FOR PIlL PROCESSING SCENARIOS 
Scenario 
Reference HGR 
Tc-99 
1-129 
AC(8) 
15 EPA Isotopes 
Complemented MGR (HLW, less Cs and 
Sr to Space) 
Tc-99 
1-129 
AC(8) 
15 EPA Isotopes 
ComElemented MGP. (Tc-99 to Space) 
Tc-99 
1-129 
AC(8) 
15 EPA Isotopes 
ComElemented MGk (1-129 to Space) 
Tc-99 
1-129 
AC(8) 
15 EPA Isotopes 
LogI0 
Total Curies Released 
for 100,000 MTHM 
-7.77(a) 
0.54 
-1.89 
2.75(b) 
-1.28 
0.54 
-1.48 
2.75(b) 
-0.58 
0.54 
-1.89 
2.75(b) 
-7.77 
0.54 
-1.89 
2.75(b) 
(a) From FEIS (U.S. DOE, 1980); PNL believes should be much higher. 
(b) Mostly C-14. 
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TABLE 6-11. LOGI0 OF EXPECTED CUMULATIVE MGR RISKS 
(CURIES) FOR PNL DRILLING SCENARIOS 
Title t ~ears 
cenario 200 IE3 1E4 1E5 
.eference MGR 
Tc-99 -0.42 0.20 1.08 'l.ll 
1-129 -2.69 -2.35 -1.3S -0.39 
AC(S) 0.53 1.76 2.0S 2.39 
15 EPA Isotopes 2.24 2 .. 38 2.50 2.76 
:ome1emen ted MGR (HLW less Cs and Cr to space) 
Tc-99 -2.42 -1.80 -0.S2 0.11 
1-129 -2.96 -2.35 -1.38 -0.41 
AC(S) -1.65 -0.256 0.0246 0.280 
15 EPA Isotopes 2.19 2.23 2.23 2.25 
:ome1emented HGR (Tc-99 to space) . 
,..,.-... .. 
Tc-99 -2.12 -1.50 -0.62 0.41 
1-129 -2.96 -2.35 -1.38 -0.39 
AC(8) 0.53 1.76 2.08 2.39 
15 EPA Isotopes 2.24 2.38 2.48 2.65 
::omp1emented MGR (1-129 to space) 
Tc-99 -0.42 0.20 1.0S 2.11 
1-129 -4.S1 -4.20 . -3.23 -2.24 
AC(8) 0.53 1.76 2.0S 2.39 
15 EPA Isotopes 2.24 2.3S 2.50 2.76 
• , •• 1 •. 
IE6 
2.66 
0.60 
2.45 
3.01 
0.66 
-0.58 
0.405 
2.32 
0.96 
0.60 
2.45 
2.76 
2.66 
-1.25 
2.45 
3.01 
-. 
. ~, 
• • .1. 
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TABLE 6-12. LOGlO OF EXPECTED CUMULATIVE MGR RISKS 
(CURIES) FOR PNL FAULT SCENAhIOS 
Time, years 
Scenario 
Reference HGR 
Tc-99 
1-129 
AC(S) 
15 EPA Isotopes 
lE4 
-2.00 
-4.57 
-7.75 
-2.00 
Complemented HCR (HLW, less Cs and 
Tc-99 -4.00 
1-129 -4.57 
AC(S) -9.74 
15 EPA Isotopes -3.46 
Complemented MGR (Tc-99 to space) 
Tc-99 -3.69 
1-129 -4.57 
AC(S) -7.75 
15 EPA Isotopes -3.39 
Complemented MGR (1-129 to space) 
Tc-99 -2.00 
1-129 -6.42 
AC(S) -7.75 
15 EPA Isotopes -2.00 
--
------
1E5 
-0.S9 
-3.46 
-2.17 
-0.83 
lE6 
0.11 
-2.46 
-1.11 
0.17 
Sr to space) 
-2.S9 -1.S9 
-3.46 -2.46 
-3.88 -3.11 
-2.09 -1.09 
-2.59 -1.59 
-3.46 -2.46 
-2.17 -1.11 
-1.69 -0.67 
-0.89 -0.11 
-5.31 -4.31 
-2.17 -1.11 
-0.83 -0.17 
------
~ ".; 
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7.0 INTEGRATED RISK BENEF1T/D1SBENEF1T FOR DISPOSAL SYSTEMS 
COMPLEMENTED BY SPACE DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE 
This section integrates the results of both the PNL (Section 6.0) and 
BCI. (Section 5.t) release risk assessr.lents for the totnl nuclear waste dis-
posal systems considered in the current year study pco~ram. Risk is defined 
as cumulative Curies released to the accessible environment (what ,,"'C refer to 
as the "biosphere"). The terrestrial disposal risk is comprised of the 
following components: (1) expected waste-processin~ releases to the 
biosphere, (2) probabilistic waste releases to the biosphere via a fault 
event, and (3) probabilistic waste releases to the biosphere due to a drilling 
scenario. The space disposal risk is comprised of probabilistic releases to 
the biosphere resulting frem credible accidents that cnn occur frem the launch 
pad to the final destination. Space accidents include: 
• Lon~-term corrosion in the ocean and in wet soil 
• Hard rock impact 
• Volcano impact 
• Heteoroid/debris impact 
• High-velocity impacts on soil, rock, and water 
• Deep-space meteoroid impncts 
• Deep-space payload return over the long tern. 
Based upon the data in Sections 5.0 and 6.0, We will discuss and 
compare the vario'.1s cumulative release risk contributions for the 
noncomplemented HGl\. (no space disposal) and the space-coml'lcr.lented MGR 
systems. The approach for discussing the integrated risk is as follows. For 
the five scenarios listed below, the risk of the noncomplementea HGR will be 
discussed first, followed by the complemented NGR risk, ass\min~ that an 
"ideal" or "zero" risk disposal system could handle the wa,;te reooved from the 
complemented HGR. Then, the total intc~rated risks (complemented HGR plus 
space risk) for each scenario will be compared to the noncompl~nented HGR. 
Potential risk beudits or disbeneflts based upon the available data will be 
discussed. 
These five scenarios are considered and discussed: 
(1) TIle CUr.lulntive release risk for the SlL'll of the IS EPA isotopes 
(see HcCnllum et aI, 1932) for IIU~ disposal in Spllt:C 
(2) The cumulative release risk for the sum of eight -actinides (see 
HcCallum et aI, 1982) for I\l.\~ disposal in space 
(3) TIle cumulative release risk of Tc-99 for llLW dispoS::ll in space 
(4) TIIC cumulative release risk of 1-129 for I-129 disposal in 
space 
(5) The cumulative release risk of Tc-99 for Tc-99 disposal in 
space. 
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HLW Disposal in Space - 15 EPA Isotopes 
Figure 7-1 presents the cumulative releas~ risk data for 15 EPA 
isotopes, as cited in Sections S.O and 6.0 of this report, for th~ case of HLW 
disposal in space (the Reference space disposal mission). The magnitudes of 
the four major risk contributors (processing, drilling, fault, and space) are 
designated by the appropriate shading (see legend). 
7.1.1 Reference MGR Risk (No Space Disposal) 
The cumulative release risk for the Reference HGR case, no space 
disposal (see Figure 7-1a), indicates that short-term waste-processing 
releases dominate the cumulative release risk (mostly due to C-14). The 
computed risk for drilling events dominate~ over the fault case by about three 
orders of magnitude. 
7.1.2 Complemented MGR Risk 
Because of the dominance of the waste-processing releases. even an 
ideal dispos1l1 system for HL\~ would not appear to reduce the cumulative re-
lease risk for the disposal system (see Figure 7-1b). If one ignores the 
short-term proc~ssing releaseq, then about a factor ~f three reduction in the 
cumulative release risk for the drillin~ event in the long t~rm is indicated, 
assuming an ideal disposal system for HLW. The fact that TRU is always 
present in the HGR contributes to this fact. For the fault case, about one 
order of magnitude improvement is possible for the sum of the 15 EPA isotopes. 
The cumulative release risk for both the Rufcrence ~IGR "nJ complemented HGR in 
the event of the postulated fault case is nt or behw the 1 Ci cumulative 
release line. This h a very low risk ill both cases. PNL indicates that this 
is well below the draft EPA release limits for mined gcolo~ic repositories. 
7.1.3 Space Risk 
The space release risk estimate (see f'igure 7-1c) is extremely small 
compared to proceSSing volumes and drlllin~ releases. It is about the same 
order of l11:lgnitude as the release risk for the complemented fault (sec Figure 
7-1b). Because of the uncertainty in the dnt:l, possible benefits/disbenefits 
of space disposal for the HGR fault scenario only are uncertain. All that cnn 
be concluded is that the ('xpected cumulative releaSe! risk of the 15 I-:PA 
isotope£ for the spllce <liS[,OS,11 of 1IL1~ is thllt the risk benefits nrc possihle 
in the very lon~ term, hut are not likely to be important. One must look to 
other discriminators, such as the actillid~'s and techn~~ttu:n, to see if there 
are any possible benefits for specific problem areas in the MGR. 
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7.2 HLW Disposal in Space - Eight Actinides 
Figure 7-2 presents the cumulative release risk data for the sum of 
eight actinides, as cited in Sections 5.0 and 6.0 of this report for the case 
of HLW disposal, in space. 
7.2.1 Reference MGR Risk (No Space Disposal) 
The cumulative actinide release risk for the Reference MGR case (see 
Figure 7-2a) indicates that the drilling event significantly dominates over 
the risks for w3dte processing and the fault. The actinide release risk from 
faulting is insignificantly small and comparable to the processing releases 
for the actinides. 
7.2.2 Complemented MGR Risk 
Figure 7-2b indicates only a slight insignificant increase in waste-
processing releases in the short term. The release risk from the fault case 
moves from insignificant values to two orders of magnitude less (see Figures 
7-2a and 7-2b). For an ideal disposal system for HLU, a benefit can be 
realized when one considers the dril:ling event postulated by PNL. About a 
factor of 100 reduction in the long-term risk can be realized for the 
actinicies. 
7.2.3 Space Risk 
As shown in Figure 7-2c, the space risk is again 'lrery small and 
comparable to 'the risk of 'waste' processing and the risk of fs:ulting in the 
Reference MGR case. It appears, even with the uncertainty theat it does not 
make sense to dispose of the actinides in space if one considoers only waste 
processing and the fault release risk. A significant disbenefit is possible. 
However, if human intrusion (drillinr,) is considered to be an illt'ortant factor 
in the risk, then space disposal of the actinides can provid-e a cU!1lulative 
rele'ase risk benefit by about a factor of 100, even with ao;pace risk 
component increase by two orders of magniturle. 
7.3 lILY Disposal in Space - Tc-99 Risk 
Figure 7-3 presents the cumulative release risk data for Tc-99, as 
cited in Sections 5.0 and 6.0 of this report for the case of IilLW disposal in 
space. 
7.3.1 Reference MGR Risk (No Space Disposal) 
Fi~urc 7-3a indicates, when compared to Fir,ure 7-1a, tfuit Tc-99 is an 
important contributor to the release risk in nn HGR (only in :terms of Curies 
released). Figure 7-3a also indicates that the drilling even~ dominates the 
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)ssible releases. PNL says that processing releases of Tc-99 were predicted 
, the FEIS (U.S. DOE, 1980) to be very ~mall; therefore, they do not appear 
1 the graph. 
7.3.2 Complemented MGR Risk 
Figure 7-3b indicates that about a factor of 100 improvement in the 
~ng-term release risk for Tc-99 can be obtained for an ideal disposal system. 
owever, because of short-term processing releases, the benefit becomes a 
light disbenefit in the short term. 
7.3.3 Space Risk 
The space risk (see Figure 7-3c) , is very small compared to the 
omplemented MGR risk envelope. It is, however, comparable to the risk of the 
sult case. Due to the uncertainties that exist in the data base, little can 
e said for technetium disposal, if one does not include human intrusion 
drilling). Benefit is possible if one considers that human intrusion is 
·ossible. However, this benefit would be better realized by partitioning 
echnetium and shipping it to space (see Section 7.5). 
, .4 1-129 Disposal in Space - 1-129 Risk 
Figure 7-4 indicates that because of the large processing releases 
lnticipated in the short term (see Section 6.0), no benefit is possible for 
lisposing of 1-129 in space. If improvement can be made in the processing of 
:he iodine, than benefits are possible with space disposal. However, these 
)enefits are believed to be technically insignificant (see the 1-Ci line in 
:he figure). The space disposal risk is exceedingly insignificant (see 
~igure 7-4c). 
7.5 Tc-99 Disposal in Space - Tc-99 Risk 
Figure 7-5 indicates that the short-term risk due to waste pro-
cessing for Tc-99 disposal in space is increased to a "relatively insig-
nificant" level (see the l-Ci line). Long-term benefits are possible if one 
considers human intrusion (drilling). There do not appear to any tech-
nical benefits for Tc-99 in space if one excludes human intrusion. ~lore 
efficient partitioning processes could improve the potential benefit ~or 
technetium disposal in space. The space risk cOrlponent is an insignificant 
contributor when co~pared with waste-processing and drilling events. 
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8.0 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
This section summarizes a few of the major results of this study. 
The results given have considered the uncertainty in the calculated values for 
the releases for both the MGR and space disposal. The results listed are 
organized by topic area: 
Based Upon Data Derived in the PNL Study 
(1) The risk to future populations from the mined geologic disposal 
of radioactive waste appears to be extremely small. 
(2) In terms of Curies released, the escape of fission products 
during normal reprocessing would be expected to be as large as 
the total amount released (due to a natural fault or human 
intrusion) over the subsequent one million years. 
(3) The release of actinide elements dominates 
radionuclides over the expected period of 
intervention (drilling events) in the MGR. 
the escape of 
possible human 
(4) The release of Tc-99 appears to dominate the escape 
radionuclides in MGR seismic events. Actinide releases 
expected to be small. 
of 
are 
(5) Since some radioactive material would be disposed of in an MGR 
for each of the space disposal options examined, space disposal 
could reduce but not eliminate this element of risk. For some 
radionuclides, the additional waste processing required for 
space options would actually increase the waste-reprocessing 
~omponent of the risk. 
(6) The potential for risk benefit is limited by the degree of 
separation and release in waste processing and the inclusion of 
TRU wastes in the MGR. 
(7) Current technology indicates that there is no potential for re-
lease risk benefit for the space disposal of 1-129. Potential 
exists for Tc-99 and the actinides for current waste-processing 
technology. 
Based Upon BeL Preliminary Space Risk Estimates 
(8) The risk of space disposal appears to be very small. 
(9) Short-term space disposal release risk (space component) is 
dominated by payload reentry, impact on hard rock, and complete 
breakup and reentry due to direct meteoroid/payload or 
debris/payload collisions. 
~P.l!~!!l' V![1~· 
i}i.,jj· 
I 
I' ' ·...:.:~i i, 
. !'i,:litl 
"""11 
1 - .:~.'.:.' . .:.':.';~ 
,"" '!;!;~',;: .~c • "1"7 i:(rh: 
r 
...... :;:;\:~~: 
, -->';:'.-; ~.~.'j-
'_' ____ ~ ____ .,:-_ :.. •• ~.'_~t" .... __ .. ~_ ~," ~~~,J\i!ju1 
~.-~.~~~ .. ~~"~' ~~--~~------~'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
, 
I .... 
150 
(10) Long-term release risk (space component) is dominated by the 
failure to locate reentered payloads in the ocean, intact 
payload return from deep space after rescue attempts fail, and 
small particle return after deep-space meteo~oid collisions. 
(11) Short-term acc1deI'.t events' dominate the space risk component, 
but not by much (well within any uncertainty band). 
(12) An uncertainty analysis was not possible under the scope of this 
study; however, the uncertainty for the space disposal risk is 
believed to be within two orders of magnitude of the expected 
value. 
(13) From examination of the release risk for space disposal (space 
component), it is evident that a few contributors to the risk 
would be very difficult to reduce (e.g., meteoroid impact); 
however, most of the risk contributors can be controlled by 
proper design. 
Based Upon Integrated PNL/BCL Risk Data 
(14) Ignoring probabilities, no single accident event examined in the 
study, for either space disposal or mined geologic disposal, 
would be catastrophic in terms of an immediate threat to a large 
number of human lives or an extensive impact on the environment. 
(15) Although space disposal appears to offer some potential for 
reduction in risk, it should be recognized that the uncertain-
ties in the risk estimates are large and that the predicted risk 
of mined geologic disposal 1s extremely small to begin with. 
(16) The results of this study only indicate possible benefits/ 
disbenefits of space disposal. To obtain morerealistic and 
meaningful results, pathway models resulting in dose estimates 
are needed. 
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9.0 CONCLUSIONS 
This section summarizes three major conclusions that come from this 
preliminary risk assessment of nuclear waste disposal in space: 
(1) Preliminary estimates of space disposal risk are low, e\'en with 
the estimated uncertainty bounds. 
(2) If calculated MGR release risks remain low, e.g., as given in 
the PNL l-laste Mixes Study (McCallum et aI, 1982), and the EPA 
requirements continue to be met, then no additional space 
disposal study effort is warranted. 
(3) If risks perceived by the public are significant in the 
acceptance of mined geologic repositories, then consideration of 
space disposal as an MGR complement is warranted. 
10.0 RECO~NDATIONS 
As a result of this study, the following recommendations are made to 
NASA a~d the U.S. DOE: 
(1) During the continued evaluation of the mined geologic repository 
risk over the years ahead by DOE, if any significant increase in 
the calculated health risk is predicted for the MGR, then space 
disposal should be reevaluated at that time. 
(2) The risks perceived by the public for MGR should be evaluated on 
a broad basis by an independent organization to evaluate 
acceptance. 
(3) If, in the future, MGR risks are found to be signifieant due to 
some p'resently unknown technical or social factor, and space 
disposal is selected as an alternative that may be useful in 
mitigating the risks, then the follO'.oling space disposal study 
activities are recommended: 
• Improvement in chemical processing technology for wastes 
• Payload accident response analysis 
• Risk uncertainty analysis for both MGR and space disposal 
• Health risk modeling that includes pathway and dose estimates 
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• Space disposal cost modeling 
• Assessment 
benefit 
of space disposal perceived (by public) 
• Space systems analysis supporting risk and cost modeling. 
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AC 
AEC 
ALARA 
ADA 
ATO 
A.U. 
BCL 
C 
cc 
C/C 
CFR 
Ci 
cm 
COR 
C DgE 
DOT 
EPA 
ERDA 
ESHC 
ET 
FSS 
g 
GWe 
HLW 
lAEA 
I ('.0 S 
JSC 
k 
kg 
km 
KSC 
kW 
LCC 
LEO 
LH2 
LOX 
LRB 
LWR 
m 
HE 
MECO 
HGR 
HLP 
M}!H 
mrem 
"J 
B-I 
APPENDIX B 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
actinide elements 
U.S. Atomic' Energy Commss'ion 
as low as reasor.ably achievable 
abort-once-around 
abort-to-orbit 
astronomical unit 
Battelle Columbus Laboratories, Columbus, Ohio 
degrees centigrade 
cubic centiceters <cm3) 
carbon/carbon 
Code of Federal Regulations 
Curies 
centimeters 
Contracting Officer's Representative 
specific heat 
U.S. Department of ,Energy, 
U.S. Department of Transportation 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
I ./~ ;. .' 
U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration 
Eastern Space and }lissile Center 
Space Shuttle's External Tank 
Flight Support System 
grams 
gigawatts electric 
high-level waste 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
Interactive Graphics Orbit Selection 
NASA's Johnson Space Center, Houston 
thermal conductivity 
kilogram 
kilometer 
Kennedy Space Center, Florida 
kilowatt 
Launch Control Center (Shuttle's at KSC) 
low-Earth orbit 
liquid hydrogen 
liquid oxygen 
Liquid Rocket Booster (Uprated Shuttle) 
light water reactor 
meters 
main engine 
n~in engine cutoff 
mined geologic repository 
Nobile L~unch Platform (Shuttle' s.~ KSC) 
monooethyl hydrazine 
millirem 
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mls 
MSFC 
MT 
MTHM 
N 
NASA 
N/cm2 
NPO 
NPPF 
NRC 
NTO 
OfF 
O~S 
ONWI 
ORNL 
O'lV 
PCR 
PL 
PNL 
RCS 
rem 
RETAC 
RP-l 
,,---, 
RSS 
RTG 
RTLS 
SAl 
SDV 
SL 
SOlS 
SRB 
SS 
SS}!E 
STD 
STS 
t.T 
TBD 
TPS 
TRU 
TVC 
USAF 
t.V 
VAB 
W 
, I Jail' 
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meters per second 
NASA's ~~rshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama 
metric tons 
metric tons of heavy metel 
Newtons 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Newtons per square centimeter 
National Waste Terminal Storage Program Office (formerly DOE-Richland 
Operations Office in Columbus, OH) 
Nuclear Payload Preparation Facility 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
nitrogen tetroxide 
oxidizer-to-fuel ratio 
Orbital Maneuvering System (Shuttle) 
Office of Nuclear Wast~ Isolation (DOE's) 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
Orbit Transfer Vehicle 
Payload Changeout Room 
payload 
Pacific Northwes t Laboratory, Richland, l-lashington 
Reaction Control System (Shuttle) 
roentgen equivalent, man 
Reentry Thermal Analysis Code 
rocket propellant number 1 (kerosene) 
Rotating Service Structure (Shuttle) 
radioisotope thermal generator 
return-to-launch-site 
Science Applications, Inc., Schaumburg, Illinois 
Shutt:~ Derived Vehicle 
sea-level 
Solar Orbit Insertion Stage 
Solid Rocket Buoster 
Space Shuttle 
Space Shuttle }~in'Engine 
Standard 
Space Transportation System 
chr3ge in temperature 
to be determined 
thermal protection system 
transuranic waste 
thrust vector control 
United States Air Force 
change in velocity 
Vehicle Assembly Building (Shuttle's at KSC) 
Watt 
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METRIC/ENGLISH UNIT CONVERSION FACTORS 
To convert 
atmospheres (atm). 
atmospheres (atm). 
calories (cal) • • 
calories per gram 
(cal/g) ••• 
centimeters (em) 
centimeters (cm) 
centimeters (em) 
. 
· ·0 ., 
· . . 
· 
. . 
cubic centimeters (cm3). 
cubic meters (m3) • 
cubic meters (m3). 
· 
. . 
into 
pounds per square inch (psi). 
pounds per square ft (psi) ••• 
British thermal units (Btu) 
British thermal units per 
pound (Btu/lb) ••••••••• 
inches (in) 
feet (ft) • 
yards (yd). 
cubic inches (in3). 
cubic feet (ft3). . . . 
. . . 
gallons (gal) • • . . . . . 
degrees Centigrade (OC). degrees Fahrenheit (OF) 
degrees Kelvin (OK) ••• degrees Rankine (OR). . . . . . 
grams (g) ••• .. . . . . pounds (lb) 
kilograms (kg) • . . . . pounds (l b) • . . . . 
kilometers (km). statute miles (mi). 
kilometers (k~) ••• nautical miles (n.mi.). . . . . 
kilometers (km). fe~t (ft) ••••••• 
kilowatts (kW) Btu per hour (Btu/hr) . . . 
meters (m) •• . . . . . inches (in) •••••• 
*NOTE: Multiply by 1.8 and then add 32. 
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multiply by 
14.70 
2116.8 
3.9685 x 10-3 
1.80 
0.3937 
3.281 x 10-2 
1.094 x 10-2 
0.0610 
35.32 
264.2 
1.8 C + 32* 
1.8 
2.205 x 10-3 
2.205 
0.6214 
0.540 
3281 
3413 
39.37 
'·¥.ij;i~ 
!:Wi~: 
: ,: :-1 ,'~,., 
I Tift \:~.~JI ~ 
; 
C-2 
To convert into 
meters (m) feet (ft) 
meters (m) yards (yd). 
meters per second (m/s). feet per second (ft/s). 
metric tons (MT) pounds (lb) 
metric tons (MT) tons (T). 
micrometers ( m) meters (m). 
Newtons (N). poucds force (lbf). 
Newtons per cm2 (N/cm2). pounds per square inch (psi). 
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multiply by 
3.281 
1.094 
3.281 
2205 
1.102 
1.0 x 10-6 
0.2248 
1.4504 
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APPENDIX E 
DISCUSSION OF CATASTROPHIC UPRATED SlnrrTLE 
FAILURES FOR IGNITION TO MECO 
Catastrophic Uprated Shut~le failures are defined to be those fail-
ures which can result in a loss and breakup of the vehicle. Six catastrophic 
vehicle response modes have been defined for the period from ir.nition to main 
engine cutoff (MEea). These six modes cover all of the categories of vehicle 
catastrophic response wllich are expected to result from vehicle component 
(hardware, subsystem) failures. The component failures considered are single-
point failures and are primarily the criticality one failure modes defined by 
NASA for the standard Shuttle. The six response modes and related 
descriptions presented in this appendix have been derived from the Wiggins 
study (Baeker, 1981). The Wiggins Company developed data for the standard 
Shuttle from a series of meetings and telephone conversations with NASA, NASA 
contractors, and Eastern Space and Missile Center (ESHC) range safety person-
nel; and from engineering judgment. For the purpose of this BCL study, two 
.--1!llis are assumed to replace the SRBs to form the Uprated Space Shuttle 
'hic1e, used for the nuclear waste disposal mission. 
TIle six failed vehicle response modes for the LRB Uprated Shuttle are 
as follows: 
(1) Inadvertent separation at nn LRB/ET aft attachment. This 
response mode involves a failure or inadvertent separation of 
the LRB from the External Tank at the aft attachment. The aft 
end of the LRB would be expected to rotate away from the ET 
about the forward attachment, Ilnd the entire vehicle would be 
expected to start tumbling rapidly. The separatinr, LRB would be 
expected to puncture the LH2 andlor the LOX tank. The sce-
nario is depicted in Figure E-l(a). TIle separating LRB is 
expected to rotate about the forward (thrust) attnchment until 
it fails, resulting in a separated but rapidly tumbling LRB. 
(2) Inadv~rtent separation at nn LRil/ET forward nttnchment. This 
response mode involves a failure or in .. ldvertent separntion at a 
forward attachoent. The fon .. ard attachment is the thrust 
fitting which carries the LRB thrust load into the ET. The aft 
attachment is not desi~p.I'd to carry the LRB thrust load and will 
fail almost iml!'.ediately. The thrusting LRB \.i11 move forward 
relative to the ET, with the LRB probably striking the ET aft 
done and puncturing the LH2 tank. The situation is depicted 
in Figure E-l(b). 
(3) Propellllnt tanks punctured. This response modl~ consists of a 
sudden puncturinr, or ruptl\rin~ of one of the propellant tanks 
due to such things ns shrapnel from an engine explosion, loss of 
tank ulla~c. or a thenllal protection system (Tl'S) failure. A 
tnnk puncture is expected to rapidly result in a loss of vehicle 
I' 
I' 
i. 
I 
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(a) Aft Attachment 
(b) Forward Attachment 
Source: Baeker, J. B., 1981. 
FIGURE E-1. INADVERTENT LRB SEPARATION 
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control, initiation of vehicle breakup including a puncturing of 
other propellant tanks, and a mixing of propellants resulting in 
a low-order explosion. No significant dispersion of the vehicle 
from the nominal trajectory is expected prior to initiation of 
breakup. 
(4) Intertank and/or aft LOX tank dome failure. This response mode 
consists of a structural failure of the intertank or aft dome of 
the LOX tank in the ET or LRBs. The expected result is a 
rupturing of the aft LOX tank dome and the forward fuel tank 
dome wi th a mixing of the liquid propellants in the forward 
section of the fuel tank. Penetration of the fuel tank results 
either from LOX contact with the LRB thrust load-carrying cross 
beam or from the fuel tank impact of the LOX from the ruptured 
LOX tank. The mixing of propellants in this case is largely 
confined, although some of the LOX may escape through punctures 
in the intertank skin. This internal mixing condition is 
expected to result in a higher yield explosion than for those 
cases which result in external mixing of propellants (5 to 10 
percent yield versus 0.5 to 1 percent). This response mode is 
much more likely to occur while the flight loads and heating are 
high. 
(5) LRB recontact at separation. This response mode occurs only at 
LRB separation and involves a recontact of an LRB with the ET 
d~e to a failure of the LRB separation system. The recontact is 
likely to cause a rupturing of both propellant tanks, but could 
also cause a buckling of the ET intertank. 
(6) Loss of engine propulsion. This response mode involves a loss 
of propulsion from all three Orbiter main engines and/or 
engines on the two boosters. If a critical loss or critical 
failure of engines occurs during the early portion of flight, 
anyone of two hazardous conditions could result: (1) the 
vehicle may fail structurally and break up prior to LRB staging, 
and (2) the LRBs may recontact the Orbiter/ET at separation. 
A critical loss of main engines from LRB staging to MECO is expected 
to result in the following: 
• LRB staging (124 seconds) to 168 seconds - Orbiter ditched, ET 
impacts intact 
• 168 to 250 seconds - Orbiter breaks up, ET impacts intact 
• 250 to 500 seconds - Orbiter breaks up, ET breaks up 
• 500 seconds to HECO (518 seconds) - Orbiter ditched, ET breaks up. 
Ie flight times presented above are approximate and are based on the orbital 
flight test-l trajectory. 
E-4 
The six failed vehicle response modes are further defined in Table 
E-l. The table summarizes the vehicle dispersion and breakup characteristics 
assumed for each of the modes, defines the categories of component failures 
which can lead to each mode, and presents important assumptions and key 
comments. The comments section reiterates the possible variations on vehicle 
response and breakup discussed above. Note, however, that the models pre-
sented under the breakup column of the table are considered to represent the 
most probable scenarios. 
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) TABLE E-l. FAILED VEHIC Ju:SPONSE MODES* 
CAS~: I IIAZARD CONDITION 
NO. 
1 
2 
VEHICLE Ilf.SPONSE MODE 
In:ldvertent Separation 
at an LRB/f.T Aft 
Attachment 
Inadvertent Separation 
at an I.RB/f.T Forward 
Attachment 
ESTIMATED VEIIlCI.E BREAKUP 
A. <7 Sees: Vehicle w/o LRB 
Impacts Intact, ET and 
RCIMlninll LRB Tanks Ex-
plode (10-50% TNT Equiva-
lency), Errant LRB Im-
pacts Intact and Explodes 
B. >; Sees: 
• Separating LRB Punctures 
LII2 and/or LOX Tank(a) 
• Other Tank Ruptures, Fuel, 
Mix and Explode With Low 
Yield 
• Orbiter (With the Wings 
and Additional Tiles 
Assumed to Break'Free) 
and ET Expected to Break 
up as per Destruct System 
Breakup Study 
• LRB Bangs ET as it Tears 
Free at Aft Attachment, 
Aft LRB Skirt Strikes ET 
Aft Dome as LRB Moves 
Forward Relative to ET 
• Breakup as in Case I, 
Exc~pt Errant LRB Stays 
Intact to Impact and 
Explodes for all Failure 
Times 
FAILURE MODES CAUSING 
HAZARD 
Structural Failure at 
the Aft LRB/ET Attach-
ment 
~. Inadvertent Detonation 
of the Attachment 
Fitting 
3. TPS Failure at the Aft 
LRB Attachment Ring (1 
(100-124 Sees only) 
1. Structural Failure at 
the Forward LRB/ET 
Attachment 
2. Inadvertent Detonation 
of the Forward Attach-
ment Fitting 
ASSUMPT[ONS 
(a) LRB at the Aft 
Attachment Area 
Is Driven into 
Aft Area of ET, 
POSSibly Driv-
ing Strut 
Through LII2 
Tank or Other-
wise Rupturing 
Tank; and/or 
LIlB Rotates 
Away from ET 
About Front 
Attachment Dri 
ving Nose of 
the LRB Toward 
and Into LOX 
Tank as Forward 
Attachment 
Breaks 
COMMENTS 
1) I1'S Failure 
I<",sul ts in a 
I ailure of the 
l' f/LRB Attach-
I,,"nt Strut 
*NOTE: The basic information contained in this table has been derived from Baeker, J. B., 
1981, by eliminating the SRB and replacing it with an LRB. 
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) TABLE E-l. FAILED VEHICLE R...JONSE HODES (CONTINUED) 
r:AS~: I "AZARU CONIIIT((,tl 
NO. 
FAItuRE HOliES CAUSING 
I\AZARD 
ASSUtfPTlONS 
VEIIICI.E RESPONSE ~IOUE 
) I Propellant Tanks 
Punctured 
", 
FSTlHATt:fI VEIIICI.E BRU.KUP 
I" ., ,,,"' V.hlol. ,.,"" r Fl,."",,., •• 10 <h. f' Th. ,,,,,.1.. '" Essentially Intact, £T an Engine Compartments (b Creates Shrap-
LRB Tanks Explode (10-50% nel Which Punc-
TNT Equivalency) 2. Engine lIozzle Col11slo tures the LII2 
Due to TVC Loss (c) Tonk(s). 
B.~7 ~ecs:.(2) 
• Fuel and/or Oxidizer Tank 13. Fire/Explosl~n In the 
01-lS/RCS Pod which. Pro-
pagate~ to the Engine 
Compartments (d) 
Punctured Due to Orbiter 
Impact, Shrapnel, or TP:; 
Failure 
• Other Tanks Rupture, Pro-
pellants Mix Externally 
• Low-Yield Explosion, Re-
sults Similar to Destruct 
System 
• Fragmentation of Orbiter, 
ET and LRBs as in IB 
4. Failure at an Orhlter/ 
ET Attachment (e) 
5. TPS Failure and Blow-
out at the Fuel Tank 
Barrels or LOX Tank 
Oglves (100-124 Sec 
Only) or at the LII2 
Tank Aft Domes (Lift-
off) 
6. TPS Failure at the LRB 
TI,ermal Curtain lIeat 
Shield 
7. Loss of Avionics Caus-
ing Loss of Engine TVC 
and Collision of Noz-
zles 
(c) The Collision 
Cau<;es an Ex-
plosion In the 
Engine CO!:lP3rt 
In<!nt. TI,e TVC 
Loss Results Ir 
a Nozzle Colli 
sian 50% of the 
Time During the 
Time from l.ift 
off to Ht:CO. 
Otherwise the 
Engine is Safe 
ly Shut Down. 
(d) An OKS/RCS Pod 
Explosion Pro-
pagates to the 
Engine Compart 
ments, Cau"lng 
an Engine Ex-
plosion 20r. of 
the Time. Other 
wise, Pre"" to 
Orbit or RTLS. 
COHMENTS 
Failures Which 
Result in a 
Puncture of 
the 1.112 Tank 
Not Caused II, 
An Orbiter 
Breaking Free 
Hay Not Result 
in a LOX Tank 
Rupture and an 
Explosion. 
The UI 2 Hay 
Here ly Bl eed 
Out, Causing 
Loss of the 
Engines. If, 
lIowcver, the 
Puncture Re-
sults from an 
Engtne Compart 
ment Explosion 
it Is Llke1v 
Tha t the Vehl-
~le will Break 
"l' and a I.ow-
Yield Explo-
sion Will Re-
suI t. Also, 
Shrapnel from 
the Engine 
Expl09ion 
Could Cause all 
t."T/I.RB Tank 
Rupture. 
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) TABLE E-l. FAILED VEHICLE REf rSE MODES (CONTINUED) 
CA5~; I IIAZARD CONllITION 
NO. 
4 
VEil !ClE RES\'ONSE MODE I ESTIHATEIJ VEIIICI.E BRf.AKUP 
Intertank and/or Aft 
Lox Tank Dome failures 
A. <7 Sees: Vehicle Impacts 
Essentially Intact (i), 
Explodes (10-50% TNT 
Equivalency) 
B. >7 Sees: 
• LOX Tank Ruptures (g) 
• LOX Pours o~to and Col-
lapes the forvard U12 
Dome (3) 
• Propellants Mix Inter-
nally, Explosion Results 
(~.1O% TNT Equivalency) 
• lRBs Explode 
. ~., ~ .. "-,, --' .. , , ......... ~ ........ -_ ...... -.---~ --"'"' 
fAILURE HODES CAUSING 
IIAZARD 
ASSUMPTIONS 
B. \'oss of LII2 Tank UI- re) Orb1ter Rup-
lage (Joint, Rellef tures tll2 Tank 
Valve, Line, Etc. as it Wrenches 
failure): Gross Le9ks Free 
Only 
(f) TPS Failure at 
9. Rupture of the Exter- the Therlll31 Cur 
nal lOX feed Line tain Ileat Shlel~ 
Results In a 
O. Rupture of the lOX lIydrazine Ex-
Line (Through HECO) ploslon and 
and LII2 Line (Prior Shrapnel Into 
to LRB Stagin~ Only) the 1II2 Dome 
Internal to tae 50% of the Th:e 
Orbiter 
1. TPS Failure at the ETI(g) An Intertank 
Inter tank (n) Collapse Cause~ 
2. Structural Failure of 
the LOX Tank Aft Dome 
(Weld Failure, Loss 
of Ullage, etc.) 
the LOX Tank t< 
Strike the 
Cross Beam and 
Split Open 
(h) TPS Fa !lure 
Resul ts in Ex-
cessive Struc-
tural Tempera-
tures and Stru 
ctural Fa !lure. 
Assumed to 
Occur Near 
Staging (100-
124 Secs) 
COMMENTS 
3)Since the Inter 
tank Cannot 
Withstand Over-
pressures 8S 
IIlgh as the 
Forvard Dome of 
a Pressuri:l:ed 
LII2 Tank, the 
Intertank May 
Rupture First 
Releasing LOX 
Outside of the 
ET. This May 
Reduce the Po-
tential for In-
ternal Mixing 
and a Illgh 
Yield Explo-
sion. 
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) TABLE E-l. FAILED VEHICLE JpPONSE MODES (CONTINUED) 
r.A;'f.1 HAZAR'; r.ONIlITlOll 
NO. 
5 
6 
VJ::IIICLE RESPONSE MOUE F.STlHATt:O VEIIICI.F. BREAKUP 
I 
I LRB Recontact at 
Separation 
I Loss of Propulsion 
'_ ET 1.112 Tank and'intertank 
Shatt~red into Small Frag-
ments; LOX Tank Breaks as 
in Destruct Study 
_ Forward Half of Orbiter 
Shattered; Aft lIalf as for 
Destruct Except Wings and 
Additional Tiles Torn Free 
,_ LRB Punctures LII2 Tank (4) 
_ LOX Tank Ruptures and Pro-
pellants Hix Externally 
~ Low-Yield Explosion Re-
sults Similar to Destruct 
System 
_ LRBs Reenter Normally 
• ET and Orbiter (with the 
Wings and Additional Tiles 
Assumed to Break Free) 
Expected to Break up as per 
Destruct System Breakup 
Study 
I - See (5) 
• ET H.ay Break up on Reentry 
(6), Otherwise Explodes 
at Impact 
FAII.URE HOIlES CAUSING 
IIAZARD 
1. Failure to Fracture a 
the Forward or Aft 
LRB/ET Attachment 
2. TPS Failure at the 
Aft Separation Motor 
(j) 
3. Premature Operation 0 
the Forward or Aft 
Separation Hotors 
1. Loss of 3 or more MEs 
2. Puncture of the 1.112 
Feed Lines (Through 
HECO) 
ASSUMPTIONS 
(i) Breakup end an 
Exp los ion H.~y 
Be Initiated 
Prior to Im-
pact, But the 
H.ajor Explosion 
Will Occur at 
Impact 
(j) T1'S Fa llure 
Causes Separa-
tion Hotors to 
FI re Prior tn 
Separation 
COMMENTS 
(4) If the Recon-
~act Ocr:urs at 
the Forward 
. End of the ET. 
the ET Inter-
, tank Could 
'Buckle and a 
lIigher Order 
Explosion 
Result 
(5) A Loss of 3 or 
More Engines 
H.ay Resut t in 
Structural 
Failure and 
Breakup or in 
Recontact at 
I.Rn SL'l~ln," 
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TABLE E-l. FAILED VEHICLE R~SPONSE HODES (CONTINUED) 
IIAZARD CONIlITtON FAILURE MODES CAUSING ASSUMPTIONS 
Vt:IIICI.E Rt:SPONSE MOIlt: Y.STtHATt:O VI-:IIICLE RRF.AKUP IIA~ARD 
• Orbiter Ditched for a 
Failure Before 168 Secs 
(Oft-I) • Orbiter l'reaks 
Up on Reentry for Failures 
t'rom 168 to Approxi"7llely 
500 Secs; Ditched for 
Failures >~OO Secs. 
COMMENTS 
6) Breakup Only 
for Loss 
Engines After 
Approximately 
2~0 Secs. 
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APPENDIX F 
DISCUSSION OF CATASTROPHIC UPRATED SHUTTLE 
FAILURES FOR MECO TO PAYLOAD SEPARATION 
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APPENDIX F 
CATASTROPHIC UPRJ.TED SHUTTLE FAILURES FOR 
MECO TO PAYLOAD SEPARATION 
InfortJation contained in thio Appendix is directly ''Hlpv-,.r':c:' i>y the 
Wiggins study (Hudson, 1979). 
For part of the mission from HECO to payload separatio~, vehicle 
failure modes have been aSSigned to four categories (in addition to the first 
six defined in Appendix E) in terms of expected effects on the u!'ratcd SIS 
from }ffiCO to payload separation. These are the following: 
(7) External Tank punctured 
(8) Loos of maneuverability and Orbiter tumbles to Earth (prior to 
orbit insertion) 
(9) Loss of maneuverability on orbit 
(10) Fire and explosion in main englne compartment and Orbiter 
~, tumbles to Earth. 
With respect to Response Mode 9, loss of maneuverability on orbit, 
the Orbiter will eventually tumble to Earth. The first OMS burn PlltS the SIS 
into an eiliptical orbit. The second burn puts the S~S into a circular orbit 
at 300 km altitlne, and the third burn phases the STS to a rendezvous with the 
OTV/SOIS. If the first and second burns ar~ not successful, then the Orbi~er 
will reenter. If the third OMS burn. is not successful, the Orbiter will 
eventually reenter.' Thus, the end result will be the san:e as for Response 
}lode 8, except that the time scale will be extended. 1.e., all failures listed 
for Response }wde 9 will eventually result in the Orbiter tumbling to Earth. 
The necessary conditiocs for each category of vehicle behavior to occur are 
listed in Table F-l. Table F-l also outlines the critical tiee periods in 
which these critical vehicle behavior modes could occur. 
Failures which in themselves would not lead to loss of the Orbiter, 
but which, if they propagate, could lead to such loss, have been included. 
These types of propagated failures can be considered to be a special case of 
cowmon-cause failures. Although common-cause failures have been excluded from 
the analysis, it is important to include failur .. s !lhich can propagate and lead 
to the critical conditions listed. An exai:lple of this type of propagated 
failure is rupture of an atmospheric revitalization systee tank subassembly, 
which results in loss of all three inertial measuring units. The failure 
rates quoted for these types of propagated failures recognize that prop3~ation 
is not a certainty given thac the initial failure occurs. In these .:ircum-
stances, therefore, the failure rat~s have beDn factored accordingly. 
,~ Th~ most critical time for loss of ReS/Avionics is jmeediately after 
T separation and before the first OMS burn. The ReS/Avionics ar~ needed for 
EJATTELLE - COLUMEJUS 
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pitch control of the Orbiter away from the External Tank. If either were 
lost, the Orbiter could pitch down and collide with the External Tank. The 
most extreme case would result in vehicle damage, as outlinE'd in Vehicle 
Response Hode 7. The most benign case could result in loss of some thermal 
tiles from the Orbiter which would render it unsafe for reentry., 
The most critical time for loss of OMS and/or RCS in one pod would be 
during the first OMS b'lr". This corresponds to the highest -:lass .;f ~~a 
Orbiter and payload combination. It is difficult to switch over to the 
remaining O}1S engine and do so correctly. However, the mission should be able 
to be completed with only one OMS engine remaining. The flight controller is, 
however, likely to abort the mission. Vehicle Response Modes 8 and 9 consider 
such losses of the OMS and/or RCS in one. pod. The failures included, however, 
do not allow cross-feeding to the other OMS engine, a necessary condition for 
survival. 
Failures of the OMS and/or ReS which propagate to the main engine 
compartment can have catastrophic results if the residual oxygen and hydrogen 
have not been completely vented to the atmosphere. The resulting explosion 
could cause the Orbiter to break up and tumble to Earth. This type of 
behavior is outlined under Response Mode 10 of Table F-1, where venting of 
residual fuel is considered to be completed by the end of the first OMS burn. 
Failures of the forward reaction control assembly items could result 
in a pitching of the Orbiter. If the Orbiter were to pitch during External 
Tank separation, collision with the External Tank could occur, causing loss of 
the Orbiter. If the failure occurs in the OMS or ReS propellant tank assem-
blies, feed lines , or fittings and pitching did not result, then loss of 
maneuverability of the vehicle could occur with the Orbiter tumbling to Earth. 
Failures in the aft reaction control assembly or Orbiter maneuvering 
system could also result in a collision between the Orbiter and the External 
Tank or could result in the loss of Orbiter maneuverability. Loss of Orbiter 
maneuverability could also be the result of propagated failures within the 
electrical power or atmospheric revitalization systems. 
Failures in the main propulsion system, the separation mechanism 
linking the Orbiter and External Tank, or the Orbiter/External Tank forward or 
aft attachment could result in the Orbiter impacting the External Tank. The 
critical time period for these failures is between MECO and External Tank 
separation. Orbiter/External Tank impact could also occur as a result of an 
OMS/ReS fire and explosion which propagates to the Orbiter main engine com-
partment. Until all residual propellants are vented, fire and explosion in 
the main engine compartment are possible as a result of failures which propa-
gate from the aft reaction control assembly or from the OHS. 
The failure modes involving liquid oxygen or hydrogen relief lines or 
gaseous oxygen or hydrogen lines or valve assemblies in the !:lain propulsion 
system are not included here. These f:lilures, if they occurred after m:co, 
are unlikely to seriously endanp,er the vehicle. Failures in the liquid 
hydrogen or oxygen pressurization lines, vent relief assembly lines, cable 
tray, etc., could directly or indirectly result in loss of ullage pressure and 
~, 
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TABLE F-l. VEHICLE RESPONSE HODES FOR HECO TO PAYLOAD SEPARATION 
Cate~ory 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
Vehicle Behavior 
!:xtern41 Tank 
Punctured 
Lo •• of Han~uver­
ahility & Orbiter 
Tumble. to Earth 
Loa. of Maneuver-
ability on Orbit 
Fire Eo Explosion 
in HE c..'orart .... "l 
and Orhlter Tmnble, 
to Earth 
Source: HuJ.on, Jo Ho, 19790 
Criticsl Time reriod 
~cc :0 !l ~uparstlon 
(KECO to KECO + 16 
.econd.) 
During Orbitor/ET 
.eparation maneuver 
(KECO + 11 .econds 
to end of RCS aepara-
tion burn) 
KECO to KECO + 11 
.econds 
KECO to orbit inA~r­
tion (crid oi first 
OI1S burn) 
F.nJ tl ra t OMS burn 
h' IUS deplo)'1I1o!nt 
MECO + 16 .('~ond. 
to orbit In~rrtton 
(end flr.t OMS burn) 
Nec~ •• ary Conditions 
• r31!urr~ ~n ~.in En~lne :~r) Propul-
.Ion Sy.t~ rele •• ln~ reSidual pro-
pellant Into aft KE compartMent and 
Ignition from within HE compartment 
• LH2 tank ruptura 
• Failures in the Orbiter/ET 
Separation System 
• Failures of forward or aft Orbiterl 
ET attachtoenta 
• Failure of the forward or aft Res 
.ystem 
• Failure. of the OMS eystema which 
propasate and cause 10 .. of ReS 
• Aft RCS or OMS failures ~~tch 
propagate to HE compartment an.1 
caule fire and explosion with 
realdual HE propellants 
• Failures of forward ReS which pro-
pa~ate and CAuse failure of all 
3 IHUe 
• Failure8 of aft RCS which propa~ate 
and lead to los. of OMS in one ~'d 
(with loat rapAblllty to croa. f~ed 
to other ~~S ,n~lne). 
a FaUuru of OMS In on" rod (with 
108t c3pahllltv to cro.s-!,,~d to 
other OMS en~lne) 
• Failure! of el"ctrl~al po~~r or 
.tm~.ph"re revltal':atton syst~m 
tAnk .ub488~ohlt~1 which rropa~4te 
and cause tailure of all 3 IHU. 
• 
• 
S.~" conditions a. for (8) 
Failure. 1n the aft ReS or o~s ~\lch 
pror.~ate to thl! HE comp~rtM~nt 
cauwln~ fire .nd explo~lon 
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possible hydrogen or oxygen tank rupture, prior to HECO. However, after HECO, 
the loss of ullage pressure is not likely to lend to rupture of either of 
these tanks, and hence, will not be a problem for the Orbiter. 
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APPENDIX G 
FAILURE PROBABILITIES FOR FAULT TREES 
This appendix documents the probability data used in the fault trees 
to estimate the critical paths through the fault trees, as well as provide an 
expected and range of values for the probabilities of various events. Tables 
G-l through G-6 were used to generate the overall space disposal ris!t esti-
mates. as discussed in Section 5.0 of this report. The entries in the tables 
that follow match the event numbers for the fault trees shown in Section 5.2. 
The description of the event. the expected value. the 90 rercent confidence 
range on the expected value. and a brief comment on how the expected values 
were derived are given in the tables that follow. 
Most of the values in the tables are truly estimates; a more rigorous 
analysis would be necessary to improve on these values. However. it is hoped 
that the ranges provided on the' expected value (with 90 percent confidence) 
should include the values that would result from a more detailed analysis. 
,,--. The basis for many of the numbers comes from "expert" opinion. People that 
provided information used in the generation of the data are listed below, 
along with the area of support. 
Person SU220rt Area 
J. B. Baeker (Wiggins Co.) Critical STS Failure Rates 
F. Cibelli (NASA/~~C) Range Safety - Aircraft Collisions 
A. J. Coyle (ONWI) Ocean Recovery 
T. C. Davis (BCL) Gene·cal and Integration 
R. S. Denning (BCL) General. Integration. and Nuclear 
R. W. Earhart (BCL) General and Integration 
A. L. Friedlander (SAl. Chicago) ~Ieteorite Impact 
J. M. Hudson (Wiggins Co.) Critical STS Failure Rates 
D. J. Kessler (NASA/JSC) Debris Damage 
W. S. Pope (BCL) Ocean Recovery 
R. P. Re iner t (Boeing Co. ) OTV/SOIS Reliability 
R. C. Reynolds (BCL) Debris Impact 
E. E. Rice (BCL) General and Integration 
D. L. Suiter (NASAl JSC) Launch Vehicle Lightning Strikes 
G. Walker (Univ. of Hawaii.) Volcano Impact 
A. E. I~eller (BCL) General and Integration 
K. R. Yates (BCL) General and Nuclear Waste Form 
Also. numerous published sources were used in developing these 
estim.1.tes. the major one being the 1974 edition of the Overall Safety ~Ianualt 
developed by the :''US Corporation for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Space 
.-.Nuclear Systems Division (lI.S. AEC. 1974a). 
-
F, 
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mlt Tree'" 
~vent No. 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
lOS 
106 
G-2 
TABLE G-1. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 1 
Event 
Description 
Release to the 
biosphere 
Shield breakage 
STS breakup and 
payload impact on 
hard surface 
Mechanically 
defective shield 
(undetected) 
Payload impacts on 
hard surface 
STS total breakup 
at altitude 
Critical lightning 
strike 
•• 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Expected 
Value 
2.1E-12 
2.1E-12 
4.2E-8 
5.0E-5 
2.0E-3 
2.1E-5 
1.0E-7 
901. Confidence 
Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
9.SE-11 8.0E-IS Same as (101) 
9.5E-l1 8.0E-IS Product of (102) x [103] 
1.9E-7 1.6E-9 
5.0E-4 5.0E-6 
4.0E-3 2.0E-4 
4.7E-5 8.0E-6 
1.0E-6 1.0E-8 
Product of [104] x [105] 
Based upon data on defects 
found in nuclear reactor 
pressure vessels ('~ash 
1285, U.S. AEC, 1974b). 
Based on twice Shuttle 
runway area divided by 
KSC area 
(2 x SESm2/S.7E8m2) -
2E-3. 
Sum of 
(106) + (107) + [108) 
Dwight Suiter, NASA! JSC; 
Suiter's estimate reduced 
by factor of S because 
of LRB replacing SRB. 
2E-7 divided equally 
between Phases 1 and 2. 
,tel Refer to fault trees, Section S.2. 
BATTELLE - COLUMDUS 
: I 
" 
Fault Tree* 
Event No. 
107 
108 
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TABLE G-l. PER mSSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 1 (Continued) 
Event 
Description 
In-flight STS/ 
aircraft 
collision - STS 
operations air-
craft 
Critical STS 
system failure 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Expected 
Value 
7.SE-10 
2.1E-S 
90r. Confidence 
Upper 
7.SE-9 
4.7E-S 
Lower Basis for Estimate 
7.SE-12 (2 x lS0m2/2E8m2) x 
(1/1000) • 7.SE-IO. 
Assumes 2 aircraft and 
8.0E-6 
a 1 in 1000 chance and 
half in Phase 1 and half 
in Phase 2 (some data 
provided by F. Cibell!, 
t~SA/KSC, Range Safety 
Office). Not possible 
for non-STS operations 
aircraft to contribute to 
event. 
Derived from IHggins data 
(J.B. Backer, 1981) for 
LRB replacing SRB. 
----_ .. -----_._-------------------------
*Note: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE C-2. PEa HISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 2 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Fault Tree* Event Expected 90% Confidence 
Event No. De sc ri ption Value Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
200 Release to the 1.1E-10 7.3E-8 4.1E-14 Same as [201 ) , . .-, 
biosphere 
" 
201 Long-term 1.1E-I0 7.3E-8 4.1E-14 Product of (202) x [203] 
corrosion in 
sea-water 
202 STS breakup and 1~IE-4 7.3E-4 4.1E-5 Product of (204) x (205) 
payload impacts 
on water 
.~ 
203 Recovery fails 1.0E-6 1.0E-4 1.0E-9 Product of [206) x [207] 
204 Payload impact s 1.0E-0 1.0E-0 1.0E-0 If failure occurs, will 
on water likely land 1n ocean. 
205 STS breakup at 1.1E-4 7.3E-4 4.1E-5 Sum of [208} + [209} + 
altitude [210) 
206 All six on-board 1-.0E-3 1.0E-2 1.0E-5 (0.1)3 ass~ed three 
transmitters destroyed by impact, 
fail before other three estimated 
detection to have 0.9 reliability 
each. ;../' //T 
207 Additional detec- 1.0E-3 1.0E-2 1.0E-4 Estimate based upon 
tion activity conversations with Art 
fail to locate Coyle, O~dI, and William 
Pope, BeL. 
208 Critical lightning 1.0E-7 1.0&-6 1.0E-8 (See [106» 
strike 
209 In-flight STsl 8.5E-I0 1.7£-8 1.7E-11 SUD of [2U) + (212) ------_ .. -. 
aircraft collision 
*Note: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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210 
211 
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TABLE G-2. PER MISSIOR PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 2 (Continued) 
Event 
Description 
Critical STS 
system failure 
General, military, 
and commercial 
aircraft collision 
STS operations 
aircraft 
collision 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Expected 
Value 
1.IE-4 
1.0E-10 
7.5E-I0 
90:t Confidence 
Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
7.3E-4 
1.0~-8 
7.5E-9 
4.1E-5 Derived from Wiggins 
data (J. B. Baeker, 
1981) for LR3 replacing 
SRB. 
1.0E-11 Estimate based upon a 
frequency of 1 violation 
in SO flights during 2-
hour critical control 
period (F. Cibelli, KSC) 
and an area ratio of 
(150/(200 E6») and a 30-
second vulnerable time 
from t • 30 to 60 sec. 
7.5E-12 (2 x 150 m2/200 E6 ~2) x 
0/1000) ~ 7.5E-1O 
(See (107) 
-------------------------------------------------------------
*Note: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-3. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 3 
Per Hission Event Probabilities 
Fault Tree* Event Expected 90% Confidence 
Event No. Description Value Uppcr Lower Basis for Estimate 
300 Release to the 2.3E-9 3.2E-7 4.5E-11 Sum of [301] + [302] + 
biosphere (303) + [304) + (305) 
301 Release in so11 9.2E-13 2.2E-I0 3.3E-15 Product of [306) x (313) 
resulting from 10ng-
term corrosion in 
wet soil 
302 Release in sea- 2.3E-9 3.2E-7 4.5E-11 Product of [307) x (308) 
\later resulting 
----.. from long-term 
corrosion 
303 Radiation shield 1.2E-12 2.8E-10 4.7E-15 Sum of [333] + [336] + 
breakage at ground [337) 
impact 
304 Rat:iation shield 2.3E-15 5.4E-13 8.6E-20 Sum of (311) + [312) 
melting 
305 Radiation shield 1.:'",· 13 1.3E-12 1.3E-15 Sum of (331) + [332] 
breakage at 
altitude with 
reentry 
306 STS breakup and 9.2E-9 2.2E-7 3.3E-I0 Product of [357) x (316) 
payload impacts 
on wet so11 
307 STS breakup and 1.15£-4 2.7E-4 4.1£-5 Product of [316) x [354) 
payload impacts on , 
\later 
308 Recovery at sea 2.0E-5 1.2£-3 1.1£-6 Suo of [328] + (329) 
fails 
311 STS breakup and 2.3E-17 5.4E-15 8.2E-20 Sum of [316] + [327] 
payload iI!lpacts 
active volcano 
-, 
te: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-3. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 3 (Continued) 
Event 
Description 
Internal melt 
Recovery fails 
because detection 
activities fail to 
locate 
All six on-board 
transmitters fail 
before detection 
Additional activi-
ties fail to 
locate in ocea'l 
STS breakup at 
altitude 
STS breakup and 
payload impacts 
active volcano 
STS breakup and 
payload impacts 
on so11 with k 
less than klimit 
Recovery fails 
within critical 
time • Tcr 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Expected 
Value 
2.3E-15 
1.0E-4 
[.OE-1 
1.0E-2 
1.15E-4 
2.3E-17 
2.3E-13 
1.0E-2 
90% Confidence 
Upper Lower 
5.4E-13 4.1E-21 
1.0E-3 1.0E-5 
1.0E-2 1.0E-4 
Basis for Estimate 
Product of (320) x (321) 
Estimate - based on ability 
to track froc space and 
take time to find. 
See (206) 
2.0E-2 1.0E-3 Estimate - based on 
discussions with Art 
Coyle, O~~I, and William 
Pope. BCL. 
2.7E-4 4.1E-5 Sum of [323) + (324) + 
(325) 
5.4E-15 8.2E-20 See [3111 
2.7E-ll 4.1E-18 Product of (316) x (330) 
2.0E-2 1.0E-3 Estimate 
*Note: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-3. PER HISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 3 (Continued) 
Event 
Description 
STS/space debris 
collision 
Payload reentry 
due to STS/meteor-
ite collision 
Critical STS 
system failure 
Payload impacts 
active volcano 
Detection of pay-
load fails at sea 
Detection success-
ful and recovery 
attempts fail 
Payload impacts 
on soil with k 
less than klimit 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Expected 
Value 
7.9E-9 
4.9E-12 
1.15E-4 
2.0E-13 
1.0E-5 
1.0E-5 
2.0E-9 
90% Confidence 
Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
7.9E-8 7.9E-11 From BCL's R. C. Reynolds 
debris data base, arrive at 
a collision rate of 8E-18 
cm-2 a-1• Multiply 
this by 394 s for Phase 3 
and 250 m2 for Orbiter 
average area and arrive 
at 7.9E-9. 
4.9E-10 4.7E-14 Based on A. Friedlander's 
(SAl) data of 3.5E-7 colli-
sions per year times 394 
2.7E-4 4.1E-5 
s divided by seconds in a 
year (for Orbiter). 
Derived froo Wiggins data 
(J. B. Baeker, 1981) for 
LRB replacing SRB. 
2.0E-11 2.0E-15 Estimate based on data from 
G. Walker, Univ. of Hawaii: 
1 km2 of lava at 600 C, 
worldwide, and 1% of this 
having molten condition 
2.0E-4 
1.0E-3 
1.0E-7 
(1 km2/O.34 x 5.1E8 
km2)(1/100)(1/50 x 
1/10)( 2). 
1.0E-7 Product of [314] y [315] 
1.0E-6 Prnduct of [355] x [356] 
1.0E-13 (1/50 x 1/10) x (E-6) -
2E-9; see [340]; E-6 is 
estimate. 
*Note: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-3. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 3 (Continued) 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Fault Tree* Event Expected 90% Confidence 
Event No. Description Value Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
331 Payload/meteorite 2.2E-15 2.2E-13 2.2E-17 1.78E-I0 per year x 394/ 
catastrophic (3600 x 24 x 365) froill 
collision Friedlander, SAl. 
332 Payload/debris 1.3E-13 1.3E-12 1.3E-15 MUltiZlY (323) x 4.24 m2/ 
catastro!lhic 250 m and divide by 
collision 1000, becomes very unlikely 
that debris will cause 
breakup - per data from Don 
Kessler, ~ASA/JSC. 
333 Shield breakage 1.2E-12 2.8E-I0 4.2E-15 Product of (334) x (335) 
,-, 
on hard surface 
due to STS failure 
334 Payload reentry and 2.3E-8 5.4E-7 8.2E-I0 Product of (340) x (316) 
impact on hard 
surface 
335 Shield defects 5.1E-5 5.1E-4 5.1E-6 Sum of (338) + (341) 
exceed dal!1age 
limits 
336 Shield breakage 1.7E-17 3.9E-14 1.7E-21 Product of (342) x [343) 
on hard ground 
due to STS/meteor-
ite collision 
337 Shield breakage 2.7E-14 2.7E-ll 2.7E-18 Product of [344) x [345) 
on hard surface 
due to STS/debris 
collision 
338 Manufacturing 5.0E-5 5.0E-4 5.0E-6 See (103) 
defect undetected 
*Note: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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Fault Tree* 
Event No. 
340 
341 
342 
343 
344 
345 
346 
347 
348 
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TABLE G-3. PER K~~SION PROBABILITY EST~JLTES FOR PHASE 3 (Continued) 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Event 
Description 
Payload iopacts 
on hard surface 
Shield damage 
exceeds critical 
limit 
Payload reen:ry and 
impact on hard 
surface 
Expected 
Value 
2.0E-4 
1.0E-6 
1.0E-15 
Shield damage 1.7E-2 
exceeds critical 
limits 
Paylo~d reentry 1.6E-12 
and impact on 
hard surf3ce 
Shield defects 1.7E-2 
exceed critical 
damage limi ts 
Manufacturing ~.Og-5 
defect undetected 
Shield damage 1.7E-2 
from meteoritel 
payload collision, 
assuming STS colli-
sion 
Payload reent~y 4.9E-12 
due to STS/meteor-
ite collision 
90% Confidence 
Upper Lower 
2.0E-3 2.0E-5 
1.0E-5 1.0E-7 
9.8E-19 
Basis for Estimate 
(1/10 x 1150) x (1/10) -
2E-4 (probability of 
impacting land du:-1ng 
Phase 3) x (probability of 
impacting rock on land). 
Estimate - damage from STS 
critical failure not 
likely to damage payload 
in any significant way. 
Product of (348] x (349] 
1.7E-l 1.7E-3 Sum of [346] + (347] 
1.6E-I0 1.6E-15 Product of (350] x (351] 
1.7E-1 1.7E-3 Sum of (352] + (353] 
5.0E-4 5.0E-6 Same as (338] and (352J. 
see (103] 
1.7E-1 1.7E-3 Area ratio O! payloa,' (2 
spheres) to an average 
Orbiter cross-section 
(4.24 m2/250 m2). 
4.9E-10 4.7E-14 Same as [324), see (324) 
*Note: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.Z • 
.---.... 
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TABLE G-3. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 3 (Continued) 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Event 
Description 
Payloa"d impacts 
on hard surface 
STS/space debris 
collision 
Payload impacts 
on hard surface 
Expected 
Value 
2.0E-4 
7.9E-9 
2.0E-4 
Manufacturing 5.0E-5 
defect undetected 
Shield damage from 1.7E-2 
debris/payload 
collision, assuming 
STS collision 
Payload impacts on 0.998 
water 
Detection at sea 1.0E-0 
successful 
Recovery attempts 1.0E-5 
at sea unsuccessful 
Payload impacts on 8.0E-5 
wet so11 
90% Confidence 
Upper Lower 
2.0E-3 2.0E-5 
7.9E-8 7.9E-11 
2.0E-3 2.0E-5 
5.0E-4 5.0E-6 
1.7E-l 1.7E-3 
0.98 0.9998 
1.0E-0 1.0E-0 
1.0E-3 1.0E-6 
8.0E-4 8.0E-6 
Basis for Estimate 
Same as (340) and (351), 
see [3401 
Same as [3231, see (323) 
Same as [340} and [349}, 
see [340) 
Same as (338) and [3461, 
see (103) 
See [347} 
Complement of land impact, 
see (340) 
1 - (328) :: 
Estimate - based on discus-
sion with Art Coyle, O~~I, 
and William rope, BCL. 
(1/10 x 1/50) x (1/50) x 
(2) (see [3401 x (fresh 
water) x 2. Assuming that 
wet soils are approximated 
by two times fresh water. 
Fresh water data from U.S. 
AEC, 1974a. 
---------------------
*Note: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-4. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PI~SE 4 
---------_. -------------_. _. ---_. __ .-.. -----
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Fault Tree. Event Expected 90% Confidence 
Event No. Description Value Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
400 Release to the 9.6£-9 1.2£-6 1.9E-I0 SUO of [401) + [402) + 
biosphere (403) + (404) + (405) 
401 Release in soil 4.3£-10 1.8E-8 8.8£-12 Product of [406) x (413) 
resulting from long-
term corrosion in I wet soil I 
Release in sea water 8.6E-9 1.2E-6 1.7£-10 Product of [407) x (408) ! \, 
resulting from long- I 402 
term corrosion I 
Radiation shield 5.6E-I0 2.2£-8 1.1£-11 Sum of (433) + (436) + I 
breakage at r,round [437) I, 403 
impact 
404 Ra";lation shield 1.1£-12 4.6£-11 4.8E-16 Sum of (411) + (412) 
melting . ,
I 
Rad!3tion shield 7.7E-13 8.8E-12 7.7E-15 Sum of (431) + (432) I' breakage at alti- , 
, I 
tude with reentry I STS breakup and 4.3£-6 1.8£-5 8.8£-7 Product of [457) x (416) i 
payload impacts on ! 
405 
406 
wet so11 
407 STS hre3kup and 4.3E-4 1.0E-3 1.5£-4 Product of [416) x (454) 
paylond iClpacts 
on water 
408 Recovery at sea 2.0£-5 1.2£-3 1.1 £-6 Suo of [428} + 1429} 
fails 
411 STS bre:tkup and 1.1£-14 2.2E-12 4.4E-17 Product of [427} x (416) . i 
payload impacts 
active volcano 
!' Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-4. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PP~E 4 (Continued) 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Event 
Description 
Internal melt 
Recovery fa11s 
because detection 
activities fail to 
locate 
All six on-board 
transmitters fail 
before detection 
Expected 
Value 
1.IE-12 
1.0E-4 
1.0E-3 
Additional activi- 1.0E-2 
ties fail to locate 
in ocean 
STS breakup at 5.4E-4 
altitude 
STS breakup and 1.IE-14 
payload impacts 
active volcano 
STS breakup and 1.IE-I0 
payload impacts 
on so11 with k 
less than klimit 
Recovery fails 1.0E-2 
within critical 
time· Tcr 
STS/space debris 4.5E-8 
collision 
Payload reentry due 2.5E-l1 
to STS/meteorite 
colUs ion 
90% Confidence 
Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
4.4E-ll 4.4E-16 Product of (420) x (421) 
1.0E-3 1.0E-5 
1.0E-2 1.0E-4 
Estimate - based on ability 
to track from space and 
take time to find. 
See (206) 
2.0E-2 1.0E-3 Estimate - based on dis-
cussing with Art Coyle, 
ONWI. 
1.1E-3 2.2E-4 Sum of (423) + (424) + 
(425) 
2.2E-12 4.4E-17 See (411) 
2.2E-9 4.4E-13 Product of (416) x (430) 
2.0E-2 1.0E-3 Estimate 
4.5E-7 
2.5E-9 
4.5E-I0 See (350), but with 2216 
s replacing 394 s. 
2.5E-13 See (348), but with 2216 
o replacing 394 5. 
-------'1ote: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-4. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 4 (Continued) 
Per Mission Event Pr~babilities 
Fault Tree'" Event Expected 90% Confidence 
Event No. Description Value Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
425 Critical STS flystem 5.4E-4 1.lE-3 2.2E-4 Derived from Wiggins data 
failure (J. B. Baeker, 1981) for 
LRB replacing SRB. 
427 Payload impacts 2.0E-11 2.0E-9 2.0E-13 See (327); but replacing 
active volcano (1/50 x 1/10) by 
49/50 x 1/5). 
----
428 Detection of pay- 1.0E-5 2.0E-4 1.0E-7 Product of (414) x (415) 
load fails at sea 
429 Detection success- 1.0E-5 1.0E-3 1.0E-6 Product of (455) x (456) 
ful and recovery 
attempts fail 
430 Payload impacts on 2.0E-7 2.0E-6 2.0E-9 (49/50 x 1/5) x (E-6) • 
soil with k less 2E-7, see (340); E-6 is 
than klimit estimate. 
431 Payload/meteorite 1.2E-14 1.2E-12 1.2E-16 1.78E-10 per year x 
catastrophic col- (2216/3600 x 24 x 365) 
lision " (from Friedlander, SAl). 
432 Payload/debris 7.6£-13 7.6£-12 7.6£-15 Multi~ly (423) x 
catastrophic 4.24m /250m2 and 
collision divide by 1000, see [ 332). 
433 Shield breakage 5.5E-10 2.2E-8 1.1E-11 Product of (434) x (435) 
on hard surface 
due to STS failure 
434 Payload reentry 1.1E-5 4.4E-5 2.2E-6 Product of (440) x (416) 
and impact on 
hard surface 
435 Shield defects 5.0E-5 5.0E-4 5.0E-6 Sum of (438) + [441] 
exceed damage 
limits 
---.. 
:ote: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. , 
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TABLE G-4.- PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 4 (Continued) 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Fault Tree* Event Expected 901. Confidence 
Event No. Description Value Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
436 Shield breakage 8.SE-IS I.7E-ll 4.ZE-I8 Pro~uct of (442) x (443) 
on hard ground 
due to STS/meteor-
ite collision 
437 Shield breakage I.SE-ll 3.IE-IO 7.6E-IS Product of (444) x (445) 
on hard surface 
due to STS/debris 
collision 
-- 438 Manufacturing S.OE-S S.OE-4 S.OE-o See (103) 
defect undetected-
440 Payload impacts on Z.OE-Z 4.0E-Z 1.OE-Z (1/5 x 49/50) x (1/10) • 
hard surface (1/50) (probability of 
impacting land during 
Phase 4) x (probability of 
impacting rock on land). 
441 Shield damage S.OE-7 S.OE-6 S.OE-8 Estimate - half the value 
exceeds critical of (341) because fewer 
limit propellants available. 
442 Payload reentry S.OE-13 1.0E-10 2.SE-lS Product of (448) x (449) 
and impact on 
hard surface 
443 Shield damnr,e 1.7E-Z 1.7E-l 1.7E-3 Sum of (446) + (447) 
exceeds critical 
limit 
444 Payload reentry 9.0E-10 1.81':-9 4.5E-12 Product of (450) x (451) 
and impact on 
hard surface 
445 Shield defects 1.7E-2 1.7E-l I.7E-3 Sum of (452) + (453) 
exceed critical 
damage limits 
~'Iote: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-4. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 4 (Continued) 
Per Hission Event Probabilities 
Fault Tree'-' Event Expected 90% Confidence 
Event No. Description Value Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
446 Manufacturing 5.0E-5 5.0E-4 5.0E-6 See [ 103) 
defect undetected 
447 Shield damage from 1.7E-2 1.7E-l 1.7E-3 See [347) 
meteorite/payload 
collision, assuming 
STS collision 
448 Payload reentry 2.5E-11 2.5E-9 2.5E-13 See [424) 
due to STS/meteor-
ite collision 
-r 
449 Payload impacts 2.0E-2 4.0E-2 1.0E-2 See [440) 
on hard surface 
450 STS/space debris 4.5E-8 4.5E-7 4.5E-10 See [423) 
collision 
-
. ,-
451 Payload impacts 2.0E-2 4.0E-2 1.0E-2 See [440) 
on hard surface 
452 Manufacturing 5.0E-5 5.0E-4 5.0E-6 See [ 103] 
defect undetected 
453 Shield damage 1.7E-2 1.7E-l 1.7E-3 See [347) 
from debris/ 
payload collision, ~ 
assuming STS coll1-
sian 
454 Payload impacts on 0.8 0.9 0.7 4/5 chance of hitting water 
water :!:. 20%. 
455 Detection at sea 1.0E-0 1.0E-0 1.0E-0 1 - [428) : 1 
successful 
456 Recovery attempts 1.0E-5 1.0E-3 1.0E-6 Estimate - based on discus-
at sea unsuccessful sions ~~th Art Coyle, O~VI. 
*Note: Refer to fault treeG, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-4. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR P!LASE 4 (Continued) 
------------------------------------.---------.---.-----------------------~------.---------------
Fault Tree* 
Event No. 
457 
Event 
Description 
Payload impacts on 
wet 8011 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Expected 
Value 
8.0E-3 
90% Confidence 
Upper Lower 
1.6£-2 4.0£-3 
Basis for Estimate 
1/5 chance of hitting land 
on nnminal track, with 
1/25 chance of hitting wet 
8011 - 8ee [357). 
-------------------------------------
*Note: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-5. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 5 , , 
/ 
-------
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Fault Tree* Event Expected 90% Confidence 
Event No. Description Value Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
500 Release to the 3.7E-10 7.5E-9 3.4£-13 Sum of [501 + (502) + 
biosphere (503) + (504) + [505) 
501 Release in soil 8.5E-14 3.6E-12 1.4E-18 Product of (506) x (507) 
rl!sul ting from 
long-term corrosion 
in wet soil 
502 Release in sea-water 1.0E-11 2.8E-9 4.5E-16 Product of (508) x [509) 
resulting from long-
~ term corrosion , 
503 Radiation shield 3.5£-10 4.6E-9 2.3E-13 Sum of (510) + (511) + 
breakage at ground (512) 
impact 
504 Radiation shield 1.9E-15 1.6E-13 1.7E-21 Sum of (514) + [513] 
melting 
505 Radiation shield l.1E-11· 1.3E-10 1.1E-13 Sum of [515) + [516) 
breakage on orbit 
with reentry 
506 Reentry and pay- 8.5E-9 1.8£-7 1.4£-12 Product of [517] x [558] 
load impacts on 
wet so11 
507 Recovery fails 1.0E-5 2.0£-5 1.0£-6 Estimate - have much more 
because detection time to prepare for even-
activities fall to tunl reentry. 
lor.ate 
508 Reentry and pay- 5.2E-7 2.3E-6 4.1£-10 Product of [517] x (518) 
load impacts on 
water 
509 Recovery fails 2.0E-5 1.2E-3 1.lE-6 Sum of [555] + (528) 
*Note: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
~ 
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Fault Tree* 
Event No. 
510 
511 
512 
513 
514 
515 
516 
517 
51B 
520 
521 
I • .!IJ. 
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TABLE G-5. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 5 (Continued) 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Event 
Description 
Shield breakage 
on hard surface 
due to STS failure 
Shield breakage 
on hard ground 
due to meteoroid/ 
payload collision 
Shield breakage 
on hard ground 
due to debris/ 
payload collision 
Expected 
Value 
2.BE-12 
2.2E-13 
3.5E-I0 
Internal melt 1.9E-15 
External melt 2.0E-17 
Payload/meteoroid I.BE-13 
catastrophic colli-
sion 
Payload/debris 1.IE-ll 
catastrophic 
collision 
Payload reentry 7.1E-7 
Payload impacts 7.3E-l 
on water 
Payload reentry 2.3E-B 
and lopact on 
hard surface 
Shield defects 1.2E-4 
exceed daMage 
limits 
90% Confidence 
Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
1.4E-I0 6.BE-17 Product of [520) x [521) 
2.SE-Il 1.4E-I7 Product of [523) x [522) 
4.4E-9 2.2E-13 Product of [524) x [525) 
1.6E-13 1.6E-21 Product of [544) x [526) 
B.7E-15 1.7E-22 Same as [527) 
I.BE-l1 I.BE-15 1.7BE-I0 per year x 
[32,290/(3600 x 24 x 365»). 
1.IE-I0 1.IE-13 BE-IS cm-2 s-1 x 42, 
400 cm2 x 32,290 s x 
(1/1000), see [332). 
3.0E-6 5.BE-I0 Product of [532) x [531) 
7.6E-l 7.0E-l For 3B-degree inclination 
orbit randoo reentry, 
from U.S. AEC, 1974a. 
1.2E-7 1.2E-ll Product of (517) x [534) 
1.2E-3 5.7E-6 Sum of [535) + [536) 
*Note: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-5. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 5 (Continued) 
Per Mission 
Fault Tree* Event Expected 
Event No. Description Value 
522 Payload reent.ry 2.2E-13 
and impact on 
hard surface 
523 Shield defects 1.0E-0 
exceed critical 
damage limits 
524 Payload reentry 3.5E-I0 
and impact on 
--
hard surface 
: 
525 Shield defects 1.0EO 
exceed damage 
limits 
526 Payload reentry 1.9E-13 
and impact on 
soil with k less 
than klimit 
527 Payload reentry 2.0E-17 
and payload impacts 
active volcano 
528 Detection success- 1.0E-5 
ful and recovery 
attempts fail 
529 Detection 1.0E-O 
successful 
530 Recovery attempts 1.OE-S 
at sea unsuccess-
ful 
531 Rescue failure 1.OE-4 
*Note: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2 • 
...--... 
Event Probabilities 
907. Confidence 
Upper Lower 
2.8E-ll 1.4E-15 
1.0E-0 1.0E-2 
4.4E-9 2.2E-ll 
1.0EO 1.0E-2 
8.1E-12 1.6E-18 
8.7E-15 1.7E-22 
1.0E-3 1.0E-6 
1.0E-0 1.0E-0 
1.OE-3 1.OE-6 
2.0E-4 1.OE-7 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
Basis for Estimate 
Product of (537) x (538) 
SlUlI of (539) + (540) 
Product of (541) x (542) 
SlUlI of (561) + (560) 
Product of (543) x (517) 
Product of (517) x (545) 
Product of (529) x (530) 
1 - (555) : 1 
See (456) 
Estimate 
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TABLE G-5. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 5 (Continued) 
Fault Tree* Event 
Event No. Description 
532 Loss of control 
on STS system 
supported by pay-
load 
534 Payload impacts 
on hard surface 
535 Manufacturing 
defect undetected 
536 Shield damage from 
system failure 
event exceeds cri-
tical limit 
537 
538 
539 
540 
541 
Payload reentry 
to meteoroidl 
payload collision 
Payload impacts 
on hard surface 
Manufacturing 
defect undetected 
Shield damage 
from collision 
with meteoroid 
exceeds critical 
limit 
Payload reentry 
due to debrisl 
payload collision 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Expected 
Value 
7.1E-3 
3.2E-2 
5.0E-5 
7.0E-5 
90% Confidence 
Upper Lower 
1.5E-2 2.9E-3 
4.0E-2 2.0E-2 
5.0E-4 5.0E-6 
7.0E-4 7.0E-7 
Basis for Esti~ate 
Sum of (547) + (548) + 
(549) + (550) + (551) 
+ (552) 
From U.S. AEC, 1974a, 
Overall Safety Manual, 
38-degree orbit random 
reentry 
See (103) 
1% of Orbiter failures, 
see [550). 
6.9E-12 6.9E-10 6.9E-14 6.7E-9 collisions 
3.2E-2 4.0E-2 
5.0E-5 5.0E-4 
1.0E-0 1.0E-O 
1.lE-8 I.1E-7 
2.0E-2 
5.0E-6 
1.OE-2 
1.IE-9 
per year for an area of 
4.24 m2 x 32,290 s 
divided by seconds in a 
year. 
See [534) 
See (103) 
Estimate 
8E-I8 cm-2 5-1 x 
42,400 cm2 x 32,290 
s - 1.IE-8 (see (323). 
~,te: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-5. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 5 (Continued) 
Event 
Description 
Payload impacts 
on hard surface 
Payload impacts 
on soil with k less 
than kl1mit 
Recovery fails 
within critical 
time - Tcr 
Payload impacts 
ac.; 've volcano 
Debris collision 
Meteoroid collision 
oTV/sors failure 
Orbiter failure 
Do eking collision 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Expected 
Value 
3.2E-2 
2.7E-7 
1.0E-2 
2.9E-11 
3.0E-7 
1.9E-10 
1.0E-7 
7.1E-3 
1.0E-6 
90% Confidence 
Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
4.0E-2 
2.7E-6 
2.0E-2 
2.9E-9 
3.0E-6 
1.9E-8 
1.0E-6 
1.5E-2 
1.0E-4 
2.0E-2 
2.7E-9 
1.0£-3 
See [534] 
For 38-degree inclination 
orbit, random reentry prob-
ability of land impact 
is 0.267. Probability of 
exceeding klimit is 
estimated at 1.0E-6. 
Estimate (see 421) 
2.9E-13 (1 km2jO.267 x 
5.1E-8 km2) x (1/100) x 
(lIS) x (2), see (327]. 
3.0E-8 8E-18 cm-2 s-l x 
1,170,000 cm2 x 32,290 
s • 3.0E-7, debris rate 
from BCL's Reynolds. 
1.9E-12 Based on A. Friedlander's 
(SAl) data of 1.85E-7 
coll~sion per year times 
32,290 s divided by 
seconds in a year. 
1.0E-8 
2.9E-3 
1.0E-8 
0.999999 .. E-6; put in 
10% here, rest in OTV 
flight phase. 
From Wiggins data (J. 
Hudson. 1979). 
Estimate 
"'Note: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-5. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 5 (Continued) 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Fault Tree* Event Expected 90% Confidence 
Event No. Description Value Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
552 Docking system 1.0E-6 1.0E-7 1.0E-8 Esticate 
will not release 
555 Detection fa Us 1.0E-5 2.0E-4 1.0E-7 Product of (556) + (557) 
556 All six trans- 1.0E-3 1.0E-2 1.0E-4 See (206) 
mUters fail 
before detection 
557 Additional detec- 1.0E-2 2.0E-2 1.0E-3 See [415 ) 
tion activities 
fail to locate in 
---
ocean 
558 Payload impacts 1.2E-2 6.0E-2 2.4E-3 Fresh water x 2, for 
on wet so11 random reentry 38-degrees 
(U.S. AEC, 1974a). 
560 Manufacturing 5.0E-5 5.0E-4 5.0E-6 See (535) 
defects undetected 
561 Shield damage 1.0EO 1.0EO 1.0E-2 Some damage may occur 
from debris! due to debris impact -
payload collision assume worst case for 
exceeds critical expected value. 
limit 
*Note: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-6. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATeS FOR PHASE 6 
Fault Tree* Event 
Event No. Description 
600 Release to the 
biosphere 
601 Release to sol1 
resulting from 
long-term corrosion 
in wet so11 
602 Rele3se in sea 
water resulting 
from long-term 
corrosion 
~603 Shield breakage 
on hard surface 
due to oTV/sors 
failure 
604 Radiation shield 
melting 
605 
606 
607 
608 
Radiation shield 
breakage on orbit 
with eventual 
reentry (long-
term) 
Reentry and pay-
load iopacts on 
wet so11 
Recovery fails 
because detec-
tion activities 
fail to locate 
Reentry and pay-
load impacts on 
water 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Expected 
Value 
3.3E-9 
1.0E-14 
1.3E-13 
3.3E-9 
2.3E-17 
2.SE'-12 
1.0E-10 
1.0E-4 
6.3E-9 
90% Confidence 
Upper Lower 
1.3E-7 1.5E-11 
2.0E-12 2.1E-18 
1.6E-10 6.6E-17 
1.3E-7 1.SE-ll 
9.2E-15 2.3~-22 
Hasis for Estimate 
Sum of [601) + [602) + 
(603) + [604) + [605) 
Product of [606J x (607) 
Product of (608) x (609) 
Sum of [610) + (611) + 
(612) + [6i3) + [614) + 
(615) 
Sum of (616) + (617) 
. l.SE-I0 2.5E-13 Sum of [618) + [619) 
1.0E-8 
2.0£-4 
1.3E-7 
2.1E-13 Product of [620] x [621] 
1.0E-5 Estimate - have less 
ti~e in so~e failure 
moaes than in [507) 
6.0E-l1 Product of (622) x (623) 
*Note: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-6. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 6 (Continued) 
Event 
Description 
Recovery fails 
High-velocity 
shield breakage 
on soil due to 
OTV/sOIS failure 
High-velocity 
breakage on water 
due to OTV/sOIS 
failure 
Hieh-veloc1ty 
surface breakage 
on hard surface 
due tc OIV/sOIS 
Shield breakage 
on hard surface 
due to OTV/sOIS 
failure 
Shield breakage 
on hard surface 
due to oeteoroid 
payload collision 
Shield breakage on 
hard surface due 
to debrislpayload 
collision 
Internal melt 
External melt 
Payload/meteoroid 
catastrophic 
collision 
Per Mission Event Probnbilities 
Expected 
Value 
2.0E-5 
2.1E-9 
6.3E-I0 
4.8E-I0 
1.4E-14 
1.3E-14 
8.0E-ll 
2.3E-17 
1.7E-19 
1.1E-14 
90% Confidence 
Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
1.2E-3 1.IE-6 Su= of (624) + (625) 
9.5E-8 6.0E-12 Product of (626) x (627) 
2.1E-8 3.0E-12 Product of (629) x (628) 
1.3E-8 5.7E-12 Product of (630) x [631} 
3.2E-12 1.lE-17 Product of (632) x (633) 
1.5E-12 I.OE-17 Product of (634) x (635) 
9.5E-10 6.SE-14 Product of (636) x (637) 
9.2E-15 2.3E-22 Product of (638) x (639) 
3.4E-16 1.7E-23 Same as [640} 
1.1E-12 1.1E-16 (515) x (1902/32,290) 
*Note: Refer to fault trec~. Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-6~ PERMISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 6 (Continued) 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Fault Tree* Event Expected 90% Confidence 
Event No. Description Value Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
619 Payload/debris 2.5E-12 2.5E-I0 2.5E-13 (676) x (4.24 / 117) x 
catastrophic (1/1000) 
collision 
620 Payload impacts 1.2E-2 6.0E-2 2.4E-3 See (558) 
on wet soil 
621 Payload reentry 8.6E-9 1.7E-7 8.6E-ll Product of (641) x (642) 
at less than 
f' critical speed for 
wet soil . 
, 
622 Payload reentry 8.6E-9 1.7E-7 8.6E-ll Product of (641) x (643) 
at less than 
critical speed for 
water 
623 Payload impacts 7.3E-l 7.6E-l 7.0E-l 0.73 from U.S. AEC, 1974a (, 
on water Overall Safety Hanual for 
38-degree orbit, random 
reentry. 
624 Detection of 1.0E-5 2.0E-4 1.0E-7 Product of (684) x (685) 
payload fails 
at sea 
625 Detection success- 1.0E-5 1.0E-3 1.0E-6 Product of (672) x (673) 
ful and recovery 
attempts fail 
626 Payload impacts 2.4E-l 3.4E-l 1.4E-l Soil impact probability 
on any soil for 38-degree inclination 
orbit from U.S. AEC, 1974a. 
627 Payload reent ry 8.6E-9 2.8E-7 4.3E-ll Product of (647) x (648) x / , 
and impact speed (649) 
exceeds critical 
speed for soil 
·"'-"'Uote: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-6. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 6 (Continued) , 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Fault Tree* Event Expected 90X Confidence 
Event No. Description Value Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
628 Payload impacts 7.3E-l 7.6E-l 7.0E-l See (623) 
on water 
629 Payload reeentry 8.6E-IO 2.8E-8 4.3E-12 Product of (650) x (651) x 
and impact exceeds (652) 
critical speed for 
water 
,--- 630 Payload impactE 3.2E-2 3.8E-2 2.6E-2 See (542) 
on hard surface ...-' 
.-"'" 
631 Payload reel;try 1.5E-8 3.4E-7 2.2E-I0 Product of (653) x (654) x 
and impact speed (655) 
exceeds critical 
speed 
632 Payload reentry 2.8E-I0 6.5E-9 2.2E-12 Product of (656) x (657) ¥ 
and impact on 
hard surface 
633 Shield defects 5.0E-5 5.0E-4 5.0E-6 Sum of (658) + (659) 
exceed damage 
limits 
634 Payload reentry 1.3E-14 1.5E-I? 1.0E-16 Product of (660) x (661) 
and impact on 
hard surface 
635 Shield defects 1.0EO 1.0EO 1.0E-l Sum of [663] + [662] 
exceed critical 
damage limits 
636 Payload reentry 8.0E-ll 9.5E-IO 6.5E-12 Product of [664] x [665] 
and impacts on 
hard surface 
637 Shield defects I.OEO 1.0EO I.OE-2 Sum of [667] + (666) 
exceed critical 
damage limits 
,---, 
*Note: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-6. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 6 (Continued) 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Fault Tree* Event Expected 90% Confidence 
Event No. Description Value Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
638 Payload reentry 2.3E-15 4.6E-13 2.3E-19 Product of (644) x (645) 
and impacts on 
soil with k less 
than klimit 
639 Recovery fails 1.0E-2 2.0E-2 1.0E-3 Estimate (see (421) 
within critical 
time • Tcr 
r-, 640 Payload reentry 1.7E-19 3.4E-16 1.7E-23 Product of (641) x (646) 
and impacts 
active volcano 
641 Payload reentry 8.6E-9 1.7E-7 8.6E-11 Product of [67C) x (671) 
642 Impact speed less 1.0EO 1.0EO 1.0EO Estimate for nominal 
than critical speed reentries (decaying type) 
for wet so11 
643 Impact speed less 1.0EO 1.0EO 1.0EO Estimate for nominal 
than critical speed reentries (decaying type) 
for water 
644 Payload reentry at 8.6E-9 1.7E-7 8.6E-l1 Product of (641) x (674) 
less than critical 
speed for soil 
645 Payload impacts 2.7E-7 2.7E-6 2.7E-9 See (543) 
soil with k less 
than klimit 
646 Payload impacts 2.0E-Il 2.0E-9 2.0E-I3 See (545) 
active volcano 
647 Critical failure 8.6E-7 8.6E-6 8.6E-8 0.999999 ~ E-6, put 86~ 
on OTV/SOIS system of it here, 41. in Phase 7, 
10% in Phase 5 (per Boeing 
recommendation) 
-----'Note: Refer to faul~ trees, Section 5.2. 
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TABLE G-6~ PER MISSIOli PROBABILITY ESTllfATES FOR PHASE 6 (Continued) 
/' 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Fault Tree* Event Expected 90% Confidence 
Event No. Description Value Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
648 Failure time 5.0E-1 8.0E-1 1.0E-1 Estimate 
exceeds that needed 
to get critical 
speed for soil 
649 Elliptical traj ec- 2.0E-2 4.0E-2 5.0E-3 Estimate 
tory within limits 
for direct reentry .' 
~ 650 Critical failure 8.6E-7 8.6E-6 8.6E-8 See [647) 
on OTV/SOIS system 
651 Failure time 5.0E-2 8.0E-2 1.0E-2 [648) (10). estimate. .. :: . 
exceeds that needed 
to get critical 
speed for water 
652 Elliptical trajec- 2.0E-2 . 4.0E-2 5.0E-3 See [649] 
tory within limits 
for direct reentry ;. 
653 Critical failure on 8.6E-7 8.6E-6 8.6E-8 See [647) 
OTV/SOIS system 
654 Failure time 9.0E-1 1.0E-0 5.0E-1 Estimate 
exceeds that needed 
to get critical 
speed on hard surface 
-" 
655 Elliptical trajec- 2.0E-2 4.0E-2 5.0E-3 See (649) 
tory within liDits 
for direct reentry 
656 Payload reentry at 8.6E-9 1.7E-7 8.6E-II Product of [668) x [641) 
less than critical 
speed for hard surface 
657 Payload impacts on 3.2E-2 3.8E-2 2.6E-2 See [542) 
hard surface 
r--
*Note: Refer to fault trees. Section 5.2. ~~ 
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Fault Tree'" 
Event No. 
667 
668 
669 
670 
671 
672 
673 
674 
676 
677 
" 
C-3l 
! I 
,i. 
I 
TABLE G-6. PER MISSION PROBADILITY ESTIMATES FOR PHASE 6 (Continued) 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Event 
Des;:ription 
Expected 
Value 
Shield damage from 1.0EO 
debris/payload col-
lision exceeds 
critical limit 
Impact speed less 1.0EO 
than critical speed 
for hard surface 
Payload reentry due 4.0E-13 
to meteoroid/payload 
collision 
Rescue failure 8.6E-7 
OTV/SOIS system 1.0E-2 
failure 
Detection successful 1.0EO 
Recovery attempts 1.0E-5 
fail 
Impact speed less 
than criti~al speed 
for so11 
Debris/collision 
(with configura-
tion) 
Meteoroid colli-
sion (with config-
uration) 
1.0EO 
7.0E-8 
1.lE-l1 
90% Confidence 
Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
1.0EO 
1.0EO 
4.0E-l1 
8.6E-6 
2.0E-2 
1.0EO 
1.0E-3 
1.0EO 
7.0E-7 
1.1E-9 
1.0E-2 
1.0EO 
4.0E-15 
8.6E-8 
1.0E-3 
1.0EO 
1.0E-6 
See (561) 
Expected for nominal 
reentry 
[677) x (4.24/117) 
Estimate - based on 6 
trys at 0.94 chance of 
success; however, must 
not excep.d [647). 
Sum of [676) + (677) + 
[678) 
1 - [624) :: 1 
Estimate see [456) 
1.0EO Estimate - see [642) 
7.0E-9 Integrated through debris 
belt based upon configura-
tion area of 117 mZ 
(AI Friedlander, SAl) 
1.1E-13 6.7E-9 per yr x [1902/ 
(365 x 24 x 3600») x 
[ 117/4.24) 
*l;ote: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
~ 
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G-32 
TABLE G-6. PER MISSION PROBABILITY ESTtKATES FOR PHASE 6 (Continued) 
Per Mission Event Probabilities 
Fault Tree* Event Expected 90% Confidence 
Event NtJ. Description Value Upper Lower Basis for Estimate 
678 OTV/SOIS failure 1.0E-2 2.0E-2 1.0E-3 Based on 0.98 delivery 
reliability taken during 
the 1902-s period (Boeing 
reliability number) 
684 All six on-board 1.0E-3 1.0E-2 1.0E-4 See (206) 
transmitters fail 
before detection 
685 Additional detec- 1.0E-2 2.0E-2 1.0::-3 Estimate, see (415) 
tion activities 
,---- fail to locate in ocean 
*Note: Refer to fault trees, Section 5.2. 
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APPENDIX H 
COMPUTER PLOTS OF PAYLOAD/GRANITE IMPACT RESPONSE 
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H-l 
APPElIDrx H 
COMPUTER PLOTS OF PAYLOAD/GRANITE IMPACT RE3PONSE 
The plots (Figure H-1 through H-16) show the DYNA2D-generated von 
Mises stress (equivalent stress) and the hoop stress (stress perpendicular to 
the plane of the model) for' 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 1.0 ms after the impact 
process starts (nuclear waste payload impacting granite). Refer to Section 
5.4.3.2 of the report for technical discussion. 
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FIGURE n-l. CONTOURS OF VON HISES STRESS AFl'ER 0.25 ms 
OF IMPACT (442 m/s IMPACT VELOCITY) 
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FIGURE H-2. CONTOURS OF VON MISES STRESS AFTER 0.50 ms 
OF IHPACT (442 m/s IMPACT VELOCITY) 
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FIGURE 11-3. CONTOURS OF VON MISES STRESS AFTER 0.75 IDS 
OF IMPACT (442 m/s IMPACT VELOCITY) 
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FIGURE H-4. CONTOURS OF VON MISES STRESS AFTER 1.0 ms 
OF IMPACT (442 m/s U1PACT VELOCITY) 
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FIGURE H-7. CONTOURS OF HOOP STRESS AFTER 0.75 ms 
OF IMPACT (442 m/s IMPACT VELOCITY) 
.' 
, 
i 
I 
, I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
1 
i 
l 
; 
I 
I 
! 
I 
t 
. I 
j 
I 
1 
I 
! 
·1 
r 
; 
. i 
, 
; 
,. 
+ 
~ 
+ 
~ 
Q) 
[!] 
.001000 
SIGMA T 
[!] -800000.00 
C9 -700000.00 
~ -600000.00 
+ -500000.00 
X -400000.00 
~ -300000.00 
H-9 ORiGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
+ 0.00 
~ 300000.00 
Y 400000.00 
~ 500000.00 
* 600000.00 
* 
FIGURE II-B. CONTOURS OF HOOP STRESS AFTER 1 0 
OF IMPACT (442 mls IMPACT VELOciTY)S 
.' 
, I 
"1 
1 
I 
.~ 
I~ I j I I j '. -, I : 
11 
I j 
ii, I j'" 
, I 
! ; 
I ' I . 
: ! 
,( , 
lJ 
I I l I 
l .. · Ii 
'i ---r---I' 1 ~ , 
~ -I i I 
I 
, 1 
1 
I 
1 
~ 
l 
I 
1 , 
• , 
~ 
l 
:l 
I 
~ 
\ 
: 
, 
, 
i 
~ i 
, \ 
1 
./ 
'I 
f 
J r' 
(!) 
~ 
+ 
H-IO Cr:'G~~'" L pt.'3E IS • ,,' h't"\ OF POOR QUALlTY 
.000250 
SIGMA' EO' 
[!] 30000.00 X 300000.00 
(!) 50000.00 ¢ 400000.00 
~ 100000.00 + 500000.00 
+ 20COOO.00 ::x: 6COOOO.OC 
FIGURE H-9. CONTOURS OF VON HISES STRESS AFTER 0.25 ms 
OF IMPACT (152 m/s IMPACT VELOCITY) 
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FIGURE H-10. cmrroURS OF VON MISES STRESS AFTER 0.50 ms 
OF IMPACT (152 m/s IMPACT VELOCITY) 
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FIGURE H-11. CONTOURS OF VON mSES STRESS AFTER 0.75 ms 
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CONTOURS OF VON MISES STRESS AFTER 1.0 ms 
OF IMPACT (152 m/s IHPACT VELOCITY) 
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FIGURE H-13. COlITOURS OF HOOP STRESS AFTER 0.25 ms 
OF IMPACT (152 m/s IMPACT VELOCITY) 
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FIGURE H-14. COUTOURS OF HOOP STRESS AFTER 0.50 ms 
OF IMPACT (152 mls IMPACT VELOCITY) 
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FIGURE H-15. CONTOURS OF HOOP STRESS AFTER 0.75 ms 
OF UiPACT (152 m/s IMPACT VELOCITY) 
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FIGURE H-16. CONTOURS OF HOOP STRESS AFTER 1.0 ms 
OF IMPACT (152 mls IMPACT VELOCITY) 
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